

THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY ASSESSMENT MONTHLY REPORT

Sea Guardian SG Ltd.

231, 28th October
Str. Limassol, CYPRUS
(+357) 25 35 1125

rep. office: (+30) 210 970 3322
www.sguardian.com

MONTHLY THREAT / RISK ASSESSMENT

Brief Update No 14/2026 • 30 October 2026


Reporting period 29 September – 30 October 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

- This document has been approved for distribution by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd / Intelligence & Analysis Department. The provided Information and Intelligence derives from open sources, the Institute for the Study of War (ISW), the Joint Maritime Information Center (JMIC) and the United Kingdom Maritime Trade Operations (UKMTO) respective Web Pages. Additional products retrofit the company's Strategic/Operational and Security situational awareness process for threat and risk assessment impacting Maritime Security in multiple areas. All rights reserved, "no part of this risk assessment may be reproduced in any form (electronic, mechanical, paper, or other means) without written permission by SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd, which maintains the rights for personal data of the document writers". Under no circumstances can SEA GUARDIAN S.G. Ltd be held responsible for any loss or damage caused by a reader's reliance on information obtained by this assessment, especially on its firms, company's management, or individual decision-making.

OBJECTIVES

- To provide the maritime industry and security stake or shareholders in a monthly cycle, with:



➢ **MAJOR MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENT SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS IN GEO-STRATEGIC FRAME FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY OF SHIPPING FOR THE PERIOD SEPTEMBER 29 – OCTOBER 30, 2026.**

➢ **ASSESSMENT UPDATES CONCERNING MILITARY OPERATIONS – TERRORISM – PIRACY AND CARGO THEFT, HIJACKING AND DETENTIONS, SMUGGLING, STOWAWAYS, SHIPS FIRED, CREW LOSSES AND CYBER-THREATS, COVERING A WIDE SPECTRUM OF THREATS/RISKS FROM MARITIME SECURITY TO NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY.**

➢ SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy, establishing synergy with a subject matter expert (SME) entity for Cyber-defense including the most important sectors of policy, methods and training to mitigate cyber threats and risks.

Important notes:

1. The Assessment is produced by the R&I team in a global approach covering **29** different maritime regions in total, offering to readers the opportunity to study it as a whole, or focusing on areas of interest through the context table.
2. You can navigate directly to:

[MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS] or [ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)]

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

For "KEY DEVELOPMENTS" of July prior to October 19, refer to:

- MONTHLY THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY ASSESSMENT (REPORT) 13/2026, September 29, 2026
- WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT (Bulletin), 13-1, October 07, 2026
- WEEKLY INTELLIGENCE ASSESSMENT (Bulletin), 13-2, October 17, 2026

October 17



Pyongyang



Kuwait, Tanzania

- **Pyongyang** - North Korea's reported hypersonic missile test could challenge US and allied defenses in the Indo-Pacific. China may view these advances as a strategic advantage in a potential Taiwan conflict by diverting US military resources, though they could also intensify regional tensions and arms race. The North Korean missile capabilities remain unverified. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] [// [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]*
- **Kuwait, Tanzania** - Kuwaiti charities are providing humanitarian aid, education, housing, healthcare, and clean water in Benin, Tanzania through the "Kuwait Bejanbak" campaign. Projects include food and medical assistance, school construction, 275 houses, hospitals, clinics, water networks, and mosques, aiming to improve living conditions and promote sustainable development. [ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]

October 18



Addis Ababa



Strait of Hormuz



Caracas

- **Addis Ababa** - Ethiopia's pursuit of reliable maritime access could strengthen regional peace, security, and economic integration. Through peaceful diplomacy and regional cooperation, Ethiopia could help protect maritime trade, address shared security threats, and promote stability and prosperity in the Horn of Africa and the Red Sea region. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN]*
- **Strait of Hormuz** - Iran's IRGC Navy reportedly claimed that a second supertanker carrying over two million barrels of crude oil caught fire after striking a naval mine in the Strait of Hormuz while attempting to use an unauthorized route. The claim has not been independently verified. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM] // [REGION/AREA: PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA]*
- **Nigeria** - President Tinubu's inclusive campaign strategy, highlighting the involvement of opposition figures to strengthen national unity and political support. It also supports his decision not to campaign physically in all 36 states, arguing that campaign coordinators and grassroots structures can spread his message while he continues governing. The author concludes that electoral success should be based on achievements, reforms, and results rather than endless rallies and political noise. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*
- **Caracas** - Venezuela expects nearly $76 billion in oil and gas investments over the next five years, according to Acting President Delcy Rodríguez. The government has signed 61 agreements and is negotiating 44 more, with projects expected to create over 324,000 jobs. However, achieving higher oil production will depend on attracting investors, modernizing aging infrastructure, improving electricity supply, and implementing continued

industry reforms. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*

October 19

- **Namibia, Tanzania** - The Africa Policy Research Institute (APRI) and GIZ are examining how colonial legacies and power imbalances affect German development cooperation. A webinar featuring case studies on Tanzania and Namibia will explore historical influences on modern development partnerships and identify ways to promote fairer, more equal international cooperation. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*

October 20



Doha



Vienna, Syria

- **Doha -** Qatar's Shura Council Speaker Hassan bin Abdullah Al Ghanim met separately with the ambassadors of Panama and Malta and the acting US chargé d'affaires in Doha to discuss bilateral relations, parliamentary cooperation, and strategic partnerships. The meetings also addressed regional and international developments, emphasizing security, stability, and peaceful solutions to conflicts. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*
- **Vienna** - Syria reaffirmed its commitment to combating organized crime and drug smuggling at a UN conference in Vienna. Brig. Gen. Abdul Rahim Jabara highlighted plans to strengthen the national criminal justice system and expand cooperation with the UN and other countries through information sharing, expertise exchange, and improved security coordination. *[PIRACY / ORGANIZED CRIME / BOARDING CONDITIONS] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*

October 21



Brussels, EU



London, UK



Gaza

- **Brussels, EU** - The European Commission has introduced a new Arctic strategy to address growing geopolitical competition and access to natural resources. The plan focuses on protecting critical infrastructure, strengthening cooperation with Arctic NATO members, expanding icebreaker capabilities, and developing new transport and undersea cable connections between Greenland and Europe. [POLITICAL] // *[REGION/AREA: GLOBAL ISSUES]*
- **London, UK** - Around 63% of shipping capacity between the Far East and Europe has returned to the Red Sea after three years of diversions. Major carriers are resuming Suez Canal routes to reduce fuel costs and transit times, while some continue using the Cape of Good Hope to avoid potential security risks. However, the Houthis' threats and high fuel prices continue to influence shipping decisions. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES] // [REGION/AREA: RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN]*
- **Beirut** - Lebanon's State Security arrested two Lebanese nationals suspected of money laundering following instructions from the Public Prosecutor at the Court of Cassation. Preliminary investigations uncovered financial links between local and foreign companies, with one suspect allegedly managing fund transfers. The case was referred to the Financial Crimes Unit for further investigation and legal action. *[PIRACY / ORGANIZED CRIME / BOARDING CONDITIONS] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*

- **Gaza** - A new British Medical Journal report documents allegations of widespread sexual violence against Palestinians, including rape, torture and sexual humiliation. UN investigations have identified abuses that may constitute war crimes and crimes against humanity. The report highlights survivors' trauma, forced displacement and lack of accountability, calling for independent investigations and justice. *[HIJACKING / KIDNAPPING / LIFE LOSSES & SMALL ARMS FIRING] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*

