



THREAT / RISK — SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN

Brief assessment • Brief Update No 12-2/2026

• Reporting period: 06-13 September 2026

In reference to:

- [Threat / Risk Security & Safety Assessment — Monthly Report No 12/2026, 30 August 2026](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 12-1, 06 Sept 2026 \(Week 1\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-2, 13 Aug 2026 \(Week 2\)](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-3, 20 Aug 2026 \(Week-3\)](#)

INSIDE — GLOBAL RISK SNAPSHOT

- Alliances are changing in the Red Sea, the Taiwan Strait, and the Arctic due to increased power consolidation in weak states. The Middle East region continues to be the most volatile military zone as new states are rising, along with increased tension between China and Taiwan and increased Russian strikes in Ukraine.


- Sanctions and natural resource allocation are becoming key levers of geopolitics, and Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, and Panama are experiencing increasing pressure, causing more attention to be paid to the Arctic and the Middle Corridor transit zones.

TOP THREE FINDINGS THIS WEEK

- **Iran-US direct clashes near the Strait of Hormuz** - attacks on warships and oil tankers mark a shift from tension to active combat, sharply raising risk for vessels transiting the strait.

- **Somali piracy resurgence** - the MV LUTUF hijacking / release, with five vessels and dozens of seafarers reportedly still held, signals a return of active piracy risk after years of relative absence.

- **Ukrainian strike on the Russian cargo ship Lady Mariia west of Crete** — expands the war's targeting from oil revenue to military logistics vessels, extending conflict risk into the Mediterranean shipping lanes.



SEA GUARDIAN global risk-tracking map

CORPORATE CONCLUSIONS

Shipping is facing a tougher, more uncertain stretch. The Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, and Panama Canal – three out of eight major maritime choke-points - are all under real pressure. At the same time the return of Somali piracy alongside attacks on vessels in the Mediterranean shows that the risks are spreading beyond the usual hotspots. Additionally, tightening sanctions, growing cyber and infrastructure threats, as well as shifting power in the Indo-Pacific and the Arctic, create difficulties for global trade but also offer opportunities in the months ahead.

THE OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE — COMING WEEK

- Hormuz stays the main worry, with Iran hinting at a new restricted zone in the Gulf and another tense standoff or tanker incident possible. Houthi strikes on Saudi energy and shipping should keep coming at an increasing pace, keeping Bab al-Mandeb and the Red Sea at high risk.

- Somali piracy likely won't ease either, given the recent run of hijackings and crew still missing. Around Taiwan, expect more of the same pressure tactics, while the Panama Canal should stay under tight restrictions as the drought continues.

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❖ **ANNEX B** : THE 45 VESSELS SANCTIONED BY IRAN

WEEK'S NEW FINDINGS


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GLOBAL ISSUES — GEO-POLICY / STRATEGY / ECONOMY	RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN	
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SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW-SE AFRICA	EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN	
BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED	OVERALL CONCLUSIONS	MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

GLOBAL ISSUES — GEO-POLICY / STRATEGY / ECONOMY



New Delhi, India



Moscow

- September 7 - New Delhi, India.** [India's Supreme Court heard a PIL over three Indian sailors allegedly killed or missing in Black Sea attacks during the Russia-Ukraine war.](#) The government said Indian embassies were coordinating with other countries, while the petitioners argued that more should be done to find the sailors and investigate their deployment. The court adjourned the case after seeking additional documents. *[HIJACKING / KIDNAPPING / LIFE LOSSES & SMALL ARMS FIRING]*
- September 8 - Moscow.** [The U.S. is continuing and expanding sanctions against Russia despite](#) a more constructive tone in negotiations, according to Russian Foreign Minister. Sergey Lavrov said that the new sanctions targeting Russian oil companies such as Lukoil and Rosneft contradict the U.S. diplomatic efforts, while Washington is also considering stronger measures that could affect global energy markets. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Maritime accountability concerning the ongoing Russia-Ukraine conflict is yet to be achieved from what is currently witnessed in the Indian courts' case of missing mariners, while sanctions pressure between the United States and Russia regarding major oil companies such as Lukoil and Rosneft continues to increase.

