



THREAT / RISK — SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN

Brief assessment • Brief Update No 12-2/2026

• Reporting period: 13-19 September 2026

In reference to:


- [Threat / Risk Security & Safety Assessment — Monthly Report No 12/2026, 30 August 2026](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 12-1, 06 Sept 2026 \(Week 1\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 12-2, 13 Sep 2026 \(Week 2\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-3, 20 Aug 2026 \(Week-3\)](#)

INSIDE — GLOBAL RISK SNAPSHOT

• Geopolitical and maritime risks continue to be high because of the tension surrounding Taiwan, the conflict between Russia and Europe, and wars in the Middle East. The areas that have been of high concern are Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz because of the Houthis' gains and the US-Iran attacks on ships and energy infrastructure. There were no reports of piracy, cyber, or navigational interference incidents around the Arabian Peninsula and East Africa, although associated risks have continued to increase.

TOP THREE FINDINGS THIS WEEK

- **Houthi successes around Bab el-Mandeb:** Control over Perim/Mayyun island in the strait will increase Houthi capabilities for surveillance, missile, drone, and asymmetric attacks, causing insurance premiums to escalate, and diversion of vessels via the Cape of Good Hope, adding high-costs to transportation.
- **Threats to maritime security in Hormuz:** The assault on EL GAIA, as well as actions carried out by Iran against vessels, fuel high risks for vessel damages, casualties, detention, delays, and disruptions of tanker traffic by both adversaries for Hormuz (Hermes) control.
- **Saudi Arabia's north export route vulnerability:** The assaults on the East-West pipeline disrupted Saudi Arabia's capability to reroute shipments via Suez Canal, while the Houthis are capable to threaten vessels at the Yanbu outskirts.



SEA GUARDIAN global risk-tracking map

CORPORATE CONCLUSIONS

Corporations should expect to be exposed to risks since control of Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz by adversaries increased. Higher freight charges, higher insurance premiums, higher energy costs, and disruption of supply chains should all be anticipated.

THE OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE — COMING WEEK

- A substantial maritime risk in the areas of Hormuz, the Gulf of Oman, Bab el-Mandeb is expected, as well as in the southern Red Sea with unpredictable attacks, that will reduce maritime traffic, will cause delays and vessels rerouting.
- Marine tankers will continue to have a high exposure risk due to Houthi threats against Saudi oil exports.

ANNEXES:

- ❖ **ANNEX A** : MARITIME SECURITY – NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS
- ❖ **ANNEX B** : THE 45 VESSELS SANCTIONED BY IRAN

WEEK'S NEW FINDINGS

CONTENT TABLE (use «click on» for directly navigating to desired section)

CONTENT TABLE (use «click on» for directly navigating to desired section)		
GLOBAL ISSUES — GEO-POLICY / STRATEGY / ECONOMY	RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN	
ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA	PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA	
SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA	EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN	
BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED	OVERALL CONCLUSIONS	MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

GLOBAL ISSUES — GEO-POLICY / STRATEGY / ECONOMY



Brussels



Ceuta, Spain - Morocco



- **September 14 - Brussels.** [It was stated that European companies are increasingly concerned about geopolitical risks](#) being underprepared. Many are diversifying markets and supply chains, while few have been prepared for a Taiwan crisis. Businesses mainly want the EU to strengthen the Single Market, support innovation and improve industrial policy rather than impose tougher measures on US or China. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 18 - Ceuta, Spain - Morocco.** [Thousands of migrants in Ceuta were moved from beaches](#) to a new tent camp after a large influx into the Spanish enclave. Police struggled to control the crowds, while authorities faced concerns due to overcrowding, public safety and poor living conditions. The crisis has also drawn criticism of the Spanish government and calls for greater EU assistance. *[STOWAWAYS / ILLEGAL MIGRATION / PORT CRIMES / CARGO THEFTS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The European supply chain remains at risk due to geopolitical disruptions, while the Ceuta refugee problem poses additional threats also at the high political level of the EU. Better contingency planning and port security are recommended.