October 22



Amman



Djibouti



Vilnius

- **Amman** - Jordan and Syria have reaffirmed their commitment to strengthening strategic ties and expanding cooperation in trade, investment, transport, water, and energy. Their foreign ministers also emphasized continued coordination to promote regional security and stability. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN]*
- **Djibouti** - China and Djibouti have called for safe and open shipping routes amid escalating Houthi attacks near the Bab al-Mandeb Strait and concerns over global oil supplies. China emphasized diplomacy but may consider naval escorts if threats to its ships and citizens increase. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES] // [REGION/AREA: RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN]*
- **Vilnius** - Lithuania stopped 31 migrants attempting to cross illegally from Belarus on 21 October, while Latvia turned back 27. Poland reported no irregular crossings on November, 20. Lithuania has prevented 1,726 crossings so far in 2026, compared with 1,652 for all of 2025, and more than 26,000 since the border crisis began in 2021. *[STOWAWAYS / ILLEGAL MIGRATION / PORT CRIMES / CARGO THEFTS] // [REGION/AREA: ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA - PACIFIC / NE ASIA]*

October 23



Jakarta



Kiev



Batumi

- **Jakarta** - Indonesian authorities seized 1.16 tonnes of ketamine from the tanker MT Global 168 off North Sumatra and arrested eight crew members, including seven Indonesians and one foreign national. The operation involved police, anti-narcotics officials, customs and water police following nearly a week of surveillance. *[PIRACY / ORGANIZED CRIME / BOARDING CONDITIONS] // [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]*
- **Kiev -** Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelensky said negotiators from Ukraine, the U.S., and Russia may meet in Abu Dhabi in early November, depending on Russia's willingness to participate. He also said a leaders' meeting could follow the technical talks, aimed at ending the war. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*
- **Batumi** - Kazakhstan and Georgia discussed strengthening their strategic partnership during a meeting between their foreign ministers in Batumi. Talks focused on trade, transport, economic cooperation, and cultural ties, with particular emphasis on developing the Trans-Caspian International Transport Route to improve connectivity between Central Asia, the South Caucasus, and European markets. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*

October 24



Tehran



Juneau

- **Tehran** - Iran has reportedly planned attacks on undersea internet cables in the Persian Gulf if U.S. and Israeli strikes resume. According to Reuters, the attacks could disrupt internet access, financial transactions, and cloud services across Gulf countries. Tehran is also considering targeting U.S.-linked data centers and technology infrastructure in the region. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM] // [REGION/AREA: PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA]*
- **China coasts** - China marks the 81st anniversary of Taiwan's recovery from Japanese rule on October 25, highlighting the island's return in 1945 after World War II. Beijing emphasizes historical ties and calls for national reunification, accusing Taiwan's ruling Democratic Progressive Party of distorting history and promoting separatism. However, Taiwan remains self-governed, and its political status continues to be disputed. *[NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL] // [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]*
- **Juneau** - The Trump administration has sued Alaska to block certification of its Senate election results if voter confusion arises from two Republican candidates with nearly identical names. The Justice Department argues that votes may be miscounted, while critics say the lawsuit lacks legal merit and threatens election integrity. The race between Republican Dan Sullivan and Democrat Mary Peltola could influence control of the U.S. Senate in the November 3 midterm elections. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA - PACIFIC / NE ASIA]*

October 25

- **Tripoli** - Libya's Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah told Egypt that his government was ready to address Cairo's concerns over maritime boundaries and economic waters. The dispute follows Libya's eastern parliament approving a maritime agreement with Turkey, rejected by Egypt as legally invalid. The deal has also been opposed by Greece and Cyprus due to conflicting maritime claims and energy exploration rights in the eastern Mediterranean. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*

October 26



Moscow, Beijing



Cabo Delgado

- **Moscow, Beijing** - The Middle East Forum urged the U.S. to target cryptocurrency networks allegedly used by Russia and Iran to evade sanctions. It identified Shelbit, A7 and TokenSpot as interconnected platforms with Sberbank playing a key role. Recommendations include sanctioning TokenSpot, targeting supporting banks and freezing USDT linked to A7. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] // [REGION/AREA: ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA - PACIFIC / NE ASIA]*
- **Cabo Delgado** - Mozambican President Daniel Chapo has urged African countries to cooperate to protect strategic natural resources, linking gas discoveries to the rise of terrorism in Cabo Delgado. However, experts identify poverty, inequality, political exclusion and religious radicalisation as key factors behind the insurgency. The ongoing violence continues to displace thousands of persons and disrupt Mozambique's major natural gas projects, despite regional military efforts to restore security. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*

October 27


West Indian Ocean


Japan SE islands


Colombia, Venezuela


Angola, Zambia

- **West Indian Ocean** - India maintained uninterrupted LPG supplies during the Strait of Hormuz crisis by expanding imports to 41 countries and increasing domestic production, Petroleum Minister Hardeep Singh Puri said. The government also tackled panic buying and hoarding, highlighting the importance of energy diversification and preparedness. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA]*
- **Japan SE islands -** US and Japanese forces are conducting the "Keen Sword" 27 military exercise across southwestern Japan, practicing anti-ship strikes and mobile missile deployments. The drills aim to strengthen their ability to counter Chinese naval forces in a potential conflict over Taiwan. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM] // [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]*
- **Colombia, Venezuela** - A new report finds that criminal groups operate in 59% of Amazon municipalities across six South American countries. Illegal gold mining has overtaken cocaine as the region's most lucrative criminal activity, increasing deforestation, pollution and violence against indigenous communities. Researchers say military crackdowns alone are insufficient and call for stronger law enforcement, education and economic opportunities. *[PIRACY / ORGANIZED CRIME / BOARDING CONDITIONS] // [REGION/AREA: GLOBAL ISSUES]*
- **Angola, Zambia** - The Africa Finance Corporation has selected European and Turkish companies to build a new 515-kilometre railway through Zambia as part of the US-backed Lobito Corridor project. The multibillion-dollar initiative aims to transport copper, cobalt and other critical minerals to Angola's Atlantic coast, providing an alternative to China-dominated export routes. Contract negotiations are expected to begin next month. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES] // [REGION/AREA: SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA]*

October 28


Ras Al Khaimah


Murmansk


London

- **Ras Al Khaimah** - An oil spill from the tanker GEM NO.2 has reportedly reached Ras Al Khaimah in the UAE, prompting the closure of all beaches in the emirate. Authorities are working to contain the leak, while experts warn that nearby desalination plants could be at risk. *[NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL] // [REGION/AREA: PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA]*
- **Murmansk** - Russia has begun exporting grain through the Arctic port of Murmansk for the first time since World War II, as attacks and disruptions have nearly halted Black Sea grain trade. Around 28,000 tonnes of wheat are planned for shipment to Morocco. Russia is increasingly using alternative ports in the Arctic and Baltic regions to maintain exports to buyers in the Middle East and Asia. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES] // [REGION/AREA: ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA - PACIFIC / NE ASIA]*
- **Moscow** - Russian President Vladimir Putin and Egyptian President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi discussed strengthening long-term bilateral relations, including trade, tourism and nuclear energy cooperation. Putin said bilateral trade increased by 14% in the first eight months of 2026 and highlighted progress on Egypt's El Dabaa nuclear power plant. He also noted that more than 1.2 million Russian tourists visited Egypt in the first half of 2026. *[POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED]*
- **London** - Climate change is increasing financial risks worldwide, with global uninsured disaster losses reaching an estimated $424 billion in 2025. Rising insurance costs and reduced coverage threaten property values, lending and economic stability. Experts urge insurers, governments and financial institutions to improve risk

assessments, invest in climate resilience and develop affordable insurance solutions to protect vulnerable communities. *[NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL] // [REGION/AREA: GLOBAL ISSUES]*

