THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY ASSESSMENT MONTHLY REPORT

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MONTHLY THREAT / RISK ASSESSMENT

Brief Update No 12/2026 • 29 August 2026

Reporting period 29 July – 29 August 2026

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

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OBJECTIVES

- To provide the maritime industry and security stake or shareholders in a monthly cycle, with:



➢ **MAJOR MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENT SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS IN GEO-STRATEGIC FRAME FOR OPERATIONAL SECURITY AND NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY OF SHIPPING FOR THE PERIOD JULY 29 – AUGUST 29, 2026.**

➢ **ASSESSMENT UPDATES CONCERNING MILITARY OPERATIONS – TERRORISM – PIRACY AND CARGO THEFT, HIJACKING AND DETENTIONS, SMUGGLING, STOWAWAYS, SHIPS FIRED, CREW LOSSES AND CYBER-THREATS, COVERING A WIDE SPECTRUM OF THREATS/RISKS FROM MARITIME SECURITY TO NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY.**

➢ SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy, establishing synergy with a subject matter expert (SME) entity for Cyber-defense including the most important sectors of policy, methods and training to mitigate cyber threats and risks.

Important notes:

1. The Assessment is produced by the R&I team in a global approach covering **27** different regions in total, offering to readers the opportunity to study it as a whole, or focusing on areas of interest through the context table.
2. You can navigate directly to:

[MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS] or [ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)]

RECENT KEY DEVELOPMENTS

For "KEY DEVELOPMENTS" of July prior to July 20, refer to:

- THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY BULLETIN (brief assessment), 11-1, August 07, 2026
- THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN (brief assessment), 11-2, August 13, 2026
- THREAT / RISK SECURITY & SAFETY WEEKLY BULLETIN (brief assessment), 11-3, August 20, 2026

August 20


- Romania scrambled F-16 fighter jets to destroy a marine drone spotted near the Neptun Deep gas project in the Black Sea. The incident highlights growing security threats to critical energy infrastructure caused by the war in Ukraine. Neptun Deep is expected to make Romania a major EU gas producer when it begins operations in 2027.
- Total Energies has trained 100 SMEs in Mozambique's Cabo Delgado province through the CapacitaMoz program. The training helps local businesses improve management, finances, safety, and competitiveness. So far, 17 of these companies have joined the Mozambique LNG supply chain, while 40 trained Cabo Delgado companies have joined the supply chain overall.
- China's Commerce Ministry announced a decision on corporate tax rate for enterprises related to anti-dumping measures on imported polyoxymethylene from USA, EU, Taiwan and Japan.

August 21

- Amigo Resources and Tanzania's STAMICO have signed an MoU to assess the recovery of graphite from mining tailings. Amigo will fund and conduct technical testing, while STAMICO will provide site access and government support. If the results are positive, both parties may proceed with a definitive agreement to develop the project.

August 22


- Finland has nearly completed a 200-kilometer border barrier along its frontier with Russia, designed to prevent illegal crossings and instrumentalized migration. The project is ahead of schedule and €22 million under budget, costing €356 million instead of the planned €378 million.
- South Korea has launched its first container ship trial through the Arctic route to explore a faster and more secure trade corridor between Asia and Europe. The voyage could shorten shipping times and strengthen Busan's role as an Arctic logistics hub, but Russia's control of the route and Western sanctions create major diplomatic, insurance and commercial challenges.

August 23

- Syria's Central Inspection and Control Board uncovered initial public fund losses of over $8 million linked to mismanagement, oil theft, and improper contracts in Deir ez-Zor oil fields. Nine officials have been suspended while investigations continue to determine the full extent of the losses.

- Lebanon faces growing concerns over forged and fraudulently obtained passports, weak identity controls, and covert travel networks. Old unused passport booklets and weak state oversight may have created security vulnerabilities that could be exploited by criminal networks, smugglers, and other actors.
- Uzbekistan and Azerbaijan signed a Treaty on Eternal Friendship and agreed to raise bilateral trade to $1 billion by 2030. The two countries are expanding cooperation in investment, energy, banking and tourism while strengthening the Trans-Caspian Middle Corridor and transport links. They will also jointly host the 2027 FIFA U-20 World Cup.
- NATO has significantly increased air patrols over Poland near Russia's Kaliningrad region under Operation Eastern Sentry, citing growing concerns about Russian intentions. Intelligence officials are assessing possible Russian actions against Poland or the Baltic states, including cyberattacks or limited military strikes, while NATO says the increased presence is defensive and not evidence of an imminent attack.
- Alaska's primary election is still unsettled, with at least 12,000 absentee and early ballots remaining. The governor's race remains highly competitive, while Republican candidates face uncertainty. Democrat Mary Peltola is leading Senator Dan Sullivan, and several Republican state legislators are vulnerable. The results could significantly reshape Alaska's House and Senate after the remaining votes are counted.