[↩ return to CONTENT TABLE](#)

ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA



Greenland



Nuuk



Arkhangelsk, Russia

- **September 16 - Greenland, Nuuk.** [The Arctic is becoming a major arena of geopolitical competition involving Russia, China, the US and Europe.](#) The EU is strengthening its security and strategic capabilities, while Finland's Arctic expertise, especially in icebreakers, gives it strategic importance. Europe is therefore seeking greater influence and strategic autonomy in a rapidly changing Arctic. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 16 - Arkhangelsk, Russia.** [Two U.S.-sanctioned heavy-lift ships are transporting power-generation modules from China to Russia's sanctioned Arctic LNG 2 project.](#) The equipment could contribute completing the second LNG train, which has been operating at reduced capacity. The shipment shows that,

despite Western sanctions, Chinese suppliers and shipping networks continue to provide critical equipment for the Russian Arctic LNG project. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS


The Arctic is becoming a more challenging area to operate from the perspectives of strategic and maritime operations, as it includes a growing number of military-security issues, competition for new shipping lanes, and the partnership between China and Russia that helps Russia to overcome the effects of sanctions on its LNG production.

↪ return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)

SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA



Lagos



Panama City

(Original statement “screenshot”)



Kahama (TANESCO)



Baghdad

- **September 14 - Lagos.** [Aliko Dangote a Nigerian billionaire has launched a \\$2.1 billion IPO for his oil refinery](#), allowing Nigerians to invest with as little as \$4. The refinery has boosted Nigeria’s fuel production and exports, though retail investors are paying a higher valuation than earlier institutional investors. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 14 - Panama City.** [Panamanian lawmakers formed a Taiwan exchange group](#), prompting China to strongly object. Beijing said the move violates the one-China principle and Panama’s diplomatic policy toward China, warning that it could harm bilateral relations. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 14 - Kahama.** [The Tanzania Electric Supply Company-TANESCO discovered an illegal electricity network supplying](#) 11 miners at Mwime Mine in Tanzania. The network bypassed meters and caused revenue losses, with electricity also being resold illegally. TANESCO is recovering the lost revenue and may take legal action against those responsible. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 16 - Baghdad.** [Iraq and Angola’s Sonangol discussed plans to develop the Qayara Oil Field](#) in Nineveh and increase crude oil production. The talks also covered oil transportation, marketing and exports, as well as the Qayara Integrated Refinery Project to expand refining capacity and supply petroleum products. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 18 - Minna.** [Protests erupted in Minna city Nigeria after 37 detainees, many of them children,](#) found dead in cells of the Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps-NSCDC, following arrests linked to illegal mining. Authorities imposed a curfew and launched an investigation, while President Tinubu called for accountability and prosecution of those responsible. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 19 - Dodoma.** [Ethiopia’s six-month trial of supplying 100 MW of electricity to Tanzania](#) through Kenya has ended, but a long-term agreement on tariffs, volumes and operating terms is still being negotiated. Transmission capacity and technical issues must also be resolved before the supply can expand. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Investments and development of energy production in Nigeria, Venezuela, and Iraq might help in the long term to ensure increased fuel supplies and exports in the international market. China-Panama disagreements regarding Taiwan approach could raise geopolitical risks at an important transit point, whereas energy theft in Tanzania underscores ongoing security challenges for infrastructure.

↪ return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)



Tripoli / Benghazi



Tehran



Kyiv



Batumi, Baku

- **September 15 - Tripoli / Benghazi.** [Libya's House of Representatives unanimously approved a 4+4 agreement](#) aimed at paving the way for presidential and parliamentary elections within 24 months. The deal seeks to unify state institutions, restructure the election commission, and resolve election-related legal disputes, helping end Libya's long-running political division. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 15 - Tehran.** [Iranian Foreign Minister Abbas Araghchi and the Lebanese Parliament Speaker Nabih Berri](#) discussed regional tensions and called for stronger regional coordination against Israeli aggression. Iran reaffirmed its support for Lebanon's sovereignty and resistance, while Berri urged international community to hold Israel accountable for violations and attacks. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 15 - Kyiv.** [Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy said Russia has not shown genuine willingness to accept a ceasefire on energy infrastructure](#), despite a U.S. proposal. Meanwhile, Ukrainian strikes on Russian energy facilities have increased pressure on Moscow, while the U.S. Congress considers new sanctions against Russia. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 15 - Batumi, Baku.** [Batumi Oil Terminal handled a record 293,000 tons of oil, oil products and gas in August 2026](#), its highest monthly volume since 2017. In the first eight months of 2026, throughput reached 1.251 million tons, up 3% from the same period in 2025. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS


The struggle among super and regional powers to dominate the Central and East Mediterranean basin will continue for quite enough time. There is an increasing threat to energy infrastructure due to growing tensions involving Iran and ongoing Russia-Ukraine strikes is directly affecting energy supplies. Increased throughput in Batumi bolsters the Black Sea-Caucasus energy route, albeit one vulnerable to regional turmoil.