October 29





Dubai; Yemen Houthis *Sanandaj* *Canada / Alaska*

- **Dubai; Yemen Houthis** - Yemen's Houthi militia funds its missile and drone attacks through Iranian support, oil trading, taxes, customs duties and financial networks, generating billions of dollars annually. Despite international sanctions, these revenues sustain its military operations, threaten Saudi Arabia and international shipping, and worsen Yemen's economic and humanitarian crisis. [ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] // [REGION/AREA: RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN]
- **Sanandaj** - Qubad Talabani said the US never planned to send Iranian-Kurdish opposition groups from Iraq into Iran during the war. He called for peaceful negotiations between Tehran and the opposition, using the Turkey-PKK peace process as a model. He also urged Iraq to disarm Iran-backed militias and bring them under state control to prevent attacks on neighbouring countries. Meanwhile, political deadlock and security challenges continue to affect the Kurdistan Region. [POLITICAL] // [REGION/AREA: PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA]
- **Canada / Alaska** - Scientists have identified a new type of permafrost landslide in Canada's Northwest Territories, linked to severe wildfires and decades of rising temperatures. Two massive slides blocked rivers, created lakes and released large amounts of sediment. Researchers warn that similar events could threaten communities, roads and water supplies in northern Canada and Alaska, although early warning signs may allow authorities to prepare. [NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL] // [REGION/AREA: ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA - PACIFIC / NE ASIA]

October 30




Singapore *Taipei*

- **Singapore** - Singapore's retrenchments reached their highest level since late 2020, mainly due to business reorganizations. Despite continued employment growth, rising job cuts indicate increasing pressure and uncertainty in parts of the labour market. [ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS] // [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]
- **Taipei -** China has tripled its intelligence and surveillance satellite fleet since 2018, strengthening its ability to monitor Taiwan and US allies and support long-range military operations. The US Defense Intelligence Agency warns that China's growing space capabilities pose a security challenge, although experts question some figures and say the expansion has recently slowed. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM] // [REGION/AREA: EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN]


↩return to **OBJECTIVES**


	GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)			
A/A	VICINITY / AREA / DOMAIN	OVERALL	THREAT	RISK
1	THE GEO-POLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS-E)	X	–	
2	CYBER-THREATS / RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION BY CYBERPAX	X	–	
3	TERRORISM – INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE CRIME – NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL	X	–	
4	LIBYA – CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN	–	X	–
5	SYRIA (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
6	LEBANON (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
7	GAZA-ISRAEL (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
8	SUDAN – ERITREA – ETHIOPIA	–	X	–
9	RED SEA – YEMEN	–	X	–
10	NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF / IRAN'S REGION	–	X	–
11	BLACK SEA / NORTH PART (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)	–	X	–
12	BALTIC SEA / NE PART (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)	–	X	–
13	GULF OF GUINEA	–	–	X
14	EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA	–	–	X
15	SUEZ CANAL – NORTHERN RED SEA	–	–	X
16	BAB-EL-MANDEB STRAITS – SOUTHERN REA SEA	–	–	X
17	GULF OF ADEN – SOMALIA / SOMALILAND	–	–	X
18	ARABIAN SEA – GULF OF OMAN	–	–	X
19	HORMUZ STRAITS – PERSIAN GULF	–	–	X
20	BLACK SEA / SOUTH PART	–	–	X
21	BALTIC SEA / WEST PART	–	–	X
22	SOUTH AMERICA / NW PART – PANAMA	–	–	X
23	SOUTH AMERICA / NE PART – VENEZUELA	–	–	X
24	SOUTHERN AFRICA / WEST PART – ANGOLA / NAMIBIA	–	–	X
25	SOUTHERN AFRICA / EAST PART - MADAGASCAR	–	–	X
26	MALACCA STRAITS	–	–	X
27	INDIAN OCEAN WEST	–	–	X
28	TAIWAN – JAPAN SEA	–	–	X
29	TAIWAN – SOUTH CHINA SEA	–	–	X
30	PACIFIC OCEAN – NE ASIA	–	–	X
31	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	–	–	X
32	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	–	–	X
33	OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING	X	X	X
	ANNEX "A": CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE	X	–	
	ANNEX "B": MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS	X	–	

↩return to **OBJECTIVES**

THE GEO-POLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS-E)









Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile:


- However, the geopolitical and geostrategic environment continues to be quite volatile; connected wars and strategic rivalries are posing threats to maritime commerce, energy sources and vital infrastructure networks. The tensions that could arise from the straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb, as well as the Horn of Africa, constitute an immediate threat to shipping, whereas Russia-NATO and China-Taiwan tensions pose bigger threats of conflict and miscalculation.


Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile:

- The geo-economy of the world is still fragmented, and there is stiff competition for energy resources, critical minerals, and infrastructure, which makes the economy volatile and expensive. Shipping routes that are dangerous, such as Hormuz and the Red Sea, sanctions on Russia, and vulnerabilities to Taiwan-related disruptions make supply chains uncertain. Alternative shipping routes, port facilities, and energy production and storage provide greater resilience, but at a cost.

International Security / Strategic sector:

- The collected report outlines a dynamic security situation on the international level where conflict spillover and the use of drones, together with increased military rivalries, put stress on transportation channels and strategic infrastructure. The situation around the Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb straits is the immediate risk at sea level, while the volatility mainly in the Black Sea and the Red Sea, as well as around the Horn of Africa, adds to the regional risks.





(SEA GUARDIAN, published the above diagrams on the beginning of this year while the globe continues to be in this intermediat e situation with the possibility of escalation)

Global Maritime Security / Navigational safety profile:

- This month's reporting shows that global shipping continues to face challenges deriving from armed conflict, piracy, smuggling, and threats to strategic infrastructure. Currently, the Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, and Hormuz pose the greatest dangers to ships and oil flows. In addition, conflicts in the Black Sea region and insecurity in the Indo-Pacific, add to uncertainties in global shipping. Even with the resumption of Suez passage and investment in other ports and alternate routes, attacks may lead to additional costs in shipping.