August 24

- US bond markets are under pressure as high energy and diesel costs fuel inflation, keeping treasury yields elevated. Rising yields threaten stocks, private credit, banks, and highly valued AI companies. The main risk is a cycle of persistent inflation, higher borrowing costs, falling asset prices, and potential financial instability.
- The Yemeni army said it carried out drone strikes on Houthi positions across several front lines as fighting intensified. The military did not provide details on the locations, casualties or damage, and the Houthis had not commented.
- The IMO has called for the immediate and unconditional release of more than 90 seafarers held captive amid renewed piracy in the Gulf of Aden. Following the August 20 hijacking of the SEAMULL, six vessels are reportedly being held. The IMO urged stronger security measures, industry best practices and continued international naval cooperation to protect crews and merchant ships.

August 25

- Nigerian President Bola Tinubu ordered the military and other security agencies on Tuesday to launch an immediate rescue operation after scores of people were kidnapped by gunmen in north-central Niger State last week. An armed group posted a video on Facebook and WhatsApp showing what residents said were about 600 women, children and older people abducted during an attack on a mosque in the state.
- Libya's National Oil Corporation signed an oil exploration and production-sharing agreement with Chevron in the Sirte Basin. The deal aims to increase Libya's oil output and attract foreign investment, but ongoing political divisions and security risks could affect its success.

- The death toll from Venezuela's June 24 earthquakes has risen to 6,509, with thousands rescued and more than 226,000 people treated in hospitals. Authorities are assessing damaged homes, rebuilding housing, and clearing hundreds of thousands of tons of debris.
- MSC will partially resume Suez Canal transits on selected East–West services from late August 2026, following improved security conditions in the Red Sea. The return will be gradual, with schedules updated individually and contingency plans remaining in place.
- Only one commodity vessel transited the Strait of Hormuz on Monday, August 24, the lowest level since May 07. Kpler data showed a single large gas carrier crossing, compared with six vessels the previous day, highlighting continued disruption and uncertainty in the strategically important waterway.
- Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore reaffirmed their commitment to keep the Strait of Malacca and Singapore Strait open, safe and free for international shipping. The waterways are vital to global trade, carrying over 100,000 vessels annually, including major oil and gas supplies. The three countries also pledged to strengthen cooperation on navigation safety, infrastructure and pollution prevention.

August 26





- Panama has declared an emergency due to a severe El Niño-driven drought, following Honduras and El Salvador. The drought is damaging crops, threatening food supplies, and reducing water levels in the Panama Canal, forcing cuts to shipping. Peru has also declared emergencies as extreme heat and rainfall threaten agriculture.
- Israel has ordered Dutch representatives working at the International Support Center for Gaza in Kiryat Gat to leave the country within one week. Foreign Minister Gideon Sa'ar said the move was a response to Dutch measures against Israeli settlements, including a new trade ban, and accused the Netherlands of adopting an increasingly hostile policy toward Israel.
- On Monday August 24, the UN's global education fund "Education Cannot Wait – ECW", announced a $22 million initiative to help students in Sudan return to learning. The programme will provide safe and inclusive education, teacher support, learning materials and mental health services, focusing on children in West Darfur, South Kordofan and Gedaref.
- The Indian Navy escorted two merchant vessels safely through the Bab-el-Mandeb Strait on August 25, reinforcing efforts to protect vital maritime trade. Indian warships remain deployed in the region for maritime security, anti-piracy operations and to safeguard Indian shipping amid regional tensions.
- Iraq summoned Iran's ambassador over controversial social media posts featuring regional maps and terminology seen as inconsistent with bilateral relations. The dispute comes amid heightened regional tensions, after Iranian officials used "Persian Gulf" and Iraqi officials responded with "Arabian Gulf."

August 27


- The U.S. said it disrupted a Chinese-linked hacking operation that targeted government agencies, NASA, the Senate, and private organizations. Authorities seized domains connected to two hacking platforms allegedly operated by a Chinese company serving Chinese intelligence and military clients. The campaign reportedly began in 2018 and involved both successful attacks and failed attempts. China denied the allegations and accused the U.S. of using cybersecurity claims to discredit Chinese companies.

- A cross-party group of Japanese lawmakers is seeking dialogue with China amid strained relations between the two countries. Beijing has welcomed their concerns and urged Japan's leaders to take concrete steps to improve ties. However, tensions over Taiwan remain a major obstacle, meaning the initiative is mainly aimed at keeping communication open rather than achieving a full diplomatic breakthrough.

August 28


- UNIFIL, the UN peacekeeping force in southern Lebanon, is expected to leave at the end of 2026. The U.S. and Israel oppose extending its mandate, while France, Russia, China, and Britain support some form of continued international presence. France is expected to propose a new mechanism focused on Hezbollah's disarmament, strengthening the Lebanese army, and monitoring Lebanon-Israel security arrangements under the framework of UN Resolution 1701.
- Two investigations found that thousands of Indigenous Greenlandic women and girls were given contraceptive devices by Danish health authorities without proper consent, mainly from the 1960s to the 1970s. The reports disagreed on whether this amounted to genocide under the UN definition. The controversy has seriously damaged relations between Greenland and Denmark and comes as the United States seeks greater influence over Greenland.

August 29




- Syria and Iraq signed an agreement to increase trade and investment cooperation. The deal aims to boost trade, strengthen business ties, and encourage joint investments between the two countries. It was signed during the 63rd Damascus International Fair, which included around 1,000 participants.
- Ukrainian President Zelenskyy wants Ukraine to increase its long-range drone attacks on Russia from over 300 to 1,000 drones per day. The strikes are increasingly targeting Russian oil, military, and energy infrastructure. Zelenskyy says these attacks are putting pressure on Russia's economy and will continue if Moscow refuses to negotiate an end to the war.

↩ *return to* **OBJECTIVES**

MARITIME SECURITY / NAVIGATIONAL SAFETY INCIDENTS AUGUST 20 - 29, 2026

SOURCE / I.D	DATE	TYPE	SECURITY/SAFETY AREA
SG R&I REPORT 054-26 (VOLGO-BALT 226)	August 20, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / East / Coordinates 42.826576, 38.376615
SG R&I REPORT 055-26	August 20, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 46.325880, 30.655713
SG R&I REPORT 057-26 (MV RMS TEAM)	August 21, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 44.129943, 37.020851
SG R&I REPORT 058-26 (MT NECIBE)	August 21, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 44.632869, 37.815411
SG R&I REPORT 059-26 (MT URAL)	August 22, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / NW / Coordinates 44.614068, 37.821071
UKMTO WARNING 118-26 & MSCIO ALERT 99-26 (MT SIBU 1 or SEAMULL)	August 22, 2026	Hijacked / Kidnapped	Gulf of Aden / Yemen / Coordinates 14.314444, 50.155000
IMB/ICC 049 -26 / ROBBERY	August 22, 2026	Robbery	S. China Sea / Coordinates / 10.269167, 107.033333
UKMTO WARNING 119-26	August 24, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Northern Red Sea / Coordinates 23.716667, 36.550000
UKMTO WARNING 120-26	August 25, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Hormuz strait / Coordinates 26.083333, 56.500000
UKMTO ATTACK 121-26	August 25, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Hormuz strait / Coordinates 26.500000, 56.500000
SG R&I REPORT 060-26 (MT STAR II)	August 25, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / East / Coordinates 43.946393, 38.914774
SG R&I REPORT 061-26 (MV LIDER BORDO MAVI)	August 26, 2026	Assumed Military Attack	Black Sea / East / Coordinates 43.917720, 38.839471



