



THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY ASSESSMENT **MONTHLY** REPORT

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231, 28th October

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MONTHLY THREAT / RISK ASSESSMENT


Brief Update No 13/2026 • 29 September 2026
Reporting period 29 August – 29 September 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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OBJECTIVES

- To provide the maritime industry and security stake or shareholders in a monthly cycle, with:



➤ **MAJOR MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENT SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS IN GEO-STRATEGIC FRAME FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY OF SHIPPING FOR THE PERIOD **AUGUST 29 – SEPTEMBER 29, 2026.****

➤ **ASSESSMENT UPDATES CONCERNING MILITARY OPERATIONS – TERRORISM – PIRACY AND CARGO THEFT, HIJACKING AND DETENTIONS, SMUGGLING, STOWAWAYS, SHIPS FIRED, CREW LOSSES AND CYBER-THREATS, COVERING A WIDE SPECTRUM OF THREATS/RISKS FROM MARITIME SECURITY TO NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY.**

➤ SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy, establishing synergy with a subject matter expert (SME) entity for Cyber-defense including the most important sectors of policy, methods and training to mitigate cyber threats and risks.

Important notes:

1. The Assessment is produced by the R&I team in a global approach covering **27** different maritime regions in total, offering to readers the opportunity to study it as a whole, or focusing on areas of interest through the context table.
2. You can navigate directly to:

[[MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS](#)] or [[ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS \(CONTEXT TABLE\)](#)]

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

For “KEY DEVELOPMENTS” of July prior to September 19, refer to:

- [THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY BULLETIN \(brief assessment\), 12-1, September 07, 2026](#)
- [THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN \(brief assessment\), 12-2, September 13, 2026](#)
- [THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN \(brief assessment\), 12-3, September 19, 2026](#)

September 19



- [Yemen says it will not be used by Iran as a bargaining tool](#) in regional conflicts, emphasizing its strong partnership with Saudi Arabia. The government of Saudi Arabia is fighting the Iran-backed Houthis while seeking to restore state control, protect civilians, and secure the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab shipping routes. Fighting has intensified across several provinces, marking the worst clashes since the 2022 truce. [POLITICAL]

September 20




- [A new Russian maritime convoy delivered military equipment to the Libyan Mediterranean Sea port of Tobruk](#), OSINT project Russia Maritime Watch reported on September 16. Tobruk is becoming Moscow’s warm-water logistics hub. New satellite images show the unloading of armored personnel carriers (MRAP-class), support vehicles. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]
- [Ukraine carried out a major drone attack on Moscow](#), damaging part of the city’s oil refinery, which supplies about 40% of Moscow’s fuel. The strike comes as Russia faces growing fuel shortages and refinery disruptions. War also continued across Ukraine, with both sides reporting heavy drone attacks and damage to infrastructure. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]

September 21



- [Türkiye’s Ministry of National Defense said Turkish combat and support](#) aircraft conducted training flights south of Cyprus in international East Mediterranean airspace. Ankara said the exercise aimed to protect its interests, strengthen military capabilities, and maintain operational readiness amid ongoing maritime disputes in the Eastern Mediterranean. [MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]
- [Georgia suspended flights by Iranian airlines affected by U.S. sanctions starting from September 21](#). Tbilisi said it was complying with international sanctions and would prevent sanctions evasion, while Iranian officials warned of economic and social consequences. Iranian visitor numbers to Georgia also fell sharply in the first half of 2026. [TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]

September 22



- [Israeli forces reportedly raided homes in Al-Khan al-Gharbi near a UN post in southern Syria's Quneitra region.](#) The incident is part of ongoing Israeli incursions and military activity in southern Syria, which have increased since December 2024. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- [Prime Minister of Lebanon Nawaf Salam met with Turkish and Iraqi leaders in New York to discuss regional stability and cooperation in trade, energy, transport and infrastructure.](#) He also emphasized strengthening state authority, reforming Lebanon's economy and institutions, rebuilding the south, and engaging the Lebanese diaspora in investment and economic recovery. *[POLITICAL]*

September 23



- [The Yemeni Transport Ministry reported that 408 commercial vessels passed](#) through the Bab el-Mandeb Strait from September 11 to 21, showing an increase from 393 in the previous 10-day period. It said maritime traffic remained generally safe and operational, averaging over 40 vessels daily, and rejected claims that navigation through the strait had stopped or become unsafe. *[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES]*
- [The US, Denmark and Greenland reached a security agreement expanding the US military presence](#) in Greenland without transferring sovereignty. The deal allows two new defence sites, expanded military access and the establishment of the planned Golden Dome system, while restricting non-NATO foreign involvement. The agreement strengthens Arctic security cooperation but keeps Greenland under Danish sovereignty and preserves its right to self-determination. *[POLITICAL]*

September 24



- [Lithuanian Foreign Minister Kęstutis Budrys told the UN Security Council that Russia](#) is intensifying its war against Ukraine, with rising civilian casualties and attacks on infrastructure. The Baltic States condemned Russian actions, rejected elections in occupied Ukrainian territories, and called for negotiations leading to a just and lasting peace while protecting Ukraine's sovereignty and territorial integrity. *[POLITICAL]*
- [Tanzania's Vice-President urged world leaders to accelerate progress toward the Sustainable Development Goals - SDGs](#) through better financing, climate action and renewable energy investment. Angola's President condemned terrorism and the growing use of force, calling for dialogue and African-led solutions to conflicts. *[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM]*
- [Russia has started commercial crude exports from its Arctic Vostok Oil project,](#) with initial shipments averaging about 150,000 barrels per day. The project has faced sanctions and delays, but Rosneft plans to significantly increase production by 2027–2030. The new Arctic route provides Russia with an alternative export path as some traditional markets reduce purchases of Russian oil. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINTS]*

September 25



- [Sudan's war has become a major regional and international crisis. Both the army and RSF](#) face allegations of serious violations against civilians, including possible chemical-weapons use. Despite sanctions and evidence of

abuses, regional and international powers continue to engage with the military leadership. The article calls for independent investigations and equal accountability for all sides. *[POLITICAL]*