↩return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

CYBER-THREATS / RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION BY CYBERPAX

CYBERPAX
Imittou 201 Street,
Athens, 11632, Greece
Mailbox: info@cyberpax.eu
Our Phone: +30 210 7525 363
IN SYNERGY WITH SEA GUARDIAN





The Compliance Excuse: When the Regulation Becomes the Ceiling

Feature on what "compliance fatigue" really describes, why regulation arms the problem avoider, why this summer's incidents do not prove what many think they prove, what the return to the Red Sea shows about how boards measure a risk when they choose to, and the one question a board should ask itself

- At international maritime cyber conference in September, one phrase came up in session after session: compliance fatigue. Operators, it was said, are exhausted by NIS2, by the IACS unified requirements, by the Coast Guard's new rule, by the questionnaires of charterers and insurers that repeat all of the above in different words. I would put it less kindly. What I hear in most of these conversations is not fatigue but an excuse — the compliance excuse: the use of regulation, and of the obligation to comply with it, as a reason to do exactly what the text requires and nothing that it does not.
- This is not laziness, and the mechanism is worth stating plainly. The management textbooks divide decision makers into problem seekers, a small minority who look for trouble before it finds them; problem solvers, who act when a problem is put in front of them; and problem avoiders, the great majority. Regulation reads differently to each. To the seeker it is a floor he has already passed. To the solver it is a lever — the mandate that unlocks a budget refused the year before. To the avoider it is a shield: a complete, externally certified answer to "what must we do?", delivered with a signature that ends the conversation. He does not choose the minimum; he is told what the minimum is, and that it suffices. Since avoiders are most of us, the aggregate effect of a rule written for solvers is to legitimize non-decision. The audit cannot see this: it issues the same certificate to the solver and the avoider. In most industries that is a cost. In ours it is an opening, because the adversary is a seeker by profession, and because the price of the avoided decision is not paid when it is avoided — the access is taken quietly and kept, as this summer showed, until someone chooses to use it. One party to the tension that moved the oil price through Hormuz all October is Iran, whose affiliated actors the July US joint advisory documented inside American water systems. The market reprices the kinetic option every morning; the cyber option is priced once; on the day it is used.
- A second argument was made at that conference that deserves more care. Regulation, it was said, forges predictable behavior, and predictable behavior is what attackers exploit. Half of that is true, and this summer's incidents prove the other half false. The British generator that stood idle for four days, the water systems reached across a dozen American states, the two tankers boarded on their way to the Gulf coast — none of these was reached through behavior that any regulation had shaped. They were reached through its absence: controllers facing the internet, factory passwords, vendor connections nobody watched. Those operators were not trapped inside the floor; they had not reached it. The predictability argument holds at the other end of the scale. When mature operators implement the same minimum in the same way, an adversary learns the shape of the minimum and moves to what it does not cover — the legacy segment the scoping rules left out, the supplier who is not in scope, the second factor that everyone now has and that can therefore be exhausted. Regulation homogenizes the defenses of the capable, leaves the incapable untouched, and does not reach the unwilling at all: the eight shadow-fleet vessels the United Kingdom sanctioned on 1 October — LNG carriers and ice-

class tonnage among them — sail outside every regime the audited operator answers to, and share its anchorages. Those are three different conditions, and folding them into one complaint helps nobody.

- The third argument — that regulation cannot keep pace with the technology — is true of the audit and much less true of the text. NIS2 asks for measures that take account of the state of the art; the IACS E26 requirements are written as goals; the British CAF is explicitly outcome-based. The rigidity enters afterwards, when the text is turned into a checklist by the consultant, the auditor and the software vendor, because a checklist is what can be sold, scheduled and signed.
- Where does this leave an operator who would rather be resilient than merely defensible? With a different question than the auditors. Not "do we meet the requirement?" but "how far above it do we stand, and where is the one condition that fails?" That is a measurement, not a declaration; it has to be made against the operator's own risk, not against the regulator's minimum; and it must be able to say that four good answers do not compensate for the fifth. The checklist cannot say that. It was never designed to.
- The industry knows how to make that kind of decision; it makes one every time it routes a ship. By late October, on Alpha liner's count, roughly two-thirds of Far East–Europe capacity was back in the Red Sea after three years of detours, the rest still rounding the Cape, while the threat at Bab al-Mandeb had grown enough for China and Djibouti to call jointly for the strait to stay open. No regulation sent those carriers back and none kept the others away; each board measured fuel and transit time against its own appetite for a threat it could see. That is what a measurement looks like, and nobody calls it fatigue. Asked the same question about the cyber readiness of the ships it has just sent back, the same board points to the audit.
- So here is the question for the board, and it needs no consultant. If your regulator disappeared tomorrow, which of your controls would you keep? Those are the ones you believe in. Everything else is the compliance excuse, and this summer the people it was meant to deter stopped being deterred by it.

Three-line risk snapshot

• Likelihood that a compliant operator's next incident arrives through what the regulation does not cover (out-of-scope suppliers, legacy segments, standing vendor access): **HIGH**

• Gap between how boards price corridor risk on the Red Sea and Hormuz routes (measured, continuously) and how they price cyber risk on the same ships (certified, annually): **HIGH**

• Boards' ability to tell which controls they would keep without a regulator — resilience from defensibility: **CRITICAL**

Dr. Eric Tartas — Founder & CEO, CyberPax S.A. — for the SEA GUARDIAN monthly assessment, October 2026

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

TERRORISM – INTERNATIONAL COMMERCE CRIME – NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL

- **Terrorism** – HIGH in areas affected by conflicts at sea, especially the Red Sea and Arabian Peninsula. Incidents of missile and drone strikes pose threats to vessels, facilities and associated shipping routes.
- **Piracy** – HIGH in affected areas, especially around Somalia and the Gulf of Aden. Seizure and injuries of crewmembers reflect dangers associated with armed boarding, detention and violence.
- **Illegal immigration** – ELEVATED in affected migration routes, with regional pressures at borders and for trafficking. Lack of maritime information makes it impossible to assess a global trend of irregular migration/stowaway situations.
- **Hijacking** – HIGH in local area off Somalia, with vessel detentions posing risks to crews. Recovery of vessels does not stop other seizures, hostage-taking, or disrupt operations.

- **Port crimes** – ELEVATED, with issues of trafficking, oil theft and financial crime causing security threats. Seizures of drugs on board illustrate cargo/vessel security risks, although port-specific information is lacking.
- **Navigational/environmental threats** – HIGH in affected areas, with attacks potentially damaging vessels/infrastructure and diverting routes. Tanker fires and damage to infrastructure may lead to pollution; mining incidents unconfirmed.

↩return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

- The country remains politically divided, with conflicting electoral laws and accusations of a link between Saddam Haftar and drone attacks that pose security issues for the government's unification attempts. Abductions and reports of people being held point to ongoing risks to personal safety but have no relation to vessel and crew security.
- Disputes between the Central Bank and the National Oil Corporation regarding oil revenue raise doubts regarding financial transparency. Fuel and electricity shortages caused by the reported drone attacks raise doubts about the vulnerabilities of energy supply lines but do not confirm any new risks to maritime transportation or to Libya being an alternative source of hydrocarbons.
- There are no reports of navigational incidents, pollution cases, GNSS interference, AIS manipulation, or cyber-attacks among the developments presented. These areas remain unassessed and cannot be declared safe from risks.
- SEA GUARDIAN advices shipping companies to plan any voyage and port call in Libya after a deliberated and updated information/intelligence analysis and threat/risk assessment.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "HIGH" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Triggers and Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Despite the lack of reported cases of piracy or vessel harassment, the waters of Syria represent an area of high risk due to instability, criminal activity, and poor infrastructure. Any potential Syrian help against the Houthis would increase confrontation with Iran. The proposed Iraq fund against terrorism reflects ongoing threats and arrest pressure by ISIS.
- Anti-crime and anti-smuggling cooperation reflects enforcement challenges. No cases of piracy, illegal migration, or port crime were reported.
- The Deir Ezzor pipeline attack reveals the vulnerabilities of energy infrastructure. The repairs are aimed at restoring the gas supply. It is unknown who attacked the pipeline.
- There were no specific threats related to navigational safety, the environment, GNSS, or cyber activities. The attacks on the pipeline are not assumed to pose increased risks for shipping or ports.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Lebanon is currently experiencing instability due to tensions with Israel, Hezbollah's refusal to disarm and its attacks on UNIFIL. The future of UNIFIL's presence in terms of stability is in doubt.
- Cases of money laundering demonstrate the issue of financial crime. There are no reports of piracy, illegal immigration, or any other port crimes in the developments provided.
- Rebuilding of Lebanon will require significant funding from the international community, which could reach beyond $27 billion. EU assistance in improving the security of the port of Beirut is planned but still awaiting deployment.
- There are no reports of navigational, environmental, GNSS, or cyber threats. There is no evidence of direct disruption of shipping or ports.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Military operations and an unstable ceasefire keep the Israel-Gaza situation at risk. The diplomatic pressure, investigation of military targeting, and serious violations add more political and humanitarian issues.
- There is no reported incident of piracy or hijacking in the provided data. The accusations of sexual violence and torture indicate a serious personal security threat but no specific threat to vessels.
- The U.S. prosecutors accused a humanitarian organization of diverting $1.7 million to the Hamas organization; however, it has not been proven yet. Military operations continue to pose a threat to coastal installations, port facilities, and maritime movements.
- No incident of GNSS interference or significant cyber event is reported. Electronic interference, access restrictions, and emergency assistance issues remain operational problems.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially depicted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Sudan – Eritrea – Ethiopia