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ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA



Bujhta, Arctic



Estonia



Arctic cycle

- September 7 - Bujhta, Arctic.** [Russia has begun exporting oil from its giant Vostok Oil project through](#) the new Bukhta Sever terminal in the Arctic. The first cargo was loaded onto the ice-class tanker Valentin Pikul. The project, costing over \$100 billion, could eventually produce and export up to 100 million tons of oil annually. Its new pipeline and transport system are expected to create major demand for Arctic-capable tankers and increase oil traffic through the Northern Sea Route. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

- **September 9 - Tallin.** [Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania are considering joint measures to stop Russian grain](#) from using Baltic ports. While Estonia says Russian grain transit is minimal, the Baltic states have significant grain-handling capacity. Latvia plans a 300% tariff, while Lithuania is increasing checks. Experts warn that restricting Russian grain exports could raise prices and create food-supply risks in developing countries. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 10 - Arctic cycle.** [Russia is increasingly using dark ship-to-ship transfers to move crude oil from](#) the Arctic to Asian markets while obscuring cargo movements. Two recent transfers in the Sea of Japan involved four tankers after voyages through the Northern Sea Route. The activity highlights Russia's growing reliance on shadow-fleet shipping and Arctic routes to bypass sanctions and increase oil exports to Asia. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Russia is moving quickly to establish itself as an Arctic oil exporter through such facilities as the recently inaugurated Vostok/Bukhta Sever port, and exploit ship-to-ship transfers of sanctioned oil through the Northern Sea Route. At the same time, the Baltic states are facing an increasing risk of hybrid warfare, they impose sanctions against grain exports to Russia. Not to undermine the renewed North Atlantic tension over territorial claims.

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SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA



Panama City



Dakar



Cabo Delgado



Luanda, Angola

- **September 8 - Panama City.** [Drought caused by El Niño is forcing the Panama Canal to reduce the daily number](#) of ships passing through. The limit has already fallen from 36 to 32 ships, with further cuts possible if water levels continue to decline. The restrictions could increase shipping costs and delays, affecting global trade, especially between the US and China. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 8 - Dakar.** [U.S.-deported migrants in Equatorial Guinea reportedly faced a confrontation in which](#) police pointed firearms at them. The incident adds to concerns about poor medical care, limited legal assistance, and unsafe conditions. Equatorial Guinea right groups are criticizing the U.S. third-country deportation program and calling for greater protection of deportees. *[STOWAWAYS / ILLEGAL MIGRATION / PORT CRIMES / CARGO THEFTS]*
- **September 9 - Cabo Delgado.** [Italy is strengthening its presence in Cabo Delgado, Mozambique](#), through cooperation with local institutions, communities, and businesses. The mission highlights Italian investments, including ENI, and launched the €2 million Cambio program to improve climate resilience in Pemba, Beira, and Ibo. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 11 - Luanda, Angola.** [Angola's ANPG \(Angolan National Agency for Petroleum, Gas\) signed](#) several agreements with major international oil companies to expand offshore exploration in the Kwanza and Congo Basins. The deals cover several blocks and include seismic studies, exploration wells and long-term production opportunities. ANPG and Total Energies also agreed to cooperate on reducing methane and other emissions, while a separate Moxico project will promote emissions reduction, job creation and sustainable land use. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINTS]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Italy's increased involvement in Cabo Delgado indicates consistent investments by an EU member in the stability and security of Mozambique. The Panama Canal's increased drought-related regulations suggest that there is a growing threat to the structural reliability of global shipping in terms of cost and reliability. The US third-country deportation scheme receives increasing criticism due to the security-related problems that arise as a result of the conditions of deportees in Guyana and Equatorial Guinea.

BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED



East Med, Crete



Eastern Libya



Damascus. Baniyas



Ali al-Taher

- **September 7 - East Med, Crete.** [Ukraine reportedly struck the Russian cargo ship Lady Mariia west of Crete](#) with drones while it was heading toward Syria. The vessel is linked to Russian military logistics and is believed to transport weapons and military equipment. If confirmed, the attack would mark an escalation from targeting Russian oil revenues to directly disrupting military supply routes, while raising concerns to South EU member-states. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 9 - Tbilisi.** [Georgia has signed a \\$310 million contract with China Railway Tunnel Group](#) to build an 11.3 km highway connecting Batumi's bypass with the Turkish border. The project includes a 7.6 km tunnel and a 1.5 km bridge, needing a four year period. It aims to improve trade and transport links between Georgia, Turkey, and the wider Central Asian corridor. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 10 - Eastern Libya.** [Libya Crimes Watch has urged UN experts to investigate the execution](#) of at least 16 people in eastern Libya after military trials. The group reported serious fair-trial violations and called for executions to stop, independent reviews and protection for families and lawyers. *[PIRACY / ORGANIZED CRIME / BOARDING CONDITIONS]*
- **September 10 - Damascus.** [Syria's Baniyas Refinery is undergoing its largest overhaul, aiming to increase](#) capacity from about 80,000 to 130,000 barrels per day. The upgrade should boost domestic fuel production, improve reliability, and reduce Syria's dependence on imported petroleum products. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 11 - Russia.** [Russia is increasingly importing fuel from countries such as India, South Korea](#) and Turkey, as Ukrainian strikes damage its refining infrastructure. Oil-product imports surged to a record of 172,000 tons in August, while major ports and refineries faced disruptions. Despite these losses, Russia is still considered capable of sustaining its war effort for several years. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- **September 11 - Ali al-Taher.** [The Israeli army has withdrawn from the Ali al-Taher hills and repositioned](#) its forces along rear lines in the Beaufort area, Israeli Army Radio reported. The report said Israeli forces will maintain fire control over the Ali al-Taher Hills and confront any attempt by Hezbollah to return to the area. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

- Libya sends contradictory messages as both the country's eastern and western military leaders agree on cooperation measures, while human rights organizations are sounding the alarm about executions despite unfair trials. Syria is rebuilding its economy through increasing the refining capacity at Baniyas port, while Georgia is working on a new transport corridor to Turkey with China's help.
- Increasing Russian dependence on imported fuel supplies demonstrates the extent of damage the Ukrainian attacks have inflicted upon its refineries, although Russia is assessed to be able to keep the war going for several years. In Lebanon, Israel appears to redeploy its forces at the tactical level near Beaufort area, instead of withdrawing them.



Cairo



Delhi, India



Yemen, Mocha port



Yemen, Mocha port

- **September 8 - Cairo.** [Yemen told the Arab League that Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab and Gulf of Aden](#) security is essential to the Arab security. It called for stronger support for the Yemeni government and coast guard to counter Houthi attacks and protect maritime routes. Yemen also urged greater Arab support for economic recovery and reaffirmed its support for Palestinian statehood and its opposition to forced displacement. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 9 - Delhi, India.** [India condemned Houthi attacks on Saudi energy facilities](#), saying they threaten regional security and freedom of navigation through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait. The attacks reportedly injured 73 people and come as Saudi Arabia increasingly relies on the Red Sea route after the closure of the Strait of Hormuz. Houthi rising activity is increasing security risks for regional energy supplies and maritime trade. *[POLITICAL]*
- **September 10 - Yemen, Mocha port.** [Houthi forces reportedly advanced toward Mocha port and key areas](#) of western Yemen, while reports also claimed they captured Zuqar Island near the Bab al-Mandab Strait. The developments could give the Houthis greater control over strategic coastal and maritime routes, but the reported captures have not been officially confirmed. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 12 - Bab el Mandeb.** [The Houthis have reportedly seized control of Yemen's strategic](#) Bab al-Mandab Strait after capturing Mayyun Island and forcing government-aligned forces to withdraw from Perim Island. The development follows the fall of Mokha after heavy fighting, giving the Houthis greater control over a key Red Sea shipping route. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 12 - Puntland, Somalia.** [Somali pirates released the merchant vessel Sward near Garacad](#) after holding it for months. The crew were reported safe, and the release followed ransom negotiations. The vessel was hijacked in April 2026 amid renewed pirate activity off Somalia's coast, despite international anti-piracy efforts such as the EU's Operation Atalanta. *[HIJACKING / KIDNAPPING / LIFE LOSSES & SMALL ARMS FIRING]*
- **September 13 - Astana.** [Kazakhstan President Kassym-Jomart Tokayev and Ethiopian Prime Minister Abiy Ahmed](#) held talks to strengthen bilateral relations, expand political dialogue, and increase trade, economic, and investment cooperation. Tokayev emphasized Kazakhstan's respect for Ethiopia and noted that the Kazakh Embassy in Addis Ababa was one of Kazakhstan's first diplomatic missions in Africa. *[POLITICAL]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

There are ongoing concerns over the Bab al-Mandab strait, as reports suggest Houthi fighters are pushing closer to the Mocha area and the Zuqar island, despite the fact that all three – India, Yemen, and Ethiopia – are increasingly worried about their security and freedom of navigation in the Red Sea. The airfield review in Jordan after its planes were downed indicates greater alertness to Iran's missiles, while the Suez container rates are gradually declining due to expected traffic increase. Amid this situation there are many regional and distant forces or other high powers being involved in this new re-emerge of conflict.

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PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA



Tehran



Washington / Iran



Salalah



Salalah


- **September 8 - Tehran.** [Iran is expanding its pressure around the Strait of Hormuz, threatening vessels](#) that are passing through without its coordination, while the US continues maritime enforcement. Tehran claims oil exports remain strong, but independent evidence is limited. Meanwhile, renewed nuclear scrutiny, rising gasoline prices and economic pressure are adding to Iran's domestic challenges. Overall, the situation shows growing military, economic and diplomatic pressure on Tehran, with significant risks for regional shipping and energy markets. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 9 - Washington / Iran.** [Iran is increasingly coordinating with regional allies, including the Houthis](#) and Iraqi militias, to pressure Saudi Arabia and U.S. partners. Houthi attacks on Saudi energy facilities and maritime routes have increased, raising risks to regional energy security. Analysts warn that continued attacks could push Saudi Arabia to abandon restraint and respond militarily. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- **September 11 - Salalah.** [Iran and Gulf states are set to hold a meeting aimed at securing buy-in for a temporary deal to manage shipping through the Strait of Hormuz](#), the Financial Times reported last Friday. The gathering is scheduled to be held on Monday 14 in Salalah, the report said, citing two people briefed on the matter. Regional states seek a pathway to ease hostilities over this critical waterway. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 13 - Oman.** [Iran and Oman agreed on new shipping routes for the Strait of Hormuz](#) and will brief Gulf countries on the plan. Iran said the strait will remain closed until its conditions for reopening are met. The waterway is a key route for global oil and gas trade. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- **September 13 - Salamishah border.** [Iraq announced a phased reopening of three border crossings](#) with Iran after closing them following a drone attack on a Saudi oil pipeline. The crossings will gradually resume passenger and trade operations from Sunday to Thursday, while Iraqi authorities strengthen security and intelligence measures. Two crossings reopened to passengers on Sunday, but trade remains suspended. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Iran keeps turning up the heat around Hormuz and leaning on allies like the Houthis to squeeze Saudi Arabia and its US partners. If Iranian attacks continue, Riyadh may not hold back much longer. At the same time, there is a planned meeting in Salalah where Iran and Gulf states will try to hash out a temporary deal to cool things down over the strait, so there is still a diplomatic door open even with tensions running high.

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EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN



Taiwan East / Pacific



Taipei



Singapore

- **September 7 - Taiwan East / Pacific.** [China is increasing its maritime pressure on Taiwan's Pacific coast](#), deploying Coast Guard vessels in waters that are important for shipping and military access. The patrols could help Beijing establish a continuous presence and prepare for a potential blockade, while avoiding

direct military confrontation. The activity also raises concerns about disruptions to global trade and tensions with the US, Japan, and the Philippines. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]

- **September 10 - Singapore.** [Singapore's terrorism threat remains high due to global conflicts and extremist propaganda.](#) The Internal Security Department warned that youth radicalization is increasing, with online platforms playing a major role. Singapore is strengthening counter-terrorism efforts while focusing on early detection, rehabilitation, and public awareness. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

China just keeps turning up the pressure on Taiwan, whether it is Coast Guard boats patrolling the Pacific side or a record number of aircraft and ships crossing the median line in a single day, forcing Taipei to scramble its own jets, ships, and missile defenses in response. Meanwhile, Japan and Taiwan are drawing closer together on defense, tech, and supply chains, and over in Singapore, officials are flagging that more young people are getting radicalized online, a good reminder that the threat picture isn't just about states flexing their militaries.

