



THREAT / RISK — SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN

Brief assessment • Brief Update No 12-1/2026

• Reporting period 29 August – 06 September 2026

In reference to:

- [Threat / Risk Security & Safety Assessment — Monthly Report No 12/2026, 30 August 2026](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-1, 06 Aug 2026 \(Week 1\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-2, 13 Aug 2026 \(Week 2\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-3, 20 Aug 2026 \(Week-3\)](#)

INSIDE — GLOBAL RISK SNAPSHOT


Regional maritime risk remains elevated due to the ongoing conflicts, strategic competition and climate disruption. Key concerns include Red Sea and Horn of Africa instability, renewed Somali piracy, strikes in the Black Sea, heightened US–Iran tensions in the Strait of Hormuz, threats to subsea infrastructure, Russia’s Arctic shipping ambitions, and operational disruptions linked to Panama Canal drought conditions and Singapore haze.

TOP THREE FINDINGS THIS WEEK

- **The most significant maritime-security development** is the escalation in the Strait of Hormuz. It is the first time with IRAN in open sources publishing a list of sanctioned vessels threatened to be targeted in case of sailing through Hormuz strait or the Persian Gulf.

ANNEX TO WEEKLY REPORT No 12-1, updated September 06, 2026

- **Renewed Somali piracy**, highlighted by the seizure and recovery of MV LUTUF, confirms an active threat to merchant shipping off Somalia and reinforces the need for heightened vessel security measures.
- **Panama Canal transit reductions** caused by drought present a growing operational risk, with likely delays, congestion, draft restrictions and increased freight costs.



SEA GUARDIAN global risk-tracking map

CORPORATE CONCLUSIONS

The maritime threat situation is likely to stay high for this week, with the US-Iran dispute in the Strait of Hormuz (Hormuz Strait) being the biggest threat driver. Maritime traffic volume continues to be considerably low, while the danger from Iranian activities, mine or attack threats, as well as navigational hindrances continue to pose significant dangers to ships operating in the Gulf region.

The recurrence of Somali piracy is a major threat in the Gulf of Aden, Horn of Africa and the Western Indian Ocean after the MV LUTUF hijacking case, while the Panama Canal drought restrictions are still posing challenges.

THE OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE — COMING WEEK

- The Strait of Hormuz will continue to be the area with the most significant maritime security threats in the coming week due to the presence of US and Iranian forces and the participation in escorts for commercial vessels passing through the region.
- In the waters off Somalia, the MV LUTUF case shows that piracy is a serious threat that will require constant vigilance from merchant ships.
- The Panama Canal limitations will start to become more significant in terms of schedule delays and shipping costs because of the limitation of 34 ships per day, which is set to decline to 32 on September 15th.

MARITIME SECURITY & NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY / SAFETY AREA
SG R&I REPORT 066-26 (M/T GOLDEN SAPLING)	30 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 43.331131, 35.044227
SG R&I REPORT 067-26	31 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 46.620384, 31.025711
SG R&I REPORT 068-26	01 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 46.590384, 31.025711
SG R&I REPORT 069-26	02 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 46.318309, 30.66416
SG R&I REPORT 070-26 (MT NEFRIT)	03 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 44.724048, 37.77996
SG R&I REPORT 071-26 M	04 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea — 46.326443, 30.656081

MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	AREA OF INCIDENT	LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 20 AUG)
UKMTO WARNING 045-26 — HIJACK (MT HONOUR 25)	21 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 9.8167, 51.3500	No release confirmed. Negotiations have continued for months; mid-July reporting described talks involving owners, insurers, flag-state interests and pirates as being at an advanced stage.
UKMTO WARNING 046-26 — HIJACK (MV SWARD*)	26 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / SE — 6.9631, 49.3622	No release confirmed. The vessel's use as a mothership indicates pirates retained operational control; the case has evolved from a static hostage incident into an enabling platform for further piracy.
IMB/ICC 025-26 — HIJACK (MT EUREKA*)	02 May 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 13.8167, 48.4667	No release confirmed. It remained one of three vessels — 44 seafarers in total — for which ransom-related negotiations were reported in July.
UKMTO WARNING 90-26 / MSCIO ALERT 78-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA*, chemical)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	No release confirmed. Public reporting continued to assess the vessel as held by Somali pirates; the hijacking was not attributed to the Houthis.