- In Sudan and the Horn of Africa, things are pretty uncertain right now because of ongoing clashes between the SAF and RSF, conflict in northern Ethiopia, and a cooling relationship between Ethiopia and Eritrea. Drone attacks and territorial gains are adding to the risk of things escalating and people being displaced, though some reports still need to be double-checked.
- The news feed we saw didn't mention anything about piracy, hijacking, illegal migration, or port crimes. But insecurity in the area could make it easier for smugglers and armed groups to operate.

- The conflict in Sudan also threatens overland travel and trade around the region. Ethiopia's issues with maritime route access are causing tension, even though there is potential for cooperation that could improve trade and safety.
- No reports were made about navigation problems, environmental issues, GPS interference, or cyber-attacks. Even though the region is tense, that doesn't mean the Red Sea transit route is disrupted—it just makes it a bit more sensitive.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered as analyzed in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Red Sea – Yemen

- Yemen and the southern part of the Red Sea still pose high risks due to Houthi advances, missile launches, and attacks by Saudi Arabia. The reported deaths and population displacement point to an escalating conflict. The related TRT article refers to the Houthis as Iran-backed instead of refuting their backing by Iran.
- There are no reports of any cases of maritime piracy or hijackings among the developments provided. Missile launches, drones, and explosives pose different risks to navigation and access to the coastal areas.
- The reported attacks have affected flights and civil infrastructure. In the case of the reported recovery of 63% of Far East – Europe shipping capacity, this makes vessels vulnerable to Red Sea disruption. Some operators keep their Cape route diversions.
- The fighting on the western coast of Yemen affects access to Bab al-Mandeb. There are no specific new incidents related to GNSS, cyber, or environmental challenges.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Northern Persian Gulf / Iran's region

- The situation in the area continues to be highly uncertain. The warning from US Embassy in Saudia Arabia, refreshed on October 28, proposes to US citizens to leave the area, although it has not an obliged notion, yet.
- The northern Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz still pose high risks in the provided assessment. Reports of contingency plans by Iran targeting the undersea cables and technology infrastructure linked to the US suggest that there is potential for escalation. The arrests of individuals by Iraq are a sign of continued security risks within the country.
- Cases of drug trafficking and illicit financial activities in Kuwait and human trafficking in Iraq represent the enforcement of laws on crime. These incidents do not confirm the existence of maritime piracy, hijackings, and port crimes.
- There is the potential for attacks on subsea cables and data centers in the Arabian Peninsula, which might affect the region in terms of communication, finances, and business. No new incidents of disruptions to navigation, the environment, GNSS, or shipping were provided in the assessment.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 08-1/2026, April 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Black Sea / NORTH part (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)

- The Black Sea region continues to be a fully-uncertain area because of the ongoing war. The drone crash near the Romanian border with Ukraine shows a possible spillover from cross-border areas, while the proposed peace talks are still uncertain.
- The provided developments contain no reports on piracy, hijacking, or port crime cases. The alleged murders in the Kharkiv region belong to the category of land-based criminal activities and have nothing to do with criminal acts against vessels.
- Reduced cost of Russian sunflower oil, destruction of Ukrainian ports, and increased expenses for logistics are making it more difficult for Ukraine to compete as an exporter.
- There is no information about any casualties or damage in connection with the drone crash. There is no information about incidents involving navigation, the environment, GNSS, or cyber.
- SEA GUARDIAN assumes this region as an extraordinary fatal zone due to destroyable attacks with fatal consequences to crews, while the need for Ukrainian and Russian export transportation is high. The recovery of men overboard seems difficult and is based mainly on the other vessels sailing in the area. A deeper analysis of incidents where seafarers were in the sea, shows that in more than half of incidents the crew of the shipwrecked were recovered by other merchant vessels, while in two cases a recovering vessel was attacked some hours later.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: VERY HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Baltic Sea / NE part (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)

- The Northern Baltic is at higher geopolitical and hybrid risks due to the Russian warnings against the European weapon-manufacturing plants and increased military collaboration between Estonia and Ukraine. These developments do not pose any military risk to shipping.
- There were no developments of piracy, hijacking, criminal risks to ships' crew, or port crime incidents in the developments provided. No grain transportation or shadow fleet violations were indicated the examined period.
- A temporary closure of a shipping route near Helsinki led to a local disruption of transportation. There were no other disruptions to trade and resource supply in the Baltic Sea as a result of the developments.
- The obstacle near Helsinki was revealed to be an old ship part without any explosive risk. Concerns about cyberattacks and sabotage remained relevant, but there were no cyber or environmental attacks reported.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as estimated in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Gulf of Guinea

- The economic outlook for the Gulf of Guinea is also rather inconsistent, since investments in Nigerian ports would benefit trade and employment opportunities, but oil-related debt would restrict future income. The provided developments contain no particular information about paramilitary and terrorist attacks.
- Nigeria's new system of petroleum security focuses on tackling oil smuggling, sabotage, and illegal processing. Improving coordination regarding the protection of maritime infrastructure would help in implementing this project, but the effectiveness depends on its implementation. No particular piracy or robbery cases are indicated in the provided developments.
- A digital fraud warning from Ghana raises financial security issues, but does not indicate any cyberattacks on shipping. There are no navigational accidents, environmental dangers, port crimes, or GNSS interference indicated in the provided developments.
- Military threat analysis for Gulf of Guinea states:

NIGERIA	CAMEROON	GHANA	CONGO	IVORY COAST	GABON
High	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium

- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the area is a multi-threat/risk maritime region calling for a deliberate planning and careful execution of sails to approach indifferent West African states waters and ports.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

East Mediterranean Sea

- As respectively analyzed in the SYRIA, LEBANON, GAZA-ISRAEL threat assessment sections of this report.
- The problems in the Eastern Mediterranean continue to exist; on the other hand, Egyptian and Cypriot cooperation in terms of gas production will serve regional business and energy cooperation. The railroad project in the Sinai Peninsula is a source of security concern for Israel.
- India and Cyprus' cooperation will enhance maritime and cyber safety. There are no reports of any acts of piracy, hijackings, migration, navigation, environmental crime, port crimes, GNSS, or cyber-attacks in the supplied news developments.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "LOW" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/22, November 12, 2025.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

- The threat from the Suez Canal and northern Red Sea remains of medium uncertain, with increased traffic as the region still faces military uncertainties. The attack by the Houthis is evidence of increasing tension, while the Egypt-Somalia mission will help ensure maritime safety.