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SEA GUARDIAN — OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

- **Political:** New trends emerge for Red Sea/Horn politics (Saudi Arabia-Sudan relations, Ethiopia's access to the sea, emergence of new state entities), for Japan-Taiwan ties under Chinese pressure, for the Arctic and North Atlantic sovereignty disputes (Iceland, Greenland, US claims), for consolidation in fragile states (Guinea-Bissau, Libya, Syria), and for the fragility of ceasefires in Gaza and Lebanon, with Gulf concerns about the Houthi threat.
- **Economic and Resources Performance / Constraints:** Resource struggles get fiercer (critical minerals, Venezuelan oil shifting to US dominance), strategic infrastructure builds up (new terminal in Panama Canal, Duqm Port, Baniyas/Syria etc.), Russia sanctions get stricter, extractive ventures move forward despite environmental constraints, and Baltic nations get into increased hybrid threat in economic terms.
- **Military / Paramilitary Operations – Terrorism:** Flashpoints in the Middle East region multiply (Houthi raids, Hormuz conflicts between Iran and the US, Jordan interdictions), gray zone operations by China escalate towards Taiwan, Russian strikes going on in Ukraine while Ukraine strikes back against Russian dark fleet, war heats up in Sudan and counter-terrorism operations carry on in Puntland/Somalia and Singapore.
- **Piracy / Organized Crime / Boarding Conditions:** Haitian gang-driven insecurity continues notwithstanding the UN-sponsored Gang Suppression Force, whose success remains uncertain.
- **Hijacking / Kidnapping / Small Arms Firing / Life Losses:** Somali piracy is making a comeback (MV LUTUF freed, ships remain hijacked) and the missing of Black Sea seafarers is in India's courts.
- **Transportation Routes and Resources:** The Arctic is becoming a significant trade route; the Panama Canal is feeling the strain due to drought cuts; the Middle Corridor/Suez alternative is balancing cargo; there are new connectivity developments (Singapore-Brazil, Mozambique, Syria); Baltic nations are imposing limits on Russian grains while Georgia's Anaklia port is disputed.
- **Smuggling - Cargo Thefts / Stowaways / Port Crimes:** Unusual migration issues continue, including stowaways at a Dutch ferry harbor and US deportee disputes in the Caribbean and Equatorial Guinea.
- **GNSS / ECDIS / AIS Electronic Interference - Cyber Attacks:** Naval/communication infrastructure continues to face interference threats, through Estonian email quarantine, Baltic cable/drone cooperation, and Iranian demands to target Gulf undersea cables.
- **Navigational Safety / Environmental:** Climate/air pollution issues continue to impact operations, through Singapore's haze threat to port operations and Palau's climate threat with funding delays.

SEA GUARDIAN — MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

- ⚡ **Political risks:** New alignments are forming around the Red Sea and new state entities appear in the Arabic Peninsula and the Horn of Africa. The Taiwan Strait and the Arctic are becoming hottest and important.
- ⚡ **Military risks:** The Middle East remains the most pronounced hotspot, alongside continued Chinese pressure on Taiwan and rising Russian-Ukrainian missile attacks.

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- ✦ **International trade:** On the one hand, sanctions and on the other, shifts in resources (Russia, Venezuela, grain trade) have become more common political strategies.
- ✦ **Shipping corridors:** Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, and Panama are under stress, shifting attention towards the Arctic and the Middle Corridor alternatives.
- ✦ **Organized crime:** Somali pirates and Haitian gangs are examples of state weakness coupled with ports exposed due to migration.
- ✦ **Cyber risks:** Maritime and communication infrastructure is becoming an intentional low-cost target of hybrid threats, from the Baltic to Iran's cutting of underwater cables.

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ANNEX A

MARITIME SECURITY – NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS (SEPT 07-13)