← return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)

RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN



Riyadh



Yemen



Perim (Mayyun) Island



Khartoum

- **September 15 - Riyadh.** [Saudi Arabia warned of a firm response after Houthi missile and drone attacks](#) injured 13 civilians in southern Saudi Arabia. Fighting has intensified in Yemen, with the Houthis targeting Saudi territory and oil infrastructure, while Riyadh carried out dozens of strikes in response. Both sides have rejected negotiations and vowed to continue the conflict. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 16 - Yemen.** [The Houthis have made major gains around the Bab el-Mandeb Strait](#), including the reported capture of Perim (Mayyun) Island, strengthening their control over this vital major maritime choke-point and the corresponding shipping route. This fact, together with disruptions to Saudi oil production and the Strait of Hormuz crisis, is raising concerns over global oil supplies, shipping and prices. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*

- **September 17 - Khartoum.** [Sudan said it does not want war with Ethiopia despite rising tensions](#) and accusations that Ethiopia is allowing RSF forces to launch drones from its territory. Ethiopia denies the accusations. The dispute adds to long-standing border tensions, while Sudan's wider civil war continues to involve regional actors. Sudan's leadership said that wants to preserve the country's unity, maintain one national army, and resolve the conflict through both military and political means. *[POLITICAL]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Increased tensions between the Houthis and Saudi Arabia, and the Houthis land gains near Bab el-Mandeb, increases the risk to the Red Sea trade, regional energy assets, and oil security. Additionally, tension between Sudan and Ethiopia might also destabilize the Horn of Africa and the west coast of the Red Sea.

↪ return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)

PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA



Tehran



Washington / Iran



Salalah



Salalah


- **September 15 - Washington / Hormuz.** [The U.S. said the Panama-flagged tanker El Gaia was struck](#) by an Iranian missile in August and then stroked again by a drone off Oman, leaving it disabled with two crew members missing. The incidents highlight escalating attacks on commercial shipping around the Strait of Hormuz, with Iran and the U.S. giving conflicting accounts of the attacks. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 16 - Oman.** [Iranian crude oil exports have nearly stopped reaching international markets](#) after the US naval blockade, tighter sanctions and attacks disrupting oil shipments. Vessel-tracking data reportedly showed no Iranian crude crossing the blockade line for 60 days, while Reuters reported that exports had been halted since mid-July. At least no vessels with Iranian crude oil manage to get out at Gulf of Oman. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 17 - Riyadh.** [Crude oil and European gas prices are falling for a second day as Saudi Arabia](#) said an important oil pipeline could soon reopen. However, oil prices remain about 75% higher than at the start of the year because of supply disruptions linked to the Middle East and Ukraine wars. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The repeated assault against El Gaia and the halt of Iranian oil exports signify that there is a serious security and energy supply disruption in the Strait of Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. Even if a Saudi pipeline is expected to reopen, regional tensions continue to affect global energy prices.

↪ return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)

EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN



Taiwan East / Pacific



Taipei



Singapore Kuala Lumpur,



Bernama

- **September 7 - Taiwan East / Pacific.** [China is increasing its maritime pressure on Taiwan's Pacific coast](#), deploying Coast Guard vessels in waters that are important for shipping and military access. Patrols could help Beijing to establish a continuous presence and prepare for a potential naval blockade, while avoiding

September 20, 2026

direct military confrontation. The activity also raises concerns about disruptions to global trade and tensions with the US, Japan, and the Philippines. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*

- **September 10 - Singapore.** [Singapore's terrorism threat remains high due to global conflicts and extremist propaganda.](#) The Internal Security Department warned that youth radicalization is increasing, with online platforms playing a major role. Singapore is strengthening counter-terrorism efforts while focusing on early detection, rehabilitation, and public awareness. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 14 - Jakarta.** [Indonesia is seeking partnerships with Latin American and Caribbean countries](#) to strengthen cooperation in critical minerals such as nickel, lithium and niobium. The goal is to develop local processing, technology and supply chains, moving beyond raw-material exports. A business mission in Chile is planned for October 2026. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 14 - Tokyo.** [Japan's ruling LDP and Taiwan's DPP agreed to strengthen cooperation](#) to maintain peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait. The parties discussed countering China's military and economic pressure and reducing economic dependence on China. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 17 - Kuala Lumpur, Bernama.** [The Strait of Malacca is a crucial trade, energy and data route.](#) Any major disruption to its shipping or submarine cables could severely affect regional economies and essential services. Alternative routes have limited capacity, so ASEAN cooperation and regional security remain important. *[GNSS / ECDIS / AIS ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE - CYBER]*
- **September 18 - Taipei.** [Taiwan donated more than NT\\$300 million to Japan to support communities affected](#) by the earthquake in Kumamoto. The donation was raised through public contributions and reflects the strong friendship and mutual support between Taiwan and Japan. Both sides also emphasized closer cooperation in disaster prevention and relief efforts. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

With the rise of tensions between Taiwan and the Strait of Malacca, along with competition amongst global powers, there is a potential for two security crises to erupt simultaneously. The Strait of Malacca continues to pose a significant threat, where ships and submarine cables can be jeopardized.