- Anti-piracy operations of Egypt related to Somalia and the provided development show that there is no sign of piracy/robbery increase in the Suez Canal/northern Red Sea.
- No development has been reported regarding threats to life, hijacking, stowaways, or illegal migration.
- There have been no developments reported regarding navigational, environmental, port crime, GPS interference, or cyber risk.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

Bab-El-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea

- Areas of risk in the region include Bab al-Mandeb and the southern Red Sea, as evidenced by Houthi attacks and a Saudi-backed offensive that may escalate into an offensive operation at unpredictable dates. Such an offensive may lead to diverting ships, which may increase transportation costs and hinder trade and energy supplies.
- The main maritime risks involve Houthi attacks and not the pirate or robbery attacks reported recently. China and Djibouti want open maritime routes and are ready for naval escort if necessary.
- There are no new events regarding hijackings, stowaways, or illegal migration.
- Military operations may disrupt navigation in the area of the Bab al-Mandeb Strait. However, there are no environmental incidents or port crimes reported. There is no GNSS jamming or cyber threats to the system.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially presented in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

Gulf of Aden – Somalia / Somaliland

- Piracy continues to make the Western Indian Ocean/Horn of Africa region of high-risk. Although there are political tensions, no new terrorist attacks or disruptions to the economy have been recorded.
- The return of M/V HONOUR 25 and the rescue of M/T EUREKA mark progress against piracy, not a decrease in risk. Puntland has arrested 16 suspects, while those holding EUREKA have managed to escape.
- The five deaths and the four injured among the crew of M/V HONOUR 25 highlight the dangers of hijacking. The 12 members of the M/T EUREKA crew were freed without harm, while the M/V ASANA remains in captivity. There are no new cases of stowaways or illegal migration.
- There have been no reports of any navigation-related incidents, environmental threats, port-related crimes, GNSS interference, or cyber-attacks. Political events have not impacted the safety of navigation.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "VERY HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "HIGH" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

- The security of Oman and the surrounding areas remains uncertain based on the provided information. While India's development of its naval base foresees an increased military presence in the area and the Oman-Iran communication predicts de-escalation, neither indicates a change in transit conditions.
- South Korea's intended expansion of its naval presence into the Gulf of Oman may improve the capabilities for monitoring and preventing any pirate attacks. There have been no new piracy or robbery attacks reported locally.
- There are no reports of new hijackings, detentions, threats to life, stowaways, or cases of illegal immigration in the provided information.
- There are no reports of navigation hazards, pollution, port crimes, GNSS jamming, or cyberattacks from the provided information.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially noted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

- The situation in Hormuz continues to be very uncertain, with the attack on tankers and the US involvement in attacking a cargo ship. Export of crude oil through Hormuz continues to be at risk due to potential disruptions and the fluctuation of oil prices.
- Maritime security issues revolve around military attacks and blockades, not piracy/ robbery as has been reported. An increase in tanker traffic does not necessarily mean an increase in safety.
- There was no threat to the crews of either tanker struck by projectiles. There has been no reported case of hijacking, stowaways, or illegal immigration.
- There is no confirmation of a mine strike on a tanker. The fire on tankers continues to pose safety issues. There has been no pollution, port crime, GNSS interference, or cyber-attacks.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: VERY HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" HAS BEEN LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK DUE TO WAR CONDITIONS and unpredictable actions by all involved parties.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Black Sea / South Part

- Risks associated with regional conflicts continue in the eastern Black Sea region, despite the drone incidents occurring in Romanian waters. The transport projects and partnership between Georgia and Kazakhstan enhance connectivity but do not result in decreased security risks.
- Maritime risks revolve around the drone attacks on vessels and incidents in the Black Sea region. The Romanian proposal for a NATO command shows that there are fears in the region; however, no piracy or robberies have been reported in Georgian waters.
- There are no deaths, hijackings, stowaways, or illegal migration incidents in the developments provided.
- Drone activity in the region poses navigational threats, but there are no incidents reported in Georgian waters or any environmental, port, GNSS, or cybercrimes.

- In practice the Black Sea south is entering to a high-risk period as hybrid attacks by air/sea drones expanding southern either by Ukrainians or Russians engaging merchant vessels near to the territorial waters of Romania and Bulgaria.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Baltic Sea / West part

- Risks in the Baltic Sea are associated with the confrontation of NATO and Russia, operations, and hybrid actions. Cyber-attacks, cable sabotage, grey fleet activities, and continuous jamming of GNSS may put ships, ports, and critical infrastructure at risk.
- Piracy is not the threat, but ships should be aware of any anomalies concerning AIS functioning, navigation, cybersecurity, and military actions.
- Readiness of Poland to activate NATO Article 5 for any aggression against the Baltic countries is the sign of a risk escalation in the region. It is concluded Poland aims to position itself as the first in receiving NATO assistance due to its importance, although, in reality, it contributes to NATO defense less than other countries in the region.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

South America / NW part – PANAMA

- The Panama Canal risks pertain to capacity issues and increased costs for transit and do not include any military or terrorist threats. Increased bookings by Panamax vessels for the period January- April 2027 have been made in order to ensure schedule reliability, whereas water security is an economic concern.
- No piracy or robbery cases have been registered. Colombia's armed-group problems do not pose a direct threat.
- The incident involving the death of a tug captain has raised demands for an independent investigation as well as better working conditions. There are no reports of hijackings, stowaways, or illegal migration.
- The major issues reported are fatigue, crewing, and resting arrangements. There are no reports of pollution, port crimes, GNSS jamming, or cyber incidents.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "NSR" - ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

South America / NE part – VENEZUELA

- The Guyana-Venezuela dispute is politically sensitive, as energy investments fuel tensions. The proposed U.S.-Venezuela oil agreement is subject to legal challenges, while the production expansion hinges on finance, infrastructure, and reforms.
- No new cases of piracy, robbery, or attacks against ships have been noted. The accusations of financial crimes do not indicate any maritime security risk.

- No new reports of deaths, hijackings, stowaways, and illegal immigration are found in the provided news items.
- Whiptail drilling demands that vessels proceed with caution until the completion date of November 30, 2026. No pollution, port crimes, GNSS spoofing, or cyber-attacks are noted.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Southern Africa / West part – Angola / Namibia

- Port developments between Angola and Namibia are mostly about economics, like investing in ports, ferry transport, and exploration. However, Namibia's meat export controls are slowing down trade. No new military or terrorism threats have been spotted.
- There haven't been any reports of piracy, robbery, or boarding incidents. The new updates don't suggest any change in the port security risk level that was previously assessed.
- There are also no new reports of deaths, hijackings, stowaways, or illegal migration.
- Luanda Bay's oxygen levels are improving towards normal, and environmental monitoring is ongoing. So far, there have been no navigational accidents, port crimes, GNSS jamming, or cyberattacks.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "NSR" - ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".*

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area).