• INCIDENTS • CHOKE-POINTS • FRIENDLY ⚓ Ports

CHARTS ARE PROVIDED BY SEA GUARDIAN "DaCoR" system / MTRI web-interactive map

↩ return to OBJECTIVES

	GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)			
A/A	VICINITY / AREA / DOMAIN	OVERALL	THREAT sections	RISK sections
1	THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS)	X	–	
2	CYBER-THREATS / RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION BY CYBERPAX	X	–	
3	LIBYA – CENTRAL MEDITERRANEAN	–	X	–
4	SYRIA (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
5	LEBANON (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
6	GAZA-ISRAEL (MIDDLE EAST ISSUE IN EAST MEDITERRANEAN REGION)	–	X	–
7	SUDAN – ERITREA – ETHIOPIA	–	X	–
8	RED SEA – YEMEN	–	X	–
9	NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF / IRAN'S REGION	–	X	–
10	BLACK SEA / NW PART (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)	–	X	–
11	BALTIC SEA / NE PART (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)	–	X	–
12	TERRORISM - ORGANIZED CRIME / HUMMANS' TRAFFICKING – NAVIGATONAL / ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS	X		
13	GULF OF GUINEA	–	X	
14	EAST MEDITERRANEAN SEA	–	X	
15	SUEZ CANAL – NORTHERN RED SEA	–	X	
16	BAB-EL-MANDEB STRAITS – SOUTHERN REA SEA	–	X	
17	GULF OF ADEN – SOMALIA / SOMALILAND	–	X	
18	ARABIAN SEA – GULF OF OMAN	–	X	
19	HORMUZ STRAITS – PERSIAN GULF	–	X	
20	BLACK SEA / EAST PART	–	X	
21	BALTIC SEA / WEST PART	–	X	
22	SOUTH AMERICA / NW PART – PANAMA	–	X	
23	SOUTH AMERICA / NE PART – VENEZUELA	–	X	
24	SOUTHERN AFRICA / WEST PART – ANGOLA / NAMIBIA	–	X	
25	SOUTHERN AFRICA / EAST PART - MADAGASCAR	–	X	
26	MALACCA STRAITS	–	X	
27	TAIWAN – JAPAN SEA	–	X	
28	TAIWAN – SOUTH CHINA SEA	–	X	
29	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	–	X	
30	ARCTIC CYCLE / EAST – EUROPE / RUSSIA / NORTHEAST ASIA	–	X	
31	Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment	X	–	X
32	Overall Assessment – Consulting	X	–	
	ANNEXES TO SECURITY ASSESSMENT			
	ANNEX "A": CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE	X	–	
	ANNEXI "B": SECURITY ASSESSMENT – LESSONS LEARNED	X	–	
	ANNEX "C": THE SEA GUARDIAN DATA & CONTROL REPORTING SYSTEM (DACOR)	X	–	

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3IS)





Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile:

- Global security threats and risks derive from a synthesis of military/paramilitary/terrorism criminal actions represented in the same area in some cases. Growing tensions in the Red Sea and Bab el-Mandeb region pose dangers to global trade routes and energy supplies, while instability in the Horn of Africa states of Somalia, Ethiopia, and Sudan, as well as the piracy/detentions incidents along with Libya and Yemen, pose a further threat of regional spillover. Meanwhile, proxy confrontations in the form of drone strikes on vessels and energy infrastructure in the Black Sea region and increasing naval activities near Taiwan are indicative of a wider move toward proxy confrontations and critical infrastructure targeting. Lately, far from the previous months' issue of Greenland US occupation, other countries show high interest in the High-North route, with international institutions upgrading their presence in the area, such as NATO.

Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile:

- Global geo-economic conditions are becoming more fragmented. Sanctions, conflict, and insecurity in key maritime routes are raising energy, shipping, insurance, and supply-chain costs despite continued economic resilience.
- States and companies are diversifying energy sources, trade corridors, ports, and payment systems to reduce dependence on vulnerable chokepoints. The result is a more resilient but costlier global trading system, with sustained volatility in commodities, freight, and strategic infrastructure.

International Security / Strategic sector:

- The security challenges posed by the Black Sea region have become interlinked with those of the Mediterranean, Red Sea, Persian Gulf, and Indian Ocean. Conflicts, acts of terrorism, criminal activities, and attacks on energy, ports, and military facilities affect the safety of navigation, commerce, and supply lines.
- The use of drones and missiles, smuggling, piracy, and illegal migration provide means of support to armed groups and increase instability in those regions.

Global Maritime Security / Navigational safety profile:

- The security and safety of maritime activities globally are deteriorating, with threats arising from the convergence of conflict, terrorism, organized crime, and drones across the Black Sea, Mediterranean, Red Sea, Horn of Africa and the Gulf region. Incidents involving attacks on the shipping industry, ports, oil installations, and offshore facilities pose dangers of damage and disruption in terms of pollution, traffic management, and port operations.
- The Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab continue to be significant disruption zones for global shipping amid slow improvements in Suez. Rerouting, increased costs of insurance, piracy, smuggling, and poor coastal management are among factors that call for improved voyage planning and maritime awareness.