- [Oman participated in several high-level UN meetings in New York, focusing on GCC](#) (Gulf Cooperation Council) and the ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) cooperation, the right to development, human rights, maritime security, protection of humanitarian workers, and climate action. Oman highlighted international cooperation, social justice, sustainable development, human rights, maritime security, and climate resilience. *[POLITICAL]*
- [In the UN assembly, Kuwait urged stronger international solidarity to address the growing threat](#) of sea-level rise, particularly for vulnerable islands and developing countries. It called for greater access to climate adaptation funding and technology, while highlighting Kuwait's efforts through the Kuwait Fund for Arab Economic Development to support projects in water management, renewable energy, sustainable agriculture and resilient infrastructure. *[NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY / ENVIRONMENTAL]*
- [Panama has fallen to third place in the world's ship registry rankings](#), overtaken by the Marshall Islands. Liberia remains the largest registry. Panama's fleet has shrunk by 15% this year, partly due to efforts to remove older and potentially sanctioned vessels, while geopolitical tensions have encouraged some owners to reflag their ships. Panama's fleet is also the oldest among the leading registries. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*

September 26



- [A Singapore court has appointed KPMG \(Klynveld Peat Marwick Goerdeler\) as interim managers](#) of iron ore trader Radiant World amid suspected fraud and concerns over its ability to pay debts. The managers will investigate the allegations and restore confidence among banks and business partners. Radiant World denies insolvency and says the appointment is unnecessary. *[ECONOMIC AND RESOURCES PERFORMANCE / RESTRAINS]*
- [Russia is expanding its military and political influence in Madagascar](#), with Antsiranana's strategic port potentially providing access to the Indian Ocean. The partnership may involve security support in exchange for greater Russian political, economic and maritime access, although a permanent Russian base has not been confirmed. *[POLITICAL]*

September 27




- The head of Hamas abroad [Khaled Meshaal said measures around Al-Aqsa Mosque \(Jerusalem\) indicate](#) an effort to change its status. He called for four responses: Palestinian resistance, popular mobilization, wider Arab and Muslim support, and stronger action by regional leaders. - *[POLITICAL]*
- [Significant numbers of political prisoners were released in Venezuela](#), although the exact total is unclear. Human rights groups reported at least 29 releases, including 12 recognized political prisoners. The releases come amid claims by Interim President Delcy Rodriguez of a democratic transition, while rights groups say hundreds of political prisoners remain detained. - *[POLITICAL]*
- [China opposes Somaliland's independence mainly because it supports Somalia's](#) territorial integrity and follows a broader policy against separatism. Its position also reflects strategic interests in the Horn of Africa, including economic investment, regional influence, access to trade routes, and competition with Western powers. Claims that China is directly arming anti-Somaliland militias, however, require independent verification. - *[POLITICAL]*



- [Yemeni forces said they carried out 756 operations in 72 hours against Houthi positions](#), claiming 2,316 Houthi fighters were killed or wounded and military equipment was destroyed. They also claimed four Iranian military experts were killed in Taiz. These casualty figures and claims could not be independently verified. - [[MILITARY / PARAMILITARY ACTIONS - TERRORISM](#)]
- [Oil prices rose more than 1% after Trump rejected Iran's proposal to reopen the Strait of Hormuz](#), keeping Middle East tensions high. Brent reached about \$105.64 per barrel, while WTI rose to \$93.11. However, increased oil exports from Saudi Arabia and the UAE and recovering shipments through Hormuz helped ease some supply concerns. - [[TRANSPORTATION ROUTES AND RESOURCES](#)]
- [Ukraine is preparing for possible major disruptions to internet and mobile services as Russia targets](#) data centers and communications infrastructure. The government is spreading critical systems across underground, cloud, domestic, and foreign facilities to keep networks operating. Recent Russian attacks damaged several data centers and temporarily disrupted services for hundreds of thousands of users. - [[GNSS / ECDIS / AIS ELECTRONIC INTERFERENCE - CYBER](#)]

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MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS SEPTEMBER 21 - 29, 2026			
SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY/SAFETY AREA
UKMTO WARNING 140-26	September 21, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait / Coordinates 26.583333, 56.383333
UKMTO WARNING 141-26	September 21, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait / Coordinates 26.483333, 56.550000
SG R&I REPORT 081-26 MILITARY ATTACK	September 21, 2026	Military Attack	Black Sea / Odesa port / Coordinates 46.501353, 30.749454
SG R&I REPORT 082-26 MILITARY ATTACK	September 23, 2026	Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 46.461048, 30.866933
UKMTO WARNING 142-26 ATTACK	September 23, 2026	Military Attack	Hormuz strait / Coordinates 26.612500, 56.371389
SG R&I REPORT 083-26 MILITARY ATTACK	September 24, 2026	Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 46.356091, 30.835749
SG R&I REPORT 084-26 MILITARY ATTACK	September 25, 2026	Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 46.437830, 30.974168
SG R&I REPORT 085-26 MILITARY ATTACK	September 26, 2026	Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 46.328998, 30.915430



• **INCIDENTS** • **CHOKE-POINTS** • **FRIENDLY**  **Ports**
 CHARTS ARE PROVIDED BY SEA GUARDIAN "DaCoR" system / MTRI web-interactive map


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MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	AREA OF INCIDENT	LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 12 SEPT)
UKMTO WARNING 045-26 — HIJACK (MT HONOUR 25)	21 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 9.8167, 51.3500	No release confirmed. HONOUR 25 remains assessed as held by Somali pirates and is one of four vessels still reported under pirate control off the Somali coast. No verified public confirmation of a ransom settlement, crew release, or vessel recovery has emerged.
IMB/ICC 025-26 — HIJACK (MT EUREKA*)	02 May 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 13.8167, 48.4667	No release confirmed. EUREKA remains assessed as held by Somali pirates. Ransom-related negotiations have been reported, but no confirmed agreement, crew release, or recovery of the vessel has been publicly reported.
UKMTO WARNING 090-26 / MSCIO ALERT 078-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA, chem. tanker)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	No release confirmed. ASANA remains held by Somali pirates. The hijack continues to be assessed as a Somali-piracy incident rather than a Houthi-linked attack.
UKMTO WARNING 118-26 / MSCIO ALERT 099-26 — HIJACK (MT SEAMULL / SIBU 1 — IMO 9204776)	20 Aug 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen coast — 14.314444, 50.155000	Released. Released following a Puntland Maritime Police Force anti-piracy operation. All 20 crew members were reported safe. There is currently no credible public confirmation that a ransom was paid for the vessel's release. Reports indicate the release resulted from a counter-piracy operation rather than a negotiated ransom payment. Several suspected pirates arrested during the operation escaped while being transferred to a detention facility, with some later recaptured.

GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)				
A/A	VICINITY / AREA / DOMAIN	OVERALL	THREAT sections	RISK sections
1	THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS)	X	—	
2	CYBER-THREATS / RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION BY CYBERPAX	X	—	
3	LIBYA – CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN	—	X	—
4	SYRIA (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	—	X	—
5	LEBANON (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	—	X	—
6	GAZA-ISRAEL (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	—	X	—
7	SUDAN – ERITREA – ETHIOPIA	—	X	—
8	RED SEA – YEMEN	—	X	—
9	NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF / IRAN’S REGION	—	X	—
10	BLACK SEA / NORTH PART (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)	—	X	—
11	BALTIC SEA / NE PART (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)	—	X	—
12	TERRORISM - ORGANIZED CRIME / HUMMANS’ TRAFFICKING – NAVIGATONAL / ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS	—	X	—
13	GULF OF GUINEA	—	—	X
14	EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA	—	—	X
15	SUEZ CANAL – NORTHERN RED SEA	—	—	X
16	BAB-EL-MANDEB STRAITS – SOUTHERN REA SEA	—	—	X
17	GULF OF ADEN – SOMALIA / SOMALILAND	—	—	X
18	ARABIAN SEA – GULF OF OMAN	—	—	X
19	HORMUZ STRAITS – PERSIAN GULF	—	—	X
20	BLACK SEA / EAST PART	—	—	X
21	BALTIC SEA / WEST PART	—	—	X
22	SOUTH AMERICA / NW PART – PANAMA	—	—	X
23	SOUTH AMERICA / NE PART – VENEZUELA	—	—	X
24	SOUTHERN AFRICA / WEST PART – ANGOLA / NAMIBIA	—	—	X
25	SOUTHERN AFRICA / EAST PART - MADAGASCAR	—	—	X
26	MALACCA STRAITS	—	—	X
27	TAIWAN – JAPAN SEA	—	—	X
28	TAIWAN – SOUTH CHINA SEA	—	—	X
29	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	—	—	X
30	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	—	—	X
31	PIRACY – BOARDING CONDITIONS, KIDNAPPING, FIRING, ELECTRONIC HARASSMENT	—	—	X
32	OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING	X	X	X
ANNEXES TO SECURITY ASSESSMENT				
	ANNEX “A”: CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE	X	—	
	ANNEXI “B”: SECURITY ASSESSMENT – LESSONS LEARNED	X	—	
	ANNEX “C”: THE SEA GUARDIAN DATA & CONTROL REPORTING SYSTEM (DACOR)	X	—	

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS)



Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile:

- The current global security situation continues to be characterized by several interconnected conflicts, hybrid threats, and competitions for important maritime transit routes and infrastructure. The immediate threat to the world's sea routes and supply lines is associated with the escalation of activities in the Straits of Hormuz and Bab al-Mandeb as well as the Horn of Africa, since the U.S.-Iranian conflict, the advancement of the Houthis, attacks against Saudi interests and piracy incidents increase the possibility of disruptions. Russia's aggression against Ukraine, alleged acts of sabotage in Europe, and NATO's reinforcement activities indicate the risk of the spillover effect of the conflict beyond the battlefield. China's military and coast guard operations near Taiwan also show the possibility of disruption of vital Asian sea routes.

Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile:

- Fragmentation** in the global geo-economy has driven up costs and increased volatility as countries focus on controlling their energy, critical minerals, trade corridors, and strategic infrastructure. Diversification enhances resilience yet creates more complex, costly, and politically sensitive supply chains.
- Competition** is heating up in the Arctic, Greenland, the Baltic region, the Red Sea and the Taiwan Strait. EU engagement with Greenland, the development of Russia's Arctic oil production, and increased Baltic hybrid challenges underscores the importance of energy infrastructure, navigation capabilities, and northern shipping lanes. Energy is still subject to conflict, sanctions, and refinery disruption. Countries are adding refining capacity, securing alternate sources and increasing control over strategic assets, while industry diversifies its supply chain but remains unprepared for a shock from Taiwan.

International Security / Strategic sector:

- Red Sea, Mediterranean, and Black Sea security concerns have become increasingly interlinked by means of conflict spillover, drone attacks, military logistics, and dangers to energy infrastructure. Increased conflicts in Yemen create additional risks for Bab al-Mandeb and Red Sea navigation, whereas allegations of Iranian involvement need to be confirmed. Deliveries of Russian military equipment to Tobruk make Libya one more participant in Moscow's Mediterranean logistics chain choke point. Ukrainian drone strikes against Russian refineries bring into focus problems with fuel supply and infrastructure. Turkish actions in and around Cyprus, Israeli activities in Syria, as well as disputes between Ethiopia, Somalia, Somaliland and Eritrea keep maritime tensions high.

Global Maritime Security / Navigational safety profile:

- Maritime security risks are rising across the Red Sea, Strait of Hormuz, Mediterranean, Black Sea and Indo-Pacific as conflict, drone attacks, piracy, sanctions evasion, and threats to energy infrastructure disrupt key trade routes.
- Houthi gains near Bab al-Mandeb, incidents around Oman, Russian shadow-fleet activity, and tensions near Taiwan and Malacca increase the likelihood of delays, diversions, higher insurance costs, and pressure on oil and gas flows.



The Option Has Been Exercised: State Cyber Operations Reach the Machinery, and the Ships

Feature on the summer's shift from pre-positioning to effect, why small and remote assets are the chosen targets, and what operators should now measure