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Southern Africa / East part - Madagascar

- Russia's reported increase of the Africa Corps in Madagascar creates some political instability but does not pose any threat to sea traffic operations. Tanzania's mining activity has been included for economic development purposes; there are no incidents of maritime terrorism.
- No incidents of piracy, robbery, or boardings have been observed in the Mozambique Channel and its vicinity. The new developments do not suggest any increase in port and anchorage crime threats.
- The new climate alerts are related to the threat of cyclones, flooding, heat, and drought in Mozambique and Madagascar, not maritime incidents.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" - GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".*

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area)

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Malacca Straits

- The Malacca-Singapore Strait remains a medium-risk corridor from the perspective of the prior assessment. Commissioning by Indonesia's carriers indicates the country's efforts to develop its naval capacities. Singapore's priorities concerning ASEAN ensure energy sustainability and e-commerce; there have been no terrorist attacks.
- The arrest of eight people on board MT Global 168 for trafficking 1.16 tons of ketamine from North Sumatra indicates maritime crime. There have been no piracy or robbery events reported recently.

- Unhealthy air conditions in Singapore cause concern about worker health and reduced visibility and may limit ship movement in the area. No GNSS jamming or cyber-attacks have been mentioned among the listed events.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "NSR" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW"*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Indian Ocean West

- The provided key developments highlight increased Western Indian Ocean dangers. The assessment makes decisions based on the route that is exposed to conflict. A specific tailor-made assessment is needed for routes and ports in case there is a need for detailed advice due to the differentiated threats and risks. From the other hand the entire area of the Western Indian Ocean is not directly connected to the war zone around the Arabian Peninsula.
- Piracy and armed attacks still pose major threats to the Gulf of Aden and the Somali basin region, being analyzed in the specific sections of this report above. It was reported that a skiff withdrew following an exchange of gunfire with the security detail aboard an LNG tanker on October 17.
- The possibility of hijackings and taking of hostages still exists; however, reports are not fully verified.
- GNSS jamming, fires, and disabled ships can lead to navigation and pollution hazards. Increased watchfulness, control of access, position checking, and warning are still only proposed precautions, not ISPS notifications.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "NSR" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".*

- Indicators will be provided in due time.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Taiwan – Japan Sea

- Tensions exist between the waters off Taiwan and Japan owing to the imminent deployment of missiles by the U.S. and Japan in close proximity to Taiwan. Supply chain cooperation is geared towards increasing resilience rather than mitigating military risks.
- There have been no cases of piracy, robbery, humanitarian crimes, smuggling or attacks against merchant vessels. There are no indications of disruptions of commercial passage through the area due to these military activities and international commerce crime (ICC).
- There have been some military exercises that could pose navigational problems, but no such restrictions, environmental pollution, port crime, GNSS jamming, or cyberattacks have been reported. Claims of the missile capability of North Korea have not yet been verified.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY LOW" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" as written in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Taiwan – South China Sea

- Taiwan-South China Sea issues revolve around cross-strait relations, illustrated by the coast guard encounter off Kinmen. The planned oil storage for the Philippines will improve energy security but not ease maritime relations.

- Coast guard incidents pose the possibility of miscalculation, although no new cases of piracy, robbery, or violence against commercial ships are noted in the provided developments.
- New fatalities, hijacking, stowaway, or human trafficking situations have not been observed but always exist due to the incidents in the current year.
- Coast guard incidents pose local operational risks, but there are no new cases of navigational restrictions, environmental incidents, port crime, GNSS jamming, or cyber-attacks.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Pacific Ocean – NE Asia

- The Bering Strait-Northeast Asia route has some sanctions risks and operational headaches, but there's currently no threat of attacks. Russian shadow-fleet oil tankers have been using the Arctic route to get to China.
- China is a known stop, but there's no proof of a similar route to North Korea or the Philippines. Just because Russia has sent fuel to North Korea in the past doesn't mean there's a link.
- There haven't been any new piracy incidents or crew injuries on this route. The unclear ownership of vessels makes screening tricky, though not all Russia-based tankers are part of the shadow fleet.
- Ice and aging tankers bring navigation and pollution risks. Before operating, it's important to check the tanker's condition, ice levels, insurance, and sanctions.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators will be provided in due time.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Arctic cycle / East – Europe / Russia / Northeast Asia

- The situation in the Arctic area is politically sensitive, with increased Russian shadow fleet leading to increased sanctions risks. The proposed cooperation of the U.S. and NATO, along with the EU's surveillance, is part of a broader strategy consideration and not evidence of an actual threat against ships.
- There is no record of any new act of piracy, robbery, boarding, hijackings, stowaways, or illegal immigration.
- There is no record of any undersea cable or shipping route incidents.
- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the situation will escalate in case of arctic exploitation especially in the beginning of next year due to the use of North routes towards the ports of North-East Asia.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Arctic cycle / West – Greenland / Alaska

- Alaska-Greenland events show increasing competition in strategic affairs, but do not pose any direct threat to maritime commerce. Military exercises and plans for the defense of Greenland go hand-in-hand with resource explorations, projects that are yet to obtain permits and funding.

- No cases of piracy, robbery, or boarding events have been noted. The provided events do not indicate any disruptions in commercial shipping operations.
- No new navigational accidents, pollution, port crimes, GNSS interference, or cyber-attacks are indicated. The events do not show any changes in ice, weather, communications or search and rescue conditions.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

- Diplomatic friction: Attacks in the Hormuz Strait, the Black Sea, and the Horn of Africa increase shipping risks, whereas tensions regarding Taiwan and Arctic resources persist. Diplomatic actions have thus far failed to illustrate a decrease in risks for shipping and international trade.
- Political instability: Instability in Libya, missile strikes in Yemen, and Ethiopia-Eritrea tensions continue to pose a threat to personnel and transport safety. Suggested regional security programs have thus far failed to demonstrate operational success.
- International trade: Tensions in the Hormuz Strait increase the risk of disruption of oil supplies and fluctuation in oil prices. Shipping's alleged return to the Red Sea signifies commercial improvement but not security improvement.
- Maritime trade: Tanker strikes, military intervention, and attacks around Bab al-Mandeb and the Black Sea regions increase shipping risks. Allegations of mines have not yet been substantiated, but drug trafficking and Singaporean haze are other factors of security and navigation risk.

Assessment overall:

- There is evidence of HIGH RISK for Hormuz and nearby affected areas, with severe risks in Bab al-Mandeb and the conflict-prone approaches to the Black Sea. The situation around Hormuz appears tense; however, there is insufficient reliable information to develop detailed measures toward peace or a potential escalation. No new confirmed instances of GNSS/AIS jamming have been reported. Considering all the aforementioned factors, SEA GUARDIAN assesses that, either in the absence of a clash or an escalation after US elections between the US and Iran, the situation will remain precarious until at least the end of this year.
- Black Sea continues to be a highly uncertain region due to the high fatality of attacks, which requires a very careful and detailed tailor-made assessment before any sail, not only towards northern regions (Ukraine, Russia ports), but also the southern (Romania, Georgia, even the South-East parts near Turkey).


Consulting voyage:

- Check the trip details and make sure you know about any attacks, restrictions, or route options based on official guidance. Prepare options in case of delays and diversions, increase watch and access controls, check navigation information, ensure back-up communication, and comply with any reporting and port instructions.
- Use the market's capabilities in maritime intelligence, expert assessments and technical provisions there are in. Prepare your crew for facing a fatal attack, reinforce the security measures, use courses near the territorial waters of Bulgaria and Romania, and maintain the capabilities of traditional navigation.