[↩ return to CONTENT TABLE](#)

SEA GUARDIAN — OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

- **Political:** Taiwan tensions rose after Japan-Taiwan enhanced coordination, while China opposes to Panama's engagement with Taiwan. In addition, NATO stated that a Taiwan confrontation could go alongside Russian actions against Europe. In the Mediterranean, Cyprus-U.S. coordination continues to be reinforced, while Libya, Syria, and Iran-Lebanon are influenced by political instability and regional security concerns. Tensions between Sudan and Ethiopia could affect the security situation in the Red Sea if they will increase.
- **Economic and Resources Performance / Constraints:** The volatility in the energy market was due to disruption in the Middle East and the Black Sea, notwithstanding the decrease in oil and gas prices after the news about the quick restoration of the Saudi pipeline. Notable events include Dangote's refinery IPO investment, possible growth of Venezuelan and Iraqi oil production, Indonesia critical minerals alliances, the increase of Batumi terminal throughput, and the Chinese logistical support of Russia's Arctic LNG 2 project.
- **Military / Paramilitary Operations – Terrorism:** High level of violence continues around Yemen, the Red Sea, Bab el-Mandeb, Hormuz and the Gulf of Oman. The news about the Houthis' advances close to the Mayyun/Perim island, attacks on Saudi Arabia territory and energy infrastructure, and the disablement of tanker *El Gaia* show the high risks for international shipping and maritime trade.
- **Piracy / Organized Crime / Boarding Conditions:** The theft of electricity at Mwime Mine in Tanzania shows how organized crime exploits security vulnerabilities of industrial assets. There are no significant reports of piracy in the form of ship boarding, armed boarding, or any organized marine crime activity.
- **Transportation Routes and Resources:** The highly volatile situation at the Bab el-Mandeb and the Strait of Hormuz along with possible disruptions in relation to oil transportation, affect directly shipping and energy costs. Any single Iranian oil vessel exiting to the Arabian Sea has been totally prohibited; the possibility of environmental disasters has increased, with the example of El Gaia grounding; Black Sea/Caucasus terminals and Arctic LNG logistics are also issues to be closely followed.

SEA GUARDIAN — MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

- ▲ **Political risks:** Tensions around Taiwan, the China–Panama dispute, as well as the potential for concurrent crises in the China–Taiwan relationship and between Russia and Europe, raise the level of global security risks.
- ▲ **Military threats:** The unpredicted progress made by the Houthis near the Bab el-Mandeb east coast and their attacks in the area of Hormuz indicate an increased threat level of missile, drone, and direct strikes against shipping and energy facilities.
- ▲ **International trade:** The Middle East conflict maintains elevated costs for energy, freight, insurance, and supply chains, while alternative oil and refining projects provide only minimal assistance.
- ▲ **Maritime routes:** The high-risk routes of Bab el-Mandeb and Hormuz require caution; disruption may result in diversions through the Cape of Good Hope, increasing travel time, late shipments, and higher costs.
- ▲ **Organized crime:** There was another case of illegal electricity theft from a mine in Tanzania, while there were no reports of pirate or boarding attacks.
- ▲ **Cyber vulnerability:** There were no reports of any cyber-attacks or interference with equipment or networks, but the conflicts in the strategic waterways area raise the risks of GNSS/AIS interference.

↪ return to [CONTENT TABLE](#)

CONTACT US FOR FURTHER SUPPORT

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd — Intel & Security

E-mail: intelsec@sguardian.com • info@sguardian.com • www.sguardian.com
CY: +357 25351125 • GR: +30 210 9703322 • +30 6944 373465

REQUEST A TRIAL OR BOOK AN APPOINTMENT FOR “DACOR” SYSTEM

<https://sguardian.com/ai-services/>

Book a Google Meet: <https://calendar.app.google/LmPSoo5fDxZMVq357>



Copyright and Confidentiality

This document is generated from processed information (intel) produced in near-real time by the in-house SEA GUARDIAN database and algorithms together with the SEA GUARDIAN R&I team, and is a service to SEA GUARDIAN partners. This intellectual property is provided as a service for specific clients and purposes and may not be distributed outside the company without the written consent of SEA GUARDIAN, in accordance with GDPR.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944 373465) can support your operational planning, help determine risk assessments, and aid decision-making by producing tailor-made assessments on request — on ports, routes, cargoes and specific merchant vessels. Refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment briefs for background on each region