* Vessel names not officially published; retrieved by the SEA GUARDIAN Intelligence Department.



Saudi Arabia's Recalibrated Engagement in Sudan and the Red Sea


Hermella Kidane



Arabian Peninsula



China



China

- **August 31 - Arabian Peninsula.** [It was stated that Saudi Arabia is strengthening its diplomatic and security engagement with Sudan, supporting the Sudanese authorities while providing humanitarian aid.](#) The shift is driven mainly by Red Sea security and regional competition, with possible implications for Ethiopia and neighboring states. [*POLITICAL*]
- **August 30 - China.** [By an article of Business Recorder was argued that critical minerals are becoming central to global economic and geopolitical competition.](#) China dominates processing and manufacturing, while the US, EU, Japan, Australia, India and resource-rich developing countries are seeking to diversify supplies and build domestic industries. The key challenge is moving beyond raw mineral exports toward processing, technology and value-added production. [*ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS*]
- **September 4 - Vlaardingen, Holland.** [Dutch police found 15 stowaways, including two children, hiding in a truck trailer at the Vlaardingen ferry terminal.](#) The group and driver were detained for identification and immigration processing, raising concerns about security at regional ferry terminals. [*STOWAWAYS / ILLEGAL MIGRATION / PORT CRIMES / CARGO THEFTS*]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Saudis engaging with Sudan comes amid increasing Red Sea rivalry. Power from critical minerals is becoming more reliant on processing capabilities. Pacific nations face harsh climate threats and are underfunded, as Haitian insecurity remains unchanged. The Vlaardingen incident shows the continued danger of migrant smuggling by ferries bound for the UK.


ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA



Reykjavík



Estonia



Arctic cycle

- **August 30 - Reykjavík.** [Icelanders narrowly rejected restarting EU membership talks, with 52.8% voting against and 47.2% in favor.](#) Concerns over control of fisheries and national sovereignty outweighed arguments about economic and security benefits, despite growing geopolitical tensions. [*POLITICAL*]
- **August 31 - Estonia.** [Estonia will quarantine emails from Russian \(.ru\) servers sent to state institutions](#) starting in September to strengthen cybersecurity and prevent Russian-linked cyberattacks. The measure is automatic but will not apply to every institution or local government. [*GNSS / ECDIS / AIS ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE - CYBER*]

- **September 1 - Arctic cycle.** [Russia plans to invest RUB 10 trillion \(\\$116 billion\) by 2035 to expand the Arctic transport corridor](#), including ports, railways, and icebreaker fleets. The goal is to boost cargo traffic and strengthen trade between Asia and Europe. Due to sanctions, China is expected to be a key investor and user of the route. [*TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES*]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The Baltic and Nordic countries are fortifying themselves against any possible hybrid threats from Russia by strengthening cybersecurity, infrastructure, and military capabilities. Meanwhile, Russia is working to boost its presence in the Arctic region in terms of transport and collaboration with the Asia-Pacific nations. The vote by Iceland proves that sovereignty and fishing are more important than closer EU integration.

SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA



Colón



Windhoek



Maputo



Kinshasa.