↩return to **KEY DEVELOPMENTS** *OR ↩return to* **CONTEXT TABLE**

ANNEX "A": CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE


ARABIC PENINSULA AND WEST INDIAN OCEAN



CURRENT MONTH ASSESSED TIMEFRAMES: 29 SEP TO 05 OCT | 06 TO 12 OCT | 13 TO 19 OCT | 20 TO 26 OCT

- Traffic performance assessment: During Sep 29 – Oct 26, 2026, maritime traffic remained volatile. Hormuz continued to weaken despite a brief rebound, while Bab el-Mandeb and Suez recorded a final-week recovery that did not establish normalization. Cape of Good Hope traffic stabilized marginally, without evidence of sustained diversion-driven growth.
- Association with key developments: During Sep 29 – Oct 26, 2026, traffic remained volatile. Hormuz weakened amid renewed hostilities and blockade measures, with no sustained recovery after the reported Salalah initiative. Bab el-Mandeb and Suez rebounded late in the period despite Houthi threats and earlier diversions, while Cape traffic stabilized marginally without sustained diversion-driven growth. These developments provide context, not proof of direct causation.

MEDITERRANEAN – BLACK SEA AND SUEZ



CURRENT MONTH ASSESSED TIMEFRAMES: 29 SEP TO 05 OCT | 06 TO 12 OCT | 13 TO 19 OCT | 20 TO 26 OCT |

- Traffic performance assessment: During Sep 29 – Oct 26, 2026, traffic remained uneven. Gibraltar declined in three weeks; the October 28 carrier development falls outside the period. Dardanelles and Suez each rebounded 15%, with the grain deal's collapse and Red Sea diversions providing context, not confirmed causes. The 2021 grounding does not explain current movements, and sustained recovery remains unconfirmed.
- Association with key developments: Traffic remained uneven. Gibraltar declined in three weeks; the October 28 carrier report falls outside the period. Dardanelles and Suez each rebounded 15% in the final week, with the grain deal's collapse and Red Sea diversions providing historical context—not confirmed causes. The 2021 grounding does not explain current changes, and sustained recovery remains unconfirmed.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

ANNEX "B": MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS

			OCTOBER 17 - 30, 2026
SOURCE / I.D	**DATE**	**TYPE**	**SECURITY/SAFETY AREA**
UKMTO WARNING 176-26	October 17, 2026	**Piracy Attack**	Gulf of Aden / West - 12.533333, 48.116667
UKMTO WARNING 177-26	October 18, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 25.600000, 56.700000
UKMTO ADVISORY 178-26	October 20, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 19.672526, 59.564965
UKMTO WARNING 179-26	October 21, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.150000, 55.916667
UKMTO WARNING 180-26	October 20, 2026	Military Attack	Northern Persian Gulf / Iraq - 29.583333, 48.783333
SG R&I REPORT 104-26 MILITARY ATTACK [MV KHORYV]	October 23, 2026	Military Attack (drone) / fatalities	Black Sea / near Romania TTW 44.184809, 29.020774
UKMTO WARNING 181-26 ATTACK	October 22, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.140000, 56.549167
UKMTO WARNING 182-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 154	October 23, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.187778, 56.605556
UKMTO WARNING 183-26 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY / MSCIO ALERT 155	October 26,	Military Attack	Northern Persian Gulf / Iraq - 29.342500, 49.071389
UKMTO WARNING 184-26 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY / MSCIO ALERT 156	October 28, 2026	**Piracy Attack**	Gulf of Aden / West - 12.533333, 48.116667
SG R&I REPORT 105-26 MILITARY ATTACK [MV CONTSHIP JET]	October 28, 2026	Military Attack (Sea drones) / injuries	Black Sea / Bulgaria EEZ 43.351993, 28.954470
UKMTO WARNING 185-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 157	October 29, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.376389, 56.241667
UKMTO WARNING 186-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 158	October 29, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.398611, 56.498889
UKMTO WARNING 187-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 159	October 29, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait - 26.481111, 56.621667
IMB/ICC 055 -26 / ROBBERY	October 29, 2026	**Robbery / Organized crime**	Gulf of Aden / West - 11.950667, 45.067500
MSCIO ALERT 160-26 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY	October 30, 2026	**Piracy Attack**	Gulf of Aden / West -
UKMTO WARNING 188-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 162-26	October 30, 2026	Military Attack	Northern Persian Gulf / Iraq - 26.116667, 53.333333
UKMTO WARNING 189-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 163-26	October 30, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait – 26.740000, 56.530000







• INCIDENTS • CHOKE-POINTS • FRIENDLY ⚓ Ports

CHARTS ARE PROVIDED BY SEA GUARDIAN "DaCoR" system / MTRI web-interactive map

MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED			
SOURCE / I.D	**DATE**	**AREA OF INCIDENT**	**LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 30 OCT)**
UKMTO WARNING 090-26 / MSCIO ALERT 078-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA, chem. tanker)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	**No release confirmed.** ASANA remains held by Somali pirates. The hijack continues to be assessed as a Somali-piracy incident. The latest official vessel-specific update located, issued by EUNAVFOR ATALANTA on Oct 16, reported the tanker inside Somali territorial waters and still under pirate control.
MSCIO ALERT 161/26 HIJACK (MV AZINI), fishing vessel	29 Oct 2026	Somalian East coasts - 9.700000, 53.916667	**No release confirmed.** MSCIO reported that armed pirates allegedly hijacked the Iranian fishing vessel AZINI off northeastern Somalia on 29 October 2026 at approximately 09:00 UTC. Its last reported position was 09°42'N 053°55'E at 04:00 UTC on 30 October. Crew safety remains unknown, and the vessel may be used as a piracy mothership. Operation ATALANTA is investigating. Vessels should maintain heightened vigilance, follow BMP-MS, and report suspicious activity to MSCIO.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Useful links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:

- ACLED and IMB/ICC for the war threat levels and international commerce crime incidents.
- Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea): Database of Legal Entities Under Sanctions
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt6GS7QohAI for an overall general assessment by the SEA GUARDIAN President presented at Naftemboriki TV (Shipping) for the latest period, covering the time-frame before and after the Houthis ballistic, drones and UCAV attacks.

CONTACT US FOR A TRIAL OR FIX AN APPOINTMENT:	OR BOOK A "GOOGLE MEET" APPOINTMENT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GLOBAL CALENDAR:
E-mail: intelsec@sguardian.com	https://calendar.app.google/LmPSoo5fDxZMVq357
CY:+35725351125|GR:+302109703322 info@sguardian.com | www.sguardian.com / Sea Guardian SG Ltd Intel & Security	

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Looking Ahead,

SEA GUARDIAN is committed to further enhancing the digital capabilities and expanding service offerings. The focus remains steady on leveraging data analytics to drive personalized customer experiences and explore new market opportunities. There is confidence that SEA GUARDIAN strategic initiatives will support our partners for sustained growth and successful decision making. Digital, Control & Reporting System – DACOR, digitalizes the maritime security environment in harmonization with new equipment, training updates, and synergies with the cyber sector, in order to provide a holistic physical and digital security environment with supplementary function to the available networking systems of control, intelligence, and share maritime situational awareness, to better assess risk management studies.

Partners (shipping companies) willing to experience the DACOR system for a 10day free of charge trial should communicate with SEA GUARDIAN for a user name and password.

COPYRIGHT AND CONFIDENTIALITY

This document has been generated by processed information (intel) which in-house SEA GUARDIAN database and algorithms produces in near-real time with SEA GUARDIAN R&I team mankind staffing-work and it is a service to partners with SEA GUARDIAN. Intellectual property is provided as service for specific clients and reasons, prohibited to be distributed outside the frame of its company without a written consent of SEA GUARDIAN in accordance with GDPR rules.



Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE