



THREAT / RISK — SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN

Brief assessment • Brief Update No 11-3/2026

• Reporting period 13–20 August 2026

Editorial change 1 — SEA GUARDIAN contact details added (Aug 23, 2026)

In reference to:


- [Threat / Risk Security & Safety Assessment — Monthly Report 11/2026, 30 Jul 2026](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-1, 06 Aug 2026](#)
- [SEA GUARDIAN Threat / Risk Security Weekly Bulletin No 11-2, 13 Aug 2026](#)

INSIDE — GLOBAL RISK SNAPSHOT

Risk at sea near Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea and the Black Sea remain high, disrupting trade and energy security and affecting port operations and shipping routes. Missiles and drone strike in Yemen, and Russia–Ukraine attacks on shipping and coastal infrastructure, reinforce the need for active voyage planning.

TOP THREE FINDINGS THIS WEEK

- **Red Sea:** Houthi missile and drone attacks shut down Mocha port, endangering shipping through Bab el-Mandeb.
- **Hormuz – Bab el-Mandeb:** Tanker detours are lengthening voyages and raising energy-transport costs.
- **Baltic / Black Sea:** The drone attack on Ust-Luga underlines rising risk to port energy infrastructure.



SEA GUARDIAN global risk-tracking map

CORPORATE CONCLUSIONS

Maritime operating risk stays elevated across the Red Sea, Hormuz and Baltic/Black Sea corridors — driven by conflict-related port attacks, tanker rerouting and energy-infrastructure exposure. Operators should maintain enhanced voyage-risk monitoring, routing flexibility and port-security contingencies.

THE OBSERVER PERSPECTIVE — COMING WEEK

- High risk persists in Hormuz; tanker attacks and uncertainty have cut traffic — expect delays, rerouting and higher costs.
- Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea stay exposed to Houthi missiles and drones, with added risk to ships and ports after Mocha's suspension.
- The Baltic saw a strike on Ust-Luga, confirming high drone risk to energy infrastructure, though oil-export operations were not halted.

MARITIME SECURITY & NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY / SAFETY AREA
UKMTO WARNING 111 & 112-26 / MSCIO ALERT 91 & 92-26	13 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.7500, 56.5000
UKMTO WARNING 113-26 / MSCIO ALERT 93-26	14 Aug 2026	ROBBERY / VIOLENT	Strait of Hormuz — 26.6333, 56.5667
UKMTO WARNING 116-26 / MSCIO ALERT 96-26	15 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Strait of Hormuz — 26.4000, 56.7333
SG R&I REPORT 048-26	16 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Novorossiysk — 44.7149, 37.7899

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY / SAFETY AREA
SG R&I REPORT 049-26	17 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Novorossiysk — 44.4157, 37.7192
SG R&I REPORT 050-26	17 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Novorossiysk — 44.4057, 37.7192
UKMTO WARNING 117-26 / MSCIO ALERT 97 & 98-26	17 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK / unmanned vessel sunk	Bab el-Mandeb / S. Red Sea — 12.6833, 43.4333
UKMTO WARNING 114-26 / MSCIO ALERT 94-26	17 Aug 2026	PIRACY / HIJACK	Somalian Coast / NE — 8.2167, 50.1667
SG R&I REPORT 051-26	17 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Odessa — 46.5275, 30.7426
SG R&I REPORT 052-26	18 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Odessa — 46.3844, 30.8909
UKMTO WARNING 115-26 / MSCIO ALERT 95-26	18 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK / crew casualty	Strait of Hormuz — 26.3000, 56.8000
SG R&I REPORT 053-26	19 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Odessa — 46.5125, 30.7320
UKMTO WARNING 118-26 / MSCIO ALERT 99-26	20 Aug 2026	PIRACY / HIJACK	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 14.3144, 50.1550
SG R&I REPORT 047-26	20 Aug 2026	MILITARY ATTACK	Black Sea / Novorossiysk — 44.4953, 37.4389