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY / SAFETY AREA
SG R&I REPORT 075-26 (MV MAVKA)	07 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / West coast — 45.333226, 28.827174
IMB/ICC 050 -26	07 Sept 2026	ROBBERY	Indonesia / -5.976667, 106.916667
UKMTO ADVISORY 128-26 / MSCIO ALERT 105-26	08 Sept 2026	MILITARY INTERACTION	Strait of Hormuz — 26.083333, 56.783333
UKMTO ADVISORY 129-26	08 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 25.000000, 57.700000
UKMTO WARNING 130-26	09 Sep 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Persian Gulf / UAE — 29.800000, 48.833333
UKMTO WARNING 131-26 (VLCC NEW ANDROS)	09 Sept 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Persian Gulf / Iraq — 25.650000, 55.083333
UKMTO WARNING 132-26 / MSCIO ALERT 107-26 & UPDATE	10 Sept 2026	PIRACY ATTACK / HIJACKING FAIL	Gulf of Aden - 13.366667, 47.950000
UKMTO WARNING 133-26 ATTACK / MSCIO ALERT 108-26	10 Sept 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.250000, 56.166667
UKMTO WARNING 134-26 & UPDATE 001 / MSCIO ALERT 109-26	13 Sept 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz - 26.550000, 56.500000

MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	AREA OF INCIDENT	LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 12 SEPT)
UKMTO WARNING 045-26 — HIJACK (MT HONOUR 25)	21 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 9.8167, 51.3500	No release confirmed. Honour 25 remains assessed as held by Somali pirates and is one of four vessels still reported under pirate control off the Somali coast. No verified public confirmation of a ransom settlement, crew release, or vessel recovery has emerged.
UKMTO WARNING 046-26 — HIJACK (MV SWARD*)	26 Apr 2026 / released 11–12 Sept 2026	Somalian Coast / SE — 6.9631, 49.3622	RELEASED. Somali pirates released MV SWARD near Garacad after ransom negotiations. All 17 crew—reported as 15 Syrians and 2 Indians—was said to be safe. The vessel had been held since April 2026 and reportedly was used as a pirate mothership during the detention.
IMB/ICC 025-26 — HIJACK (MT EUREKA*)	02 May 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 13.8167, 48.4667	No release confirmed. Eureka remains assessed as held by Somali pirates. Ransom-related negotiations have been reported, but no confirmed agreement, crew release, or recovery of the vessel has been publicly reported.
UKMTO WARNING 090-26 / MSCIO ALERT 078-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA*, chemical tanker)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	No release confirmed. Asana remains held by Somali pirates. The hijack continues to be assessed as a Somali-piracy incident rather than a Houthi-linked attack.
UKMTO WARNING 118-26 / MSCIO ALERT 099-26 — HIJACK (MT SEAMULL / SIBU 1 — IMO 9204776)	20 Aug 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen coast — 14.314444, 50.155000	No release confirmed. Seamull, also reported as Sibu 1, remains assessed as held by Somali pirates. It is included with Honour 25, Eureka, and Asana among the four vessels currently reported under pirate control.

* Vessel names not officially published; retrieved by the SEA GUARDIAN Intelligence Department.

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ANNEX B**THE 45 VESSELS SANCTIONED BY IRAN**

No.	Vessel	IMO	No.	Vessel	IMO
1	Kiku	9329796	24	Ryujin	8206818
2	Mubaraz	9074626	25	Anna Barbara	9407500
3	Minoan Pioneer	9471630	26	Sunbird Arrow	9323821
4	Hafeet	9928009	28	Maria	9917828
5	Al Rekayyat	9397339	27	Minoan Dignity	9294484
6	Wedyan	9524970	29	Kavomaleas	1042823
7	Cyprus Prosperity	9595216	30	Mardan	9360453
8	Al Rawdah	9734513	31	Sweden Prosperity	9588392
9	Rasheeda	9443413	32	Jarnain	9823546
10	Lebrethah	9976927	33	Kaifan	9656046
11	Lila Vadinar / Vadin	9324100	34	Nissos Kea	9920758
12	Maha Roos	9231004	35	Rotterdam Energy	9508859
13	GFS Galaxy	9401271	36	Al Hamra	9074640
14	Al Bahyah	9937799	37	Umm Al Ashtan	9074652
15	Mombasa B	9739501	38	Marigold LNG	9230062
16	Stolt Magnesium	9739317	39	Banastar	9228045
17	Al Watan	9615030	40	Navara	9241798
18	Navig8 Messi	9482859	41	Nissos Heraclea	9419618
19	Singapore Prosperity	9419967	42	Blue Star 1	9215115
20	Disha	9250713	43	Ashley	9258466
21	GasLog Shanghai	9600528	44	Mraweh	9074638
22	Lubna	9489065	45	Al Lulu	9583627
23	Hazi 1	7802598			

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