- In July this column described state-linked intrusions into critical infrastructure as access held in reserve, valuable less for what it could do that day than for what it could do later. This summer the reserve was drawn on. In July a small power generator in the United Kingdom was forced offline for four days by a cyberattack widely reported as the work of Iran-affiliated hackers. The British government has confirmed the incident, stressed that the wider grid was never at risk, briefed energy companies and shared further advice; it has not named the attacker. The Telegraph, which broke the story, called it the first disruptive attack of its kind in the United Kingdom. In the same weeks, a coordinated campaign hit more than thirty community water systems in Minnesota alone and utilities in at least a dozen US states; operators fell back to manual control and service was not interrupted. And in the second half of August the story reached our own domain. US Coast Guard and FBI cyber teams boarded two US-bound oil tankers, one of them in the Gulf of Mexico, after what the Coast Guard called indications that their networks had been "compromised by foreign cyber actors"; reporting on one vessel describes interference with engine speed and fuel systems and a loss of communications of more than a day. No operational harm was reported, and attribution remains open.
- Two features of these incidents deserve the attention of maritime operators. The first is how little they required. The US federal advisories on the water campaign describe no exotic tooling: controllers reachable from the internet, factory-default passwords, operator screens taken over. The second is the choice of target. A small generator whose outage nobody outside the sector noticed is a poor target if the aim is damage, and a very good one if the aim is to show that such access exists and can be used at will. Small, distributed, remotely managed assets are the natural stage for that kind of demonstration. The business reader should notice the same profile in a different place: the terminal, the bunkering station, the offshore unit, the vessel maintained over a vendor link - small assets whose stoppage makes no headline and whose contractual exposure is out of all proportion to their size. A boarded tanker is a schedule lost, a cargo delayed and a conversation with the charterer; under the US Coast Guard's 2025 cybersecurity rule the incident is also reportable, and the vessel's cyber posture is now a question in vetting and in the renewal discussion with insurers. The demonstration this summer was not that such systems can be stopped. It was that stopping them costs the attacker very little and the operator a great deal. And the effort needed to reach such systems keeps falling. Researchers at Fore scout recently had an AI port a working PLC exploit to a neighboring controller model in about eight and a half hours, for some five hundred dollars of computing cost - still slower than an expert, by their own account, but that gap is the one that is closing.
- A word of discipline, because it matters for how we read all this. Attribution in these cases still rests largely on press reporting, and serious analysts have warned against leaping to conclusions; as Robert M. Lee of Dragos put it, "probably isn't enough in geopolitics." In my view the operator's question does not wait on attribution anyway. Whoever the actor, the conditions that made these incidents possible are known, and they can be checked. Is any controller reachable from the internet? Are default

credentials anywhere in the estate? Who holds remote access, through which vendor, and who watches it? Can the plant or the vessel run manually, and has anyone practised doing so? How long would it take the people on site to notice that something is wrong? These questions do not average out. A facility that answers four of them well and fails the fifth has, in practice, failed. Readiness is set by the weakest of them, and it should be assessed that way.

- Nothing about the threat this summer was new, except its willingness to act. The access had been there for years. This year it was used, on allied soil and at sea, and the operators - and the owners answering to charterers and insurers - best placed for what comes next are those who have already checked which of those conditions apply to them.

Two-line risk snapshot

- State-linked disruptive operations against small and remote OT assets (terminals, offshore units and vessels reachable over vendor links): **HIGH**
- Operators' ability to verify the basic gating conditions (internet exposure, default credentials, vendor access, manual fallback, time to detect): **CRITICAL**

Dr. Eric Tartas — Founder & CEO, CyberPax S.A. — for the SEA GUARDIAN monthly assessment, October 2026

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THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

- Military / Terrorism: Libya is still classified as a high-risk area because of the fragmentation of military control, local militia violence, and increasing military activity. The Russian military deliveries to the Tobruk Port highlighted the military awareness of eastern ports as more sensitive to Russian Geo-policy.
- Piracy / Organized Crime: There have been no reports of any verified acts of piracy or boarding. However, the weak governance, presence of armed groups, and illicit networks contribute to high levels of organized crime.
- Hijacking / Life Damages: There have been no recent maritime hijackings. Localized clashes and violent incidents may occur and could lead to fatalities, especially at the locations near checkpoints and military-related areas.
- GNSS Interference / Cyber-Threats: There have been no confirmed reports of GNSS, AIS, or cyber incidents.
- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that, as much as the oil transportation delays do not return to regular trends due to the conflict around the Arabian Peninsula, Libya is rising as an alternative source of hydrocarbons for international markets. The re-unification of Libya under the control of one government is the solution for increasing oil exports, while the presence of foreign armed forces in the country is constraining the normalization of the state governance under one political power.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” – ICC/Piracy: “NSR” – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: “HIGH” – GNSS interference: “LOW”.

- Triggers and Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

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Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- The waters around Syria constitute a high-risk area as a result of regional military tension, terrorist threats, inadequate security structure, and organized crime.
- The involvement of Israel in southern Syria and the uncertain nature of the broader Iran conflict raises the possibility of rapid deterioration of security conditions, transportation disruptions and limitations on port access and overland movements. The IAEA report for Syria's attempt to acquire nuclear weapon does not pose an immediate threat to the shipping industry but adds to the strategic considerations.
- No cases of piracy, hijackings, GPS interference or cyber-attacks against vessels and Syrian ports were recently reported. Nevertheless, threats of cargo theft, document forgery, smuggling, bribery and poor port services should be considered as significant.
- Potential navigational problems might occur due to ports insufficient infrastructure, inadequate emergency services and navigational aids, congestion, and delays.
- Ships visiting Latakia, Tartus or Baniyas should enhance their security precautions, check the port arrangements prior to arrival, restrict shore excursions and preserve diversion alternatives.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

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Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Military / Terrorism: Lebanon continues to be medium to high-risk because of the ongoing tensions between Israel and Hezbollah and the Israeli military operations.
- Piracy / Organized Crime: There are no piracy incidents, but the risks of smuggling and organised crime exist due to weak border control and the presence of armed paramilitary groups.
- Hijacking / Life Damages: No maritime hijacking incidents have occurred. Ongoing conflict operations could generate risks of injuries, damage, and movement disruptions.
- Navigational Hazards: Careful monitoring of alerts and constant planning for passage and port calls is recommended, as military conflict escalation could pose sudden risks to maritime vessels.
- GNSS Interference / Cyber-Threats: No incidents of interference in global navigation satellite systems or cyber threats have been reported. It is recommended to conduct alternative position checks and use reliable means of communication.
- Crime in Ports: High fuel and logistics operations in Tripoli increase the need to improve cargo and access security measures, even if there are no incidents of criminality in ports.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- The Israel–Gaza maritime environment remains highly dangerous due to ongoing military operations, armed-group activity, and a fragile ceasefire. Ground operations, airstrikes, and mutual allegations of

violations sustain the risk of sudden disruption to coastal infrastructure, port access, and maritime movements.

- No recent piracy, hijacking, GNSS-interference, or major cyber incidents affecting Gaza's maritime approaches have been reported. However, vessels should expect possible electronic disruption, security restrictions, changing access controls, and limited emergency support. Humanitarian pressure remains acute, while rubble clearance may be delayed by requirements to preserve human remains and evidence of alleged international crimes.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially depicted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Sudan – Eritrea – Ethiopia

- Military / Terrorism: Sudan poses a very high risk because of increasing conflicts between the SAF and RSF in Darfur, Kordofan, and the Blue Nile. Threats due to armed-group activities, drones, ethnic conflicts, displacements, and humanitarian impacts are more than possible.
- Piracy / Organized Crime: There are no cases of maritime piracy reported. However, poor state control and porous borders could create risks of smuggling and other criminal activities by armed groups.
- Hijacking / Life Damages: There are no cases of maritime hijackings/kidnappings recorded. Conflicts and drone attacks ensure that there will be very high risks of casualties and disruption of overland transport.
- Navigational Hazards: No cases of navigational hazards were reported. Insecurity in the region and Ethiopia's drive for access to the sea increase the strategic sensitivity of the Red Sea and Horn of Africa maritime corridors.
- GNSS Interference / Cyber-Threats: No incidents of any GNSS interference or cyber-attack were reported. Operators should maintain alternate navigation and communication methods.
- Crime in Ports: No crime in ports was reported. A poor security environment may increase the risk of ports becoming vulnerable to theft and smuggling, among other problems.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "LOW".

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered as analyzed in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Red Sea – Yemen

- The southern Red Sea and Yemen pose high-risk maritime areas. The heightened levels of fighting between the Houthis and the Yemeni's Government, the use of missile and drone strikes, as well as increased activity near the western coast of Yemen, have increased the chances of disruption to shipping, ports, and Bab al-Mandeb. Houthis' presence in Mocha and other strategic coasts can also disrupt access to these routes.
- There is an increased number of attacks on Saudi Arabia by the Houthis, as well as the threat of reprisals from Saudi Arabia, increasing the risk of escalation. No new cases of pirate attacks or hijackings have been reported in Yemeni territorial waters; however, there is still a threat of missiles and drones, as well as explosives, GNSS, and disruption of access.
- SEA GUARDIAN highlighted in the May 2026 monthly report and repeated the trend in July 2026 the deployment of Iranian officers in Yemen for providing training on new weapon systems to the Houthis.

It is assessed that Iranian officers mission serves from one hand to orient Houthis' efforts against Saudi Arabia and in the other hand to conquer the control of the entire Yemen. This comes in contradiction to the latest published news on media as in [TRT world](#), that the Houthis are not Iranian proxies.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Northern Persian Gulf / Iran's region

- The Northern Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz remains as a high-threat/risk zone. Strikes against merchant vessels, disruptions to shipping operations and ambiguity in a conditional route through Iran-Oman pose serious risks to international shipping and energy transfers. Traffic accommodation is disrupted by repeated military attacks in the south around Hormuz, creating a high level of uncertainty for the maritime community to return into the strait.
- Military/Terrorism: Regional escalation and activities by Iranian proxies keep the risk of attacks on vessels, energy infrastructure, and personnel alive. The characterization of ships as targets in accordance with different rules between the US mission tasks and Iran's pursuit to totally dominate the strait, creates a puzzle of threat and risk difficult to resolve in any case.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: Although there is no piracy trend, ship detention, smuggling, and forced management of waterways pose significant risks. High crew risk is posed by vessel strikes, ship detention and restricted access to emergency services in the strait.
- GNSS/Cyber: Even if there have been no confirmed important incidents due to electronic warfare, the electronic interference picture is of a high risk.
- Port Crime: Even if there aren't port crimes in practice, there is still the possibility of military strikes inside ports at berth or anchorages.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 08-1/2026, April 30.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Black Sea / NORTH part (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)

- Military/Terrorism: Escalation risk remains high in connection with threats by Russian military against energy infrastructure in Ukraine, as well as the strike of a drone on the SBU headquarters in Kyiv. In retaliation Ukrainian attacks by drones against Russian energy facilities is on a daily base. The war continues to also target merchant vessels, with the loss of a captain's life in the latest week.
- Piracy/Organized Crime: There were no reports of any incidents related to piracy and organized crime, hijacking/life damages due to criminality. Disruption of energy logistics and exposure to sanctions remain the primary maritime risks.
- Navigational Risks: There were no specific navigational risk incidents. Even so, the possibility of debris and other related hazards harming merchant vessels is high. Monitoring of NAVWARNs for short-notice potential restrictions due to military activities is recommended, especially close to ports, terminals, and transport routes.
- GNSS Interferences/Cyber Threats: No new confirmed incidents have been reported. It is recommended to use regular navigation, communications, and contingency procedures.

- Crime in Ports: No specific port-related crimes have been reported. Refinery disruptions resulted in an increase in fuel imports, which could put extra stress on Russian ports and logistics infrastructure, leading to circumvention of international rules.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: VERY HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Baltic Sea / NE part (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)

- The Northern Baltic continues to be a highly risky region for navigation because of drone activity, electronic warfare risks, sanctions, and hybrid threats.
- Military / Terrorism: Estonia and the wider Baltic area continue to be subject to a higher level of geopolitical and hybrid threat risk due to Russia's war with Ukraine. In practice, there is no direct impact on shipping.
- Piracy / Organized Crime - Hijacking / Life Threats: There are no reports of any piracy, hijacking, or life threats due to criminality. Organized crime incidents are a possibility as part of actions in the context of a war. Restrictions on the passage of Russian grain would likely increase compliance and documentation requirements.
- Navigational deficiencies: There have been no specific reports on navigational challenges. Restrictions on the transit of Russian grain could pose navigational challenges for the Baltic ports.
- GNSS / Cyber Threats: Estonia's plan to block emails sent by servers from Russia due to a high level of cyber threat risk has been assumed. Operators need to improve phishing protection measures.
- Crime in Ports: Ordinary port crime is rare in this area, but violations of international rules could be committed in relation to shadow/grey fleet activities. Baltic ports could confront a high level of checks and screenings due to Russian grain shipment restrictions.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as estimated in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

TERRORISM - ORGANIZED CRIME / HUMMANS' TRAFFICKING – NAVIGATONAL / ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

- Terrorism: Risks from missiles, drones, and attacks by armed groups remain high globally. The major threats at sea include activities of the Houthis near Bab al-Mandeb, Iran-US tensions in the Hormuz Strait region, the Russia-Ukraine conflict in the Black Sea and the Baltic, and China's pressure near Taiwan.
- Organized Crime / Human Trafficking: Weak governance and conflict situations are continuing to allow smuggling, trafficking and stowaways, especially in Libya, Yemen, Sudan, Haiti and the Horn of Africa. Ferry terminals in Europe are also vulnerable to risks related to migrant access, cargo security and cyber threats.
- Navigational / Environmental Hazards: Military activity is likely to impact shipping routes and ports in the Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, Taiwan, and eastern Mediterranean regions. Smoke in Singapore and extreme weather due to climate change will affect navigability.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Gulf of Guinea

- Gulf of Guinea is a high-risk maritime area, especially near Nigeria, where piracy, armed robbery, kidnapping, trafficking, and port crime continue to be issues despite increased security efforts. Instability in Guinea-Bissau and unrest in Nigeria could further complicate local security and logistics.
- There have been no recent GNSS interference or cyber events noted in this report. Ships should exercise anti-piracy measures, secure navigation and communication systems, minimize unnecessary port visits, and ensure local security and crew transfer arrangements.
- Military threat analysis for Gulf of Guinea states:

NIGERIA	CAMEROON	GHANA	CONGO	IVORY COAST	GABON
High	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium

- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the area is a multi-threat/risk maritime region calling for a deliberate planning and careful execution of sails to approach different African states waters and ports.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW"

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

East Mediterranean Sea

- As respectively analyzed in the [SYRIA](#), [LEBANON](#), [GAZA-ISRAEL](#) threat assessment sections of this report.
- Additionally, it was appeared during the recent UN General Assembly in NY that Turkey in pursuing its objectives in East Med risking to jeopardize the calm waters of it, with Israel highlighting the strong alliance with Greece and Cyprus. A sudden possibility of escalation is always on the scene as we approach to the Israel's elections in October 2026.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/22, November 12, 2025.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

- Eastern Mediterranean and Egyptian waters remain in the low-to-moderate risk category due to recovering Suez Canal traffic and growing confidence in the route. There was significant growth in Suez Canal traffic, although insecurity in the Red Sea and Houthi threats add uncertainty for vessels making Suez crossings.
- The regional security situation is dynamic, with Jordan shooting down 18 out of 20 ballistic missiles fired from Iran. This does not mean any direct effect on canal transit but proves the possibility of quick escalation and the need for revised routes and communication.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Bab-El-Mandeb Straits – Southern Red Sea

- The Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the southern part of the Red Sea continue to be high-risk areas because of the military operations of the Houthis in Mokha as well as their capture of Mayyun/Perim Island. All these have increased the danger of attacks, restricted navigation, and disrupted both energy and shipping despite vessels still passing through this strategic choke-point, even if no attacks against vessels other than Saudi-related ones have been executed so far.
- There are no new pirate or hijacking threats included in the report; however, the general threat from the Houthis' activities, illegal smuggling, port-related criminality, and even the overall escalating situation in the region is at its highest levels.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially presented in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Gulf of Aden – Somalia / Somaliland

- The Western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa continue to pose serious risks, as there is an unmistakable comeback of Somali piracy. The freeing of MV LUTUF, MV SWORD and MT SIBU 1 after lengthy periods of being hijacked – with ransom allegedly paid amid controversy – proves the ongoing danger for ships and crew; some ships and seamen are still under captivity.
- Piracy suppression has been strengthened due to the support of several forces in the area, among them Somalia, Turkey, and the US, while Puntland maintains its fight against the Islamic State terrorists but remains at the same time a major hub of pirates. The situation in the area is extremely complex, with piracy, terrorism, politics, and the danger associated with the Houthis, necessitating greater security and strict compliance with navigation warnings in the Gulf of Aden and Somalian coasts.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "VERY HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "HIGH" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

- Oman and surrounding waters continue to pose high-risk operations due to U.S.–Iran conflict, the ongoing closure of the Strait of Hormuz, and dangers to vessels lacking Iranian cooperation. The creation of entry-exit points from Iran and Oman does little to eliminate dangers such as detention, military attacks, GNSS/AIS jamming, cyber-attacks, and marine pollution.
- The near-total halt of Iran's crude oil shipments due to the U.S. naval blockade highlights ongoing disruptions to regional energy supply and Gulf of Oman maritime activity. The development of Duqm Port and Kuwait-Oman logistics cooperation may facilitate an alternative energy supply chain even through STS (ship-to-ship) operations.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially noted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

- As analyzed in the [NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF / IRAN'S REGION](#), the threat level in the Hormuz strait has escalated. The escorting of vessels by U.S.N. ships and attacks on Iran's military infrastructure, as well as attacks on each other by the US and Iran, have made vessels vulnerable to military threats.
- The attacks on El Gaia via missiles and drones are an example of threats posed to shipping activities near Oman. Though Salalah meetings may help coordinate efforts, they will not neutralize these risks.
- Transshipment of oil by Saudi Arabian ships off Sohar is helpful for crude exports but risky in terms of shipping operations. It is needless to say that this new trend is not outside the threat profile, which in practice means that the risks continue to exist.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" HAS BEEN LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK DUE TO WAR CONDITIONS and unpredictable actions by all involved parties.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Black Sea / East Part

- Eastern Black Sea region is at risk due to the side effects of the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Energy infrastructure disruptions and navigational risks exist. Georgian authorities are working on new transport routes via the Middle Corridor, Anaklia, and Batumi-Turkey connection routes, but this development is assessed as needing a huge investment to be finalized.
- The Batumi Oil Terminal hit its highest-ever exported oil tonnage at 293,000 tons in August. However, vessels need to have a high degree of situational awareness and contingency plans.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Baltic Sea / West part

- The Baltic Sea risks reflect the tensions between NATO and Russia, military operations, and hybrid activities. Cyber-attacks, subsea cable damage, shadow/grey fleet operations, and constant GNSS jamming pose dangers for ships, ports, and critical infrastructure.
- Piracy is not a threat in this area; however, ships have to be aware of any abnormalities in AIS operations, navigation systems, cybersecurity issues, and military actions.
- Poland's readiness to invoke NATO Article 5 for any aggression against the Baltic countries demonstrates the escalation danger in the area. It is assessed that Poland's pursuit is to set itself as a priority for NATO support related to the significance the country has, while in practice its contribution to NATO defense is less than that of other countries in the area.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

South America / NW part – PANAMA

- Panama Canal still presents some risks since the drought caused by the El Niño effect is cutting down the number of ships transiting every day, from 36 to 32. Operators can expect delays, increased charges, cargo limits, and diversions.
- Full control of the Petro-terminal by Panama will make it easier for the country to control the oil route between the oceans. China-Taiwan tensions may add certain political risks in the competition for canal use priorities.
- The canal, being an alternative route for shipping to avoid exposure to the dangers of war, takes higher priority than in the near past amid a great conflict among law and commercial companies.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: “NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: “NSR” - GNSS interference: “LOW”.

- Indicators that distort the “risk levels” in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

South America / NE part – VENEZUELA

- The Guyana-Venezuela area continues to be politically delicate due to the Essequibo issue and the increasing strategic importance of oil and gas resources offshore. Increasing energy cooperation between Venezuela and the United States will change oil flows in the region and create geopolitical competition over production in Venezuela.
- NABEP (North American Blue Energy Partners) will acquire Venezuelan oilfields that were previously managed by Chinese and Russian companies, and at the same time, talks regarding energy, mining, and security cooperation have been held by the officials of the two countries.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: “MEDIUM” - ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: “VERY LOW” - GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

- Indicators that distort the “risk levels” in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Southern Africa / West part – Angola / Namibia

- There is still a moderate risk in the Angola-Namibia area of port-based crimes, theft, and boarding attacks. There is little risk of terrorism, piracy, hijacking, and GNSS and cyber threats. Ships need to maintain good access controls as well as port security.
- Activities at sea have increased as Namibia has approved the Sandpiper phosphate mining project near Walvis Bay, pending additional permissions, and Angola has made new exploration contracts in the Kwanza and Congo Basin areas.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: “NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “HIGH” - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: “NSR” - GNSS interference: “VERY LOW”.

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area).

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Southern Africa / East part - Madagascar

- Mozambique Channel and Madagascar Strait still have a low risk associated with the use of deep waters, and there have been no reports of piracy, hijacking, terrorism, or any interference with

GNSS/AIS. Port and anchorage crime is the major threat; ISPS Level 1 and strong access, cargo, and navigational control are enough.

- There can be some regional improvements in infrastructure and resilience that may help to make the logistics more convenient, such as the reconstruction of Natete Bridge in the Nacala Corridor, and the €2 million CAMBIO climate-resilience program of Italy in Pemba, Ibo, and Beira.
- But the accusations of the Angolan president against Tanzania regarding a possible escalation of terrorism that could block the advance of the aforementioned investment ought to be noted for the near future.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "VERY LOW" - GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area)

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Malacca Straits

- Malacca Strait is still considered to be a medium-level risk route, with traffic congestion, piracy, and the possibility of disruption of GNSS/cyber systems requiring constant vigilance and navigation checks. The possibility of haze also needs to be considered in the Singapore Strait and in ports to limit harbor craft operations.
- The agreement between Singapore and Brazil on the Green and Digital Shipping Corridor will only help increase future port efficiency and cybersecurity. The strategic significance of Malacca's maritime route and data cables through the region requires coordination.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "NSR" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW"

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Taiwan – Japan Sea

- Taiwan-Japan Sea is still at risk because of Chinese military and economic pressure, regional political conflicts, and the risk of disruption of navigation or logistics.
- Ships must be equipped with high maritime situational awareness, secure communication, GNSS/cyber-resilience, and self-navigation capability. The Taiwanese disaster relief assistance to Japan shows both countries excellent relationship, but does not reduce regional escalation risks.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY LOW" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW".

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" as written in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Taiwan – South China Sea

- Taiwan-South China Sea is considered to be at risk because of the increase in Chinese military and coast guard operations, disputes, and cross-strait tensions. Taiwan has ramped up its patrol activities around the Pratas Islands because of increased Chinese coast guard presence, while the constant deployment of the Chinese around Taiwan creates a risk of miscommunication/miscalculation.
- Organized crime and GNSS/cyber-attacks have not been reported in the available sources. Nevertheless, there are incidents of vessel attacks for theft in the broader area south of and around

the Philippines. Vessels should always be aware of military and coast guard operations, employ route planning and communications, and have navigation capacity.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping/Crew life losses: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "VERY LOW".

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Arctic cycle / East – Europe / Russia / Northeast Asia

- Despite being at controllable risk in terms of piracy and criminal activity, the Arctic continues to be an area of increased political and operational sensitivity for the Northern Sea Route due to increasing Russian military operations and sanctions evasion efforts. The Northern Sea Route will continue to be seasonally used for cargo shipping and limited to ice-breakers and ice-capable vessels.
- The recent Vostok Oil shipments via Bukhta Sever and the use of reported dark ship-to-ship transfers of oil, indicates increasing oil activity in the Arctic region and the potential risks related to sanctions compliance.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

Arctic cycle / West – Greenland / Alaska

- There is currently no direct threat to commercial traffic within the region from military activities and strategic competition. It is important to be ready for severe weather conditions, ice navigation, communication problems, and search and rescue issues, as well as to monitor military operations and regulations in the region.
- U.S.-Denmark-Greenland Security Partnership enhances U.S. access rights as well as introduces new defense zones in Narsarsuaq and Mestersvig, while stressing Danish sovereignty and prohibiting permanent non-NATO military presence. There are also plans by the European Union to increase funding for Greenland from €225 million to €530 million.

OVERALL, THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

PIRACY – BOARDING CONDITIONS, KIDNAPPING, FIRING, ELECTRONIC HARASSMENT

- Threats to **maritime security persist** at a high level due to conflict, piracy, hybrid attacks, cyber threats, and pressure in strategic chokepoints. Somali piracy has returned; the release of MV LUTUF, MV SWARD and MT SIBU 1 following long periods of being held for ransom, indicates that piracy continues to be a risk for crews and vessels, along with other vessels and seafarers still being in captivity.
- Cyber and navigational resilience** are crucial factors. The Baltic countries are reinforcing defenses against Russian cyber-attacks, drones, GNSS, and submarine cable systems, while demands from Iran to attack underwater cables near Hormuz illustrate the vulnerability of maritime communications infrastructure.
- Migrant and stowaway** threats at ferry terminals and Mediterranean ports necessitate strict procedures for port and vehicle security.
- Vessels** must retain enhanced vigilance, anti-piracy and access controls, independent GNSS/AIS verification, secure communications, and dynamic route planning alternatives.