MARITIME SECURITY — HIJACKED SHIPS IN THE GULF OF ADEN / OFF SOMALIA REMAIN DETAINED

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	AREA OF INCIDENT	LATEST DEVELOPMENT (AS OF 20 AUG)
UKMTO WARNING 045-26 — HIJACK (MT HONOUR 25)	21 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 9.8167, 51.3500	No release confirmed. Negotiations have continued for months; mid-July reporting described talks involving owners, insurers, flag-state interests and pirates as being at an advanced stage.
UKMTO WARNING 046-26 — HIJACK (MV SWORD*)	26 Apr 2026	Somalian Coast / SE — 6.9631, 49.3622	No release confirmed. The vessel's use as a mothership indicates pirates retained operational control; the case has evolved from a static hostage incident into an enabling platform for further piracy.
IMB/ICC 025-26 — HIJACK (MT EUREKA*)	02 May 2026	Gulf of Aden / Yemen — 13.8167, 48.4667	No release confirmed. It remained one of three vessels — 44 seafarers in total — for which ransom-related negotiations were reported in July.
UKMTO WARNING 90-26 / MSCIO ALERT 78-26 — HIJACK (MT ASANA*, chemical)	17 Jul 2026	Gulf of Aden / HRA — 13.4475, 49.1642	No release confirmed. Public reporting continued to assess the vessel as held by Somali pirates; the hijacking was not attributed to the Houthis.
UKMTO WARNING 114-26 / MSCIO ALERT 94-26 — HIJACK (MV LUTUF*)	17 Aug 2026	Somalian Coast / East — 8.2167, 50.1667	Status unresolved. No official confirmation of crew condition, vessel release, remaining hijackers, or the authority behind the reported strike. Assessed as under pirate control / unconfirmed.

* Vessel names not officially published; retrieved by the SEA GUARDIAN Intelligence Department.

GLOBAL ISSUES — GEO-POLICY / STRATEGY / ECONOMY



Morocco / Ceuta



Ceuta crossings




Ulchi Freedom Shield

- **14 Aug 2026 — Ceuta.** [Moroccan authorities detained 148 migrants near Fnideq after stopping a mass attempt to cross into Spain's Ceuta.](#) The group included 128 African nationals and 20 Moroccans. Security was raised and social media monitored amid calls for mass crossings. It follows much larger movements toward Ceuta in late July, which caused reported deaths. *[Stowaways / Illegal Migration / Port Crime]*
- **18 Aug 2026 — Korean Peninsula.** [President Trump ordered a reduction of the 2026 Ulchi Freedom Shield exercise with South Korea,](#) citing his relationship with Kim Jong Un and Seoul's refusal to join the US confrontation with Iran. The move could affect US–ROK readiness and the alliance. Pyongyang calls the drills war preparation; Washington and Seoul call them defensive. *[Political]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The migration threat near Ceuta remains a Western Mediterranean border-protection issue. Reduced joint U.S.–South Korean training could heighten uncertainty over the Korean Peninsula.

ARCTIC CYCLE / BALTIC SEA



Baltic — Ust-Luga



Northern Sea Route



Greenland



Lithuania border

- **14 Aug 2026 — Ust-Luga.** [Ukraine launched a large drone attack on Russia, causing a fire at Ust-Luga port.](#) Russia said it downed hundreds of drones across several regions, including near Moscow. No casualties were reported, though property and infrastructure were damaged. A drone also entered Latvian airspace and was shot down by NATO jets. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **14 Aug 2026 — Northern Sea Route.** [The NSR \(North Sea Route\) is emerging as a key alternative trade and energy corridor between](#) China, Russia and Northern Europe. Russia provides access and resources; China offers investment, technology and market. Melting ice improves access, deepening cooperation despite Western sanctions. *[Transportation Routes & Resources]*
- **15 Aug 2026 — Greenland.** [A U.S. oil company delayed planned drilling in eastern Greenland pending permits,](#) and was criticised for moving equipment without authorization. The project, expected to start in October, cannot begin before winter 2027 at the earliest — amid growing U.S. interest in Greenland's oil. *[Economic & Resources Performance / Restraints]*
- **16 Aug 2026 — Lithuania–Belarus border.** [A Lithuanian border guard was slightly injured during a confrontation with about 20 migrants who allegedly entered from Belarus through an underground tunnel.](#) The migrants fled back to Belarus. Lithuania has recently found several similar tunnels along the border. *[Stowaways / Illegal Migration / Port Crime]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Drone strikes on Ust-Luga are a reminder that Baltic energy-port facilities are vulnerable to similar attacks. China–Russia cooperation in the Arctic underlines the rising importance of the Northern Sea Route, while the Greenland drilling delay shows the regulatory hurdles to Arctic resource extraction.

SOUTH AMERICA – NW AFRICA / SW–SE AFRICA



Venezuela — gold reserves

- **18 Aug 2026 — Venezuela.** [Venezuela plans to use gold reserves held at the Bank of England to help fund earthquake reconstruction.](#) The gold would move through U.S. Treasury accounts, with international audits ensuring the money supports housing, healthcare and schools. The arrangement forms part of wider government–opposition talks on economic and democratic reform. *[Economic & Resources Performance / Restraints]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Venezuela's attempt to draw on gold reserves held in foreign banks to rebuild public and private infrastructure shows a country that remains financially vulnerable and dependent on international procedures. (New assessments for this region follow in the next monthly report.)


BLACK SEA – CENTMED / LIBYA – EASTMED



Hezbollah



Black Sea ceasefire



Syria / Latakia



West Bank

- **14 Aug 2026 — Lebanon.** Hezbollah leader Naim Qassem criticised Lebanon's government for implementing the Israel–Lebanon framework, calling it humiliating. He rejected [Hezbollah's](#) disarmament and urged Beirut to reverse the deal, which includes Israeli withdrawals from southern Lebanon and Lebanese army deployment. Negotiations remain difficult. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **14 Aug 2026 — West Bank.** [Palestinian VP Hussein al-Sheikh condemned Israel's plan to transfer responsibility for settlers from the military to the police, calling it a step toward annexation.](#) Hamas also rejected it. The dispute comes amid rising settler violence and Palestinian displacement. *[Political]*
- **15 Aug 2026 — Black Sea.** [Russia rejected Turkey's proposal for a Black Sea ceasefire,](#) saying the situation has not improved and no official proposal was received from Ankara. Turkey wants strikes on ships and infrastructure halted to protect civilian navigation and trade. Moscow also dismissed reviving the grain deal. *[Political]*

- **17 Aug 2026 — Off Libya.** [An Italian rescue group saved 50 people from a wooden boat off Libya](#); seven were found dead and two in critical condition. The central Mediterranean route remains extremely dangerous, with nearly 900 deaths reported this year (IOM). *[Stowaways / Illegal Migration / Port Crime]*
- **19 Aug 2026 — Syria.** [Turkey denied having troops at Syria's Abu al-Duhur airbase and rejected Israel's justification for strikes as fabricated](#). The attacks drew criticism from Jordan and concern from the U.S., raising fears of further escalation over foreign military presence in Syria. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **19 Aug 2026 — Palestine.** [A Palestinian-American man raised the US flag outside his besieged home in the occupied West Bank, where Israeli settlers have blocked residents and supplies](#). The incident has drawn rare US criticism, with officials calling for action against settler violence and emphasizing the rights and safety of Palestinian residents. *[Political]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The Israel–Lebanon framework is still hindered by Hezbollah, while events in Syria and the West Bank keep escalating regional tensions. Russia's rejection of a Black Sea ceasefire leaves uncertainty for civilians and trade, and deaths off Libya underline the dangerous situation in the central Mediterranean.

RED SEA – YEMEN / GULF OF ADEN



Mocha – Houthi attacks



Saudi–Somalia



Tanker rerouting

- **15 Aug 2026 — Mocha, Yemen.** [Repeated Houthi missile and drone attacks forced the suspension of operations at Mocha port](#). Officials said attacks killed seven people, damaged port facilities and vessels, and caused about \$16 million in losses. The disruption affected 1,300 workers and raised concern over shipping, food and fuel supplies. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **15 Aug 2026 — Somalia.** [Saudi Arabia is expanding military cooperation with Somalia](#), training over 5,000 soldiers to strengthen its army and improve Red Sea and Gulf of Aden security. The program also involves Turkey and Pakistan, but faces challenges over Somalia's federal politics and command structures. *[Political]*
- **19 Aug 2026 — Tigray, Ethiopia.** [Tensions in Tigray are rising after local officials accused federal forces of a drone strike near Mekelle](#). The alleged attack caused no reported casualties but could signal a serious escalation threatening the 2022 peace agreement. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **19 Aug 2026 — Hormuz / Bab el-Mandeb.** [Chinese shipping giants COSCO and CMES decided to stop sending tankers through Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb over rising security risks](#), using alternative routes and ship-to-ship transfers that raise voyage times and freight costs — highlighting growing disruption to Middle Eastern oil supplies. *[Transportation Routes & Resources]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

Houthi attacks on Mocha reflect the persistent danger to Red Sea port activity. The diversion of Chinese tankers from Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb confirms real disruption to regional oil movements. Saudi–Somali cooperation falls within the recently signed Turkey–Pakistan–Saudi Arabia strategic framework.

PERSIAN GULF – ARABIAN SEA



USS George H.W. Bush



Hormuz dispute



KRG drone strike

- **16 Aug 2026 — Arabian Sea.** [The USS George H.W. Bush arrived to replace the USS Abraham Lincoln](#), which faced an unusually long deployment. Concerns were raised over supply shortages, maintenance and crew wellbeing; the U.S. Navy said the replacement is a planned rotation. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **18 Aug 2026 — Strait of Hormuz.** [President Trump sparked controversy by posting a map labelling](#) the Strait of Hormuz as “New U.S. Territory.” The claim raised tensions with Iran, while conflicting statements over the waterway’s status raised concern for global energy supplies and shipping. *[Political]*
- **18 Aug 2026 — Iraqi Kurdistan.** [Kuwait condemned a drone attack on Kurdistan Regional Government](#) sites in Iraq, stressing respect for Iraq’s sovereignty. The attack caused no casualties and drew condemnation from several Gulf states and Iraqi authorities, increasing pressure over Iran’s regional actions. *[Military / Paramilitary Actions – Terrorism]*
- **19 Aug 2026 — U.S.–Oman.** [Tensions between the U.S. and Oman are reportedly linked to Muscat’s](#) mediation with Iran and disagreements over navigational rules in Hormuz. Washington wants safe shipping and energy flows; Oman favours dialogue. The dispute could undermine Oman’s mediation. *[Political]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

U.S. carrier rotation keeps forces active in the Arabian Sea, while Hormuz tensions and the U.S.–Oman relationship raise political uncertainty over a critical energy chokepoint. Washington signals it intends to control the strait and preserve freedom of navigation, and the rotation suggests the issue will not be resolved in the mid-term. The drone attack in Iraqi Kurdistan again highlights escalation and security risk.

EAST ASIA – MALACCA STRAIT / TAIWAN



Indonesia earthquake



Taiwan – KMT



Taiwan / Taichung

- **16 Aug 2026 — Eastern Indonesia.** [A magnitude 7.7 earthquake struck eastern Indonesia](#), killing at least 53 people and injuring more than 130. Around 5,000 were evacuated as landslides, collapsed buildings and blocked roads disrupted the area. Nearly 1,000 aftershocks were reported. *[Navigational Safety / Environmental]*
- **16 Aug 2026 — Taiwan.** [KMT Chairwoman Cheng Li-wun sparked controversy by saying Taiwan](#) has never been independent and backing closer ties and possible peaceful unification with China. Critics said her pro-China stance could hurt the KMT in the November elections; supporters argue stronger cross-strait ties promote peace. *[Political]*
- **16 Aug 2026 — Taiwan.** [Several Taiwan-based groups held forums and protests criticising Japan’s](#) growing military role, warning that renewed militarism could threaten peace in the Taiwan Strait and East Asia, and urging closer ties and reunification with mainland China. *[Political]*

BRIEF ASSESSMENT / CONCLUSIONS

The Indonesia earthquake raises humanitarian and port-logistics concerns, while political conflict within Taiwan and anti-Japanese sentiment show that Taiwan Strait tensions persist. The two triangles of aggression — Taiwan–Japan–China and China–Taiwan–Philippines — create a picture of sensitive power relationships: parties seek to keep the Strait stable yet compete to control the sea area east of Taiwan. The U.S., Russia, France and others are attentive, as the area connects directly to the “High North route.”

SEA GUARDIAN — OVERALL CONCLUSIONS

Political: Disputes over borders, alliances and sovereignty drive instability in the Middle East, Sahel, Taiwan Strait, Arctic and Black Sea. Tensions in Hormuz and the absence of de-escalation in the Black Sea undermine trust in secure navigation and trade.

Economic & Resources: The economic and resource performance of Gabon, Nigeria, Greenland and Venezuela is driven by investment, regulation, sanctions exposure and political control. Middle East shipping disruptions raise risks to energy supply and logistics.

Military / Paramilitary – Terrorism: Risk of military escalation persists in the Middle East — particularly Yemen, Syria, Lebanon, Gaza, Iraq and the wider Iran-connected environment. Missile and drone attacks on Mocha exemplify direct risk to ports, vessels and logistics. Russia–Ukraine drone warfare and unrest in Tigray raise risk to infrastructure and maritime-related assets.

Transportation Routes & Resources: Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb and the Red Sea are exposed to disruption, causing tanker diversions, longer voyages and higher freight rates. The Black Sea faces risk from the Russia–Ukraine conflict, while the Northern Sea Route gains significance for China–Russia trade and energy flows.

Smuggling / Stowaways / Port Crime: Illegal migration remains an issue at Ceuta, Libya and the Lithuania–Belarus border. Central and East Mediterranean traffic continues to strain humanitarian, rescue and coastal-security resources.

Navigational Safety / Environmental: The tanker oil spill in Oman is a major pollution incident, with added navigational risk from the monsoon. The Indonesia earthquake may disrupt coastal facilities, logistics and supply chains. No incidents of GNSS/AIS/ECDIS jamming, cyberattacks or small-arms attacks were recorded.

SEA GUARDIAN — MAJOR OBSERVATIONS

Political risks: Border disputes and geopolitics across the Middle East, Black Sea, Baltic, Arctic and Indo-Pacific may lead to navigation restrictions, sanctions and port-access difficulties.

Military threats: Missile, drone and proxy threats are most significant around Yemen and the Gulf. Russia–Ukraine drones could threaten port and coastal infrastructure in the Black and Baltic Seas.

International trade: More tanker diversions and Black Sea disruption mean longer voyages, higher shipping costs, increased insurance risk and alternative logistics.

Maritime routes: Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, the Red Sea, Black Sea, central/east Mediterranean and Arctic routes require additional voyage planning and contingency measures.

Organised crime: No cargo-theft cases recorded; piracy has been rising since March 2026 around the Horn of Africa and off Somalia. Migration around Libya, Ceuta and the Lithuania–Belarus border pressures border and coastal forces.

Cyber vulnerabilities: No cyber incidents or serious navigation-interference issues; however, route and security changes call for communications resilience and navigation verification.

CONTACT US FOR FURTHER SUPPORT

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