- **August 31 - Colón.** [The Panama Canal will reduce daily vessel crossings due to falling water levels caused by El Niño phenomenon](#), which has also worsened drought and extreme weather across the Americas. With rainfall and water inflows well below normal, authorities warn of growing risks to shipping, agriculture, and water supplies. [*TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES*]
- **September 1 - Windhoek.** [Namibia has approved an environmental clearance for the Sandpiper marine phosphate mining project off Walvis Bay](#). The project aims to produce about 3 million tons of phosphate annually, but environmentalists warn that seabed dredging could damage marine ecosystems and threaten the country's important fishing industry. NMP said mining will be controlled and closely monitored. [*ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS*]
- **September 2 - Maputo.** [A published article argues that conflicts are disrupting global energy](#), trade, and food supplies, exposing Madagascar's dependence on imported fuel and maritime routes. To strengthen its economy and food security, Madagascar must diversify suppliers, expand maritime cooperation, and develop local energy resources. [*TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES*]
- **September 3 - Panama City.** [Panama has acquired full ownership of the Petroterminal de Panamá for \\$191.7 million](#), strengthening its control over a strategic oil transport system linking the Caribbean and Pacific coasts. The deal gives the state greater influence over energy and maritime logistics, reflecting Panama's more assertive approach to strategic infrastructure. [*ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS*]
- **September 4 - Kinshasa.** [A new Ebola case has been confirmed in AFC/M23-controlled eastern Congo](#), more than two months after the group declared the area Ebola-free. A 21-year-old man tested positive in North Kivu, prompting health authorities to begin contact tracing and increase surveillance to prevent further spread. [*NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL*]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Reforms in Guinea-Bissau are oriented toward giving more power to the president. Restrictions on the Panama Canal point to climate change dangers for international shipping, whereas the takeover of Panama's Petro terminal enhances its control over energy logistics. All of the South is affected by political instability, uncontrolled smuggling, and tension among superpowers/high-powers for natural resources and navigational routes, which is full of threats and risks for the maritime industry.



Anaklia port



Eastern Mediterranean



Libya / al Qatrun



Kyiv

- **September 1 - Tbilisi.** [Anaklia Deep Sea Port announced as the first Georgian deep water container port](#) with state-of-the-art infrastructure and equipment. A consortium of the state-owned China [Communication](#) and Construction Company (CCCC), one of the largest construction companies in the world, and its subsidiary China Harbour, has been given the project for the construction of Anaklia in 2024. The issue is embroiled with international, political and business interests. [*TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES*]
- **September 2 - EastMed.** [A Russian naval group is moving from the Atlantic east through the Mediterranean with its AIS tracking turned off.](#) It may be heading to Port Said, Egypt, or Tartus, Syria, possibly as part of Russia's "Syrian Express" logistics operations. Its exact destination and cargo remain unconfirmed. At the same time Syria and Russia [signed a memorandum of understanding](#) during August 2026 to reorganize Russia's military presence in Syria. Russian civilian facilities are to be transferred to Syrian control, while Russian military bases are planned to be converted into joint training and qualification centers. [*MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM*]
- **September 2 - Damascus.** [The IAEA confirmed that Syria had attempted to build an undeclared nuclear reactor at Deir Az Zor under Bashar al-Assad.](#) The site was destroyed by Israel in 2007, and Syria had not fully answered the IAEA's questions. New inspections found cooling infrastructure consistent with a nuclear reactor. The IAEA will continue monitoring the site. [*MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM*]
- **September 2 - Beirut.** [Southern Lebanon remains heavily damaged and largely deserted after fighting between Israel and Hezbollah.](#) Israel has expanded its military presence and strengthened positions in the area despite the ceasefire, while demolitions and attacks continue. Talks over an Israeli withdrawal and Hezbollah's disarmament have stalled, leaving many Lebanese displaced and raising fears of a prolonged Israeli presence in southern Lebanon. [*MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM*]
- **September 4 - Libya's al-Qatrun.** [Tensions rose in southern Libya's al-Qatrun after 16-year-old Hussein Matar was shot at a petrol station.](#) Residents blamed the Libyan National Army's 87th Battalion, though responsibility remains disputed. Clashes followed, prompting calls for an investigation, justice and an end to retaliation. [*MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM*]
- **September 5 - Damascus.** [Commercial throughput across Syrian Mediterranean ports continues to show signs of operational recovery,](#) with General Authority for Ports reporting steady cargo growth at Latakia and Tartus alongside expanding oil transit operations at Baniyas. [*TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES*]
- **September 5 - Kyiv.** [A Russian drone struck the headquarters of Ukraine's SBU security service in central Kyiv,](#) injuring 12 people. The attack marked a rare and significant hit on a key government building amid days of heavy Russian strikes and Ukraine's shortages of air-defense systems. President Zelensky called for a strong response, while Ukrainian officials urged international condemnation and increased pressure on Russia. [*MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM*]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Libyan elections accord can present a viable way forward for resolving the political gridlock, but its execution depends on the ability and competition among several parties. Russian Navy movements and the past use of nuclear reactors in Syria pose security challenges in the region, while activities in southern Lebanon and Gaza by Israel suggest that the ceasefires are tenuous. The revived port activities in the Syrian Mediterranean could promote economic normalization and increase maritime traffic in this region.

RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN



Adulis & Assab



Darfur



Yemen / Red Sea



Yemen / West part

- September 2 - Adulis & Assab.** [It was stated that Ethiopia views access to the Red Sea as essential to its economic, strategic and national interests.](#) Its landlocked status creates heavy dependence on Djibouti for international trade and limits maritime connectivity. The government also draws on Ethiopia's history, when ports such as Adulis and Assab supported trade and regional influence. Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed's "two waters" vision links Red Sea access with the Nile as key factors in Ethiopia's future growth and security. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- September 3 - Darfur.** [Sudan's army plans to intensify operations in Darfur, Kordofan and Blue Nile.](#) Army Chief of Staff Yasser al-Atta accused the RSF of killings and ethnic violence. The army is reinforcing its positions as the RSF advances in Blue Nile. The UN reported continued humanitarian aid efforts amid displacement and a cholera outbreak. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- September 3 - Yemen / Red Sea.** [Houthis launched 14 ballistic missiles and drone attacks on populated areas](#) along Yemen's western coast. The attacks targeted areas in Taiz and Hodeidah, according to Yemeni government forces. Air defenses intercepted and downed several drones during the strikes. Government forces said their positions were not damaged and remained on high alert. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- September 6 - Yemen / West part.** [Government forces in Yemen are pushing back against a major Houthi offensive in Hodeidah and Taiz.](#) They have recaptured several strategic positions, while air strikes and attacks on supply lines have weakened Houthi forces. Fighting has also affected civilians, with shelling killing four people and displacing families. The escalation is raising concerns about humanitarian needs and the security of the Bab al-Mandab Strait. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

MV LUTUF seizure has signaled increased piracy concerns for Somalia despite the unverified claim of either rescue by military forces or ransom being paid out. On the other hand, the resumption of operations at the Suez Canal points to improved transit security in the Red Sea, while conflict in Sudan, attacks by Houthis, and Red Sea ambitions of Ethiopia keep maritime security concerns in the region alive.


PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA



Oman



Tehran



Persian Gulf Subsea cables



Hormuz strait

- September 3 - Oman.** [Kuwaiti Public Works Minister Noura Al-Mashaan visited Oman to strengthen cooperation in transport and logistics.](#) She toured Duqm Port and reviewed its infrastructure, capabilities and role in supporting trade and supply chains. Officials from both countries discussed cooperation opportunities and exchanged expertise. The visit aims to improve logistical integration and strengthen Kuwait-Oman relations. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- September 3 - Tehran.** [Iran's hardline Kayhan newspaper called on the military and IRGC to disrupt or cut](#) undersea internet cables in the Persian Gulf and Strait of Hormuz. The proposal aims to pressure the US and its allies by targeting critical digital communications infrastructure. Kayhan acknowledged that such action could violate international rules and harm other countries. The call highlights the growing strategic

importance of undersea cables and infrastructure as a potential pressure point in the region. [GNSS / ECDIS / AIS ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE - CYBER]

- **September 6 - Hormuz Strait.** [Iran and the United States have exchanged attacks involving warships and oil tankers](#), sharply escalating tensions. Iran claimed it damaged US naval vessels, while the US denied any hits. The US reportedly struck three Iranian tankers, and Iran later retaliated against several vessels. The IRGC also claimed to have targeted a US submarine near the Strait of Hormuz. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS – TERRORISM]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The US Navy's escort operations and attacks in the area of Hormuz show serious risks for the disruption of energy supply in the region through sea routes. The need for attacks on underwater communication lines indicates a growing threat to maritime infrastructure, but even if they are efforts in the right direction, the alternative of land routes deployment is not a near-future solution.

EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN



Taipei



Taipei



Singapore

- **August 31 - Taipei.** [Taiwan warned that China is increasing military pressure around the island](#), strengthening control of nearby air and sea areas. Beijing is also studying lessons from conflicts in Ukraine and Iran, including drone warfare, air defense, and logistics, while preparing blockade and encirclement tactics around Taiwan. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]
- **September 1 - Taipei.** [Taiwan Deputy Legislative Speaker Johnny Chiang met with Japanese lawmaker Nakatani Gen](#) to discuss regional security and Taiwan-Japan cooperation. Chiang highlighted the strong ties between the two democracies and called for deeper exchanges in response to shared security challenges. Nakatani emphasized the importance of peace and stability in the Taiwan Strait, stronger regional cooperation, and enhanced defense capabilities to address growing Indo-Pacific security concerns. [POLITICAL]
- **September 4 - Singapore.** [On 4 September 2026, Singapore reported an unhealthy PSI \(Pollutant Standard Index\) level of 101 in the Central region](#) due to haze. Maritime communities were advised to monitor air quality and take safety precautions, as reduced visibility could affect navigation. The Port Master may restrict harbor and pleasure craft movements if visibility becomes dangerously low. [NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The new corridor between Singapore and Brazil encourages the use of low-emission fuels and efficiency at ports, while China is becoming increasingly militarized in its approach to Taiwan, increasing maritime security risks in the Indo-Pacific region. Tension is building regarding Taiwan.

SEA GUARDIAN — OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Political: Saudi Arabia has developed political ties with Sudan due to its strategic interest in the Red Sea, whereas Ethiopia continues to pursue sea access, which could result in heightened regional competition. Unresolved political tensions continue in Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Israel, and the Taiwan Strait.

Economic and Resources Performance / Restraints: The importance of critical minerals, Venezuela's oil, offshore phosphate mining, and port-logistics development has increased. Governments have been trying to gain greater influence over the supply chain, processing facilities, energy reserves, and maritime trade.

Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism: Military threats exist along the Strait of Hormuz (Hermes), Red Sea, Taiwan, Black Sea, Lebanon, Sudan, and Yemen. The use of missiles, drones, naval, and ground forces could destabilize the regions, critical infrastructure, and merchant shipping activities.

Piracy / Organized Crime / Boarding Conditions: The MV LUTUF attack is indicative of a piracy threat by Somalia in the western Indian Ocean. There could be more such incidents, crew kidnappings, and boardings by force. The ship was released by a coalition of Turkish, US, French, and Somali ships, boats, and personnel, either in exchange for ransom (2 million out of the 10 million the pirates asked for), with the freight supposedly being military and the hijacking on August 17 conditions not clearly defined so far.

Hijacking / Kidnapping & Firing of Small Arms: The case of MV LUTUF highlights how commercial ships can still be hijacked and crews kidnapped in Somalia. Military intervention might be a response to such an event, but prevention methods are necessary. This intervention is not a trend for all hijacking incidents, as this hijacked vessel proved to have military freight.

Transportation Route / Resource Considerations: Hormuz, the Suez Canal, Panama Canal, the Arctic passage, Duqm, Anaklia, and the Nacala Corridor continue to be significant. Drought, conflict, sanctions, investments, infrastructure development, and diversification of transportation routes will impact maritime trade flows, while the development of the Arctic cycle navigation route is heavily reimbursed not only by Russia and China but also by other East Asian states.

GNSS / ECDIS / AIS Electronic Interference – Cyber Attacks: Cyber and hybrid threats are growing; this is especially true in the case of Estonia and the Baltic Sea region. Email filtering, protection of underwater infrastructure, drone defense, and maritime cybersecurity are becoming higher priorities.

Nautical Safety & Environmental Factors: Drought-based restrictions on the Panama Canal, climate-driven infrastructure risks for Mozambique, and seabed phosphate mining plans for Namibia are environmental and safety concerns. Droughts, extreme weather conditions, and environmental risks will affect the maritime industry.