↪ return to [WEEKLY BULLETIN](#)

September 20, 2026

ANNEX A:

MARITIME SECURITY – NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS (SEPT 13-19)			
SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY / SAFETY AREA
SG R&I REPORT 078-26	14 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / West coast — 46.300000, 30.650000
SG R&I REPORT 079-26	14 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / West coast — 45.350000, 28.840000
UKMTO WARNING 135-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 110-26	14 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.600000, 56.283333
UKMTO WARNING 136-26 SUSPICIOUS ACTIVITY / MSCIO ALERT 111-26	17 Sep 2026	PIRACY ATTACK	Gulf of Aden / Yemen coasts — 12.828056, 45.671111
UKMTO WARNING 137-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 112-26	17 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.561389, 56.490000
SG R&I REPORT 080-26 MILITARY ATTACK	17 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / West coast — 44.801300, 30.663500
UKMTO WARNING 138-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 113-26	18 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.666667, 56.500000
UKMTO WARNING 139-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 114-26	18 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.633333, 56.600000

MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED			
SOURCE / I.D	DATE	AREA OF INCIDENT	LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 12 SEPT)
UKMTO WARNING 045-26 — HIJACK (MT HONOUR 25)	21 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 9.8167, 51.3500	No release confirmed. HONOUR 25 remains assessed as held by Somali pirates and is one of four vessels still reported under pirate control off the Somali coast. No verified public confirmation of a ransom settlement, crew release, or vessel recovery has emerged.
IMB/ICC 025-26 — HIJACK (MT EUREKA*)	02 May 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 13.8167, 48.4667	No release confirmed. EUREKA remains assessed as held by Somali pirates. Ransom-related negotiations have been reported, but no confirmed agreement, crew release, or recovery of the vessel has been publicly reported.
UKMTO WARNING 090-26 / MSCIO ALERT 078-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA*, chemical tanker)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	No release confirmed. ASANA remains held by Somali pirates. The hijack continues to be assessed as a Somali-piracy incident rather than a Houthi-linked attack.
UKMTO WARNING 118-26 / MSCIO ALERT 099-26 — HIJACK (MT SEAMULL / SIBU 1 — IMO 9204776)	20 Aug 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen coast — 14.314444, 50.155000	No release confirmed. SEAMULL also reported as Sibu 1, remains assessed as held by Somali pirates. It is included with Honour 25, Eureka, and Asana among the four vessels currently reported under pirate control.

* Vessel names not officially published; retrieved by the SEA GUARDIAN Intelligence Department.

ANNEX B :**THE 45 VESSELS SANCTIONED BY IRAN**

No.	Vessel	IMO	No.	Vessel	IMO
1	Kiku	9329796	24	Ryujin	8206818
2	Mubaraz	9074626	25	Anna Barbara	9407500
3	Minoan Pioneer	9471630	26	Sunbird Arrow	9323821
4	Hafeet	9928009	28	Maria	9917828
5	Al Rekayyat	9397339	27	Minoan Dignity	9294484
6	Wedyan	9524970	29	Kavomaleas	1042823
7	Cyprus Prosperity	9595216	30	Mardan	9360453
8	Al Rawdah	9734513	31	Sweden Prosperity	9588392
9	Rasheeda	9443413	32	Jarnain	9823546
10	Lebrethah	9976927	33	Kaifan	9656046
11	Lila Vadinar / Vadin	9324100	34	Nissos Kea	9920758
12	Maha Roos	9231004	35	Rotterdam Energy	9508859
13	GFS Galaxy	9401271	36	Al Hamra	9074640
14	Al Bahyah	9937799	37	Umm Al Ashtan	9074652
15	Mombasa B	9739501	38	Marigold LNG	9230062
16	Stolt Magnesium	9739317	39	Banastar	9228045
17	Al Watan	9615030	40	Navara	9241798
18	Navig8 Messi	9482859	41	Nissos Heraclea	9419618
19	Singapore Prosperity	9419967	42	Blue Star 1	9215115
20	Disha	9250713	43	Ashley	9258466
21	GasLog Shanghai	9600528	44	Mraweh	9074638
22	Lubna	9489065	45	Al Lulu	9583627
23	Hazi 1	7802598			

↔ return to [ANNEXES](#)