↔ return to [CONTEXT TABLE](#)

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

- **Diplomatic tensions**: The hot spots of diplomatic contradictions are the Strait of Hormuz, the Red Sea, Taiwan, the Baltic, and the Arctic, with increasing military cooperation and rivalry for maritime strategic access and energy pathways.
- **Political instability**: The ongoing fighting and unstable governments in Yemen, Sudan, Libya, Lebanon, Syria and parts of Africa raise concerns regarding spillover into different regions, displacement, terrorist threats and disruption of strategic transportation networks.
- **International trade**: Trade in supplies of energy, critical minerals, and rare earths is increasingly being disrupted by sanctions, wars, and criminality at sea. Alternative sea routes such as the Arctic and the Middle Corridor gain significance, but the implementation of planning for new land alternative routes is a solution for the future.
- **Maritime trade**: Ships remain under threat of missile and drone attacks, military interference, piracy, and restricted access to routes like the Strait of Hormuz, Bab al-Mandeb, the Gulf of Aden, and the Black Sea. Shipping is slowly recovering in some areas like the Suez and Bab al-Mandeb. The weaponization of international shipping during conflict periods is a fact that will last a significant period, while the normalization of international trade will appear again when USA, China and Russia will found new balances in a multipolar world.

Overall assessment:

- The maritime security environment remains HIGH RISK, particularly around Hormuz, Bab al-Mandab, the Gulf of Aden, Black Sea, Baltic and conflict-affected waters. Missile/drone attacks, military activity, piracy and regional instability may cause sudden disruption, delays or diversions.
- NAVIGATIONAL AIDS HAZARDS: GNSS/AIS interference, communications disruption, military activity and changes to maritime routes may affect safe navigation. Vessels should maintain enhanced bridge watch, independently verify position and cross-check GNSS/AIS with radar, ECDIS and official navigational warnings
- Shipping companies should conduct voyage-specific security assessments, maintain diversion/emergency plans and continuously monitor maritime-security developments before and during transit.


Overall consulting:

- A Voyage-Specific Security Clearance will be necessary for any high-risk transit, including the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Bab al-Mandeb, Gulf of Aden, Somali Basin, and the Black Sea. Factors to consider include current threat intelligence and assessment, vessel/cargo characteristics, vulnerability of the crew, port security, insurance, sanctions, navigation risks, and rerouting.
- The Master should maintain the right to delay, divert, suspend, or cancel operations in case residual risk exceeds company risk tolerance. Maintain increased bridge and security watches, engines and rudder ready, rapid reporting, and intelligence monitoring. Report to UKMTO, MSCHOA, and relevant authorities as applicable.
- Double-check GNSS/AIS information against radar, visual, chart, gyro, dead reckoning, and other independent sources. Implement cybersecurity protections, secure communication, strict access controls, anti-piracy and stowaway measures, and port/agent arrangements verification.


ANNEX "A": CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE

SEA GUARDIAN, exploiting near-real time apps of open and specialized sources for the traffic performance reporting system to feed its algorithms, provides the following statistics shows how the relative performance in the group of major chock-points fluctuates:

ARABIC PENINSULA AND SOUTH AFRICA



MEDITERRANEAN – BLACK SEA AND SUEZ



Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / (+30) 694 437 3465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports, routes, cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk Assessments for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

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ANNEX “B”: SECURITY ASSESSMENT – LESSONS LEARNED


LESSONS LEARNED		
INCIDENTS	REACTIONS	TRANSFORMATION NOTICES
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	Permanent contact with the shipping company as well the maritime security company that hires security teams.	Developing independent international relations and operational apps for supporting crew recovery having abandoned the vessel.
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The active contingency plans and business impact analysis in case of discontinuation with the security guarding teams (such as an attack difficult to face with small arms).	Further implementation of maritime/ISO standards.
Inbound in an area of high military / paramilitary threats with all navigational aids and AIS closed	Operate all the navigational aids and AIS/communication systems after having been attacked by ballistic or related missiles, when visual targeting was available due to the lack of international naval forces.	Stabilize the closed navigational aids to prevent targeting towards the necessity of giving information through them to friendly entities.
The detailed analysis after a special interview of security crew assessing decision-made	A fundamental decision involves choosing whether to abandon a sinking vessel using a lifeboat for safety, or to escape directly into the sea with only life jackets, while under the threat of attacking skiffs searching for survivors.	Balance the threat while abandoning the ship at sea with the threat of environmental and geographical conditions for survival.
The re-emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden-Horn of Africa and Somalia	From the latest incidents in the area, it was proven that the existence of Maritime security teams is of paramount importance, as well as the existence of International Maritime operations.	The overall security umbrella is achieved if: – A consistent/ coherent Security assessment has been done in advance – International Maritime operations in the region exist – The use of Security teams onboard for a wider area is available.

Useful links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:


- ACLED and IMB/ICC for the war threat levels and international commerce crime incidents.
- Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea): Database of Legal Entities Under Sanctions
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt6GS7QohAI> for an overall general assessment by the SEA GUARDIAN President presented at Naftemboriki TV (Shipping) for the latest period, covering the time-frame before and after the Houthi ballistic, drones and UCAV attacks.

ANNEX “C”: THE SEA GUARDIAN DATA & CONTROL REPORTING SYSTEM - DACOR

The overall global map with the threats/risk levels, it is shown in the next chart which is the basic reference for the DACOR being informed with them:



- DACOR system visualizes this report and covers the period between two successive monthly Security Assessments and three weekly reports, with near-real time data and reporting capabilities.
- The system is ready to be provided as a subscription service hosted in SEA GUARDIAN servers.



CONTACT US FOR A TRIAL OR FIX AN APPOINTMENT:	OR BOOK A “GOOGLE MEET” APPOINTMENT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GLOBAL CALENDAR:
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FUTURE OUTLOOK

Looking Ahead,

SEA GUARDIAN is committed to further enhancing the digital capabilities and expanding service offerings. The focus remains steady on leveraging data analytics to drive personalized customer experiences and explore new market opportunities. There is confidence that SEA GUARDIAN strategic initiatives will support our partners for sustained growth and successful decision making. Digital, Control & Reporting System – DACOR, digitalizes the maritime security environment in harmonization with new equipment, training updates, and synergies with the cyber sector, in order to provide a holistic physical and digital security environment with supplementary function to the available networking systems of control, intelligence, and share maritime situational awareness, to better assess risk management studies.

Partners (shipping companies) willing to experience the DACOR system for a 10day free of charge trial should communicate with SEA GUARDIAN for a user name and password.

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