SEA GUARDIAN — MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

Political risks: There is competition in the Red Sea and the Horn of Africa region over Sudan, Ethiopia's access to the sea, ports, and regional security partnerships, while Somaliland is becoming of high importance for the Horn of Africa.

Military threats: Threats of military conflict are highest in the area of Hormuz, the Red Sea, Yemen, Lebanon, Sudan, Ukraine/Black Sea, and Taiwan, where missile strikes, drones, naval and ground forces are threats to regional stability.

International trade: Energy, mineral, and container shipments remain subject to conflict, sanctions, droughts, and competition over control of strategic supply routes and infrastructure.

Maritime routes: Routes through Hormuz, the Red Sea, Somalia, Panama, Suez, and the Arctic are exposed to multiple risks of conflict, piracy, water scarcity, sanctions, and operational challenges.

Organized crime: The MV LUTUF case confirms increased risk of Somali piracy in the region, involving hijacking of vessels, crew abduction and detention, boarding by force, and potential criminal activity.

Cyber vulnerabilities: Increased risks of cyberattacks and hybrid warfare are compounded by AIS dark sailing and subsea cable risks, requiring advanced maritime surveillance and cyber protection.

THE 45 VESSELS SANCTIONED BY IRAN

No.	Vessel	IMO	No.	Vessel	IMO
1	Kiku	9329796	24	Ryujin	8206818
2	Mubaraz	9074626	25	Anna Barbara	9407500
3	Minoan Pioneer	9471630	26	Sunbird Arrow	9323821
4	Hafeet	9928009	28	Maria	9917828
5	Al Rekayyat	9397339	27	Minoan Dignity	9294484
6	Wedyan	9524970	29	Kavomaleas	1042823
7	Cyprus Prosperity	9595216	30	Mardan	9360453
8	Al Rawdah	9734513	31	Sweden Prosperity	9588392
9	Rasheeda	9443413	32	Jarnain	9823546
10	Lebrethah	9976927	33	Kaifan	9656046
11	Lila Vadinar / Vadin	9324100	34	Nissos Kea	9920758
12	Maha Roos	9231004	35	Rotterdam Energy	9508859
13	GFS Galaxy	9401271	36	Al Hamra	9074640
14	Al Bahyah	9937799	37	Umm Al Ashtan	9074652
15	Mombasa B	9739501	38	Marigold LNG	9230062
16	Stolt Magnesium	9739317	39	Banastar	9228045
17	Al Watan	9615030	40	Navara	9241798
18	Navig8 Messi	9482859	41	Nissos Heraclea	9419618
19	Singapore Prosperity	9419967	42	Blue Star 1	9215115
20	Disha	9250713	43	Ashley	9258466
21	GasLog Shanghai	9600528	44	Mraweh	9074638
22	Lubna	9489065	45	Al Lulu	9583627
23	Hazi 1	7802598			

CONTACT US FOR FURTHER SUPPORT

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd — Intel & Security

E-mail: intelsec@sguardian.com • info@sguardian.com • www.sguardian.com
CY: +357 25351125 • GR: +30 210 9703322 • +30 6944 373465

REQUEST A TRIAL OR BOOK AN APPOINTMENT FOR “DACOR” SYSTEM

<https://sguardian.com/ai-services/>

Book a Google Meet: <https://calendar.app.google/LmPSoo5fDxZMVq357>



Copyright and Confidentiality

This document is generated from processed information (intel) produced in near-real time by the in-house SEA GUARDIAN database and algorithms together with the SEA GUARDIAN R&I team, and is a service to SEA GUARDIAN partners. This intellectual property is provided as a service for specific clients and purposes and may not be distributed outside the company without the written consent of SEA GUARDIAN, in accordance with GDPR.

Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944 373465) can support your operational planning, help determine risk assessments, and aid decision-making by producing tailor-made assessments on request — on ports, routes, cargoes and specific merchant vessels. Refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment briefs for background on each region