↩return to **CONTEXT TABLE**

CYBER-THREATS / RISKS ASSESSMENT AND MITIGATION BY CYBERPAX

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IN SYNERGY WITH SEA GUARDIAN

When Wars End Ashore, They Continue at Sea: Shipping in the Asymmetric Decade

Feature on the war–crime convergence, the piracy resurgence of 2026, and why maritime risk can no longer be estimated by averages.

- The defining feature of maritime insecurity in 2026 is not any single conflict. It is that the boundary between war and crime has dissolved, and shipping stands on the wrong side of both. Wars do not conclude at sea; they decay into criminal economies that inherit the weapons, the trained hands and the targeting infrastructure the war built. August made the point brutally. Two vessels were hijacked within four days: the cargo ship Lutuf, taken off the Somali coast on the 17th, and a product tanker seized in the Gulf of Aden on the 20th by six armed men some 136 nautical miles east of Al Mukalla and diverted toward Puntland. Six commercial vessels have now been seized since April across the Gulf of Aden and the western Indian Ocean. The IMB counted 38 piracy and armed robbery incidents worldwide in the first half of the year, five of them hijackings, with Somali pirates responsible for 94 percent of all crew taken hostage. The economics are back too: reported ransom demands have reached ten million dollars for a single vessel.
- Why now? Because the wars made it possible. The naval forces that suppressed Somali piracy for a decade are stretched thin by the Red Sea and Hormuz crises, and merchant traffic rerouting away from those flashpoints passes closer to Somali waters than it has in years. The connection runs deeper than distraction, however. A United Nations report has assessed that Al-Shabaab reached a transactional agreement with the Houthis: more piracy, in exchange for advanced weapons and training. Analysts now warn openly about what follows if that channel matures, and it is worth stating plainly. Missile, drone and unmanned-surface capability moving from a militia arsenal into criminal hands would change the nature of piracy altogether. Nor is this the piracy of fifteen years ago even today. The skiff has not changed, but the targeting has: pirate groups plan operations using satellite communications and GPS, run motherships that put attack teams hundreds of miles offshore, and read the same tracking data the industry publishes about itself. A criminal group with commodity satellite equipment now holds an intelligence picture that only navies held a generation ago. The merchant vessel it hunts has gained no comparable defensive leap.
- For owners, operators and underwriters, the hardest consequence is analytical. This environment defeats estimation. War-decay criminality does not follow last year's frequency tables; when an arsenal migrates, when a latent actor can be reactivated by a political decision made elsewhere, the loss distribution is not a curve to be averaged. It is a set of conditions, and any one of them, in a failed state, changes everything. Route exposure, tracking discipline, communications hygiene, crew readiness, naval presence: these do not offset one another. A fleet cannot compensate for transiting a compromised corridor by excelling elsewhere. Operators who will navigate this decade well are those who assess risk the way it now actually behaves: gated, not averaged. Identify the small set of conditions that individually void all the others, and verify each one holds. The same logic, incidentally, applies ashore, where the criminal ecosystem works the office as well as the sea lane; Greek authorities

demonstrated it this summer by recovering four million euros taken from a shipping company through forged payment instructions planted inside its own banking correspondence.

- The wars of this decade will be declared over, one by one, in capitals. At sea, their residue will keep working: the weapons, the trained hands, the targeting data. Shipping is not a bystander to that process. It is the revenue model.

Two-line risk snapshot

• War-decay criminality against shipping: satellite-enabled piracy, militia-armed networks, potential transfer of missile/drone capability to criminal hands: **HIGH**

• Ability of operators to assess gated, non-compensable exposure conditions rather than averaged historical risk: **CRITICAL**

Dr. Eric Tartas — Founder & CEO, CyberPax S.A. — for the SEA GUARDIAN monthly assessment, August 2026

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Military Operations

Libya – Central Mediterranean

- The security situation in Libya is of high risk, particularly in and around Zawiya and Surman, due to fighting among militias, an escape from prison, and drones attacking oil, fuel, and power infrastructure.
- Military/Terrorism: Localized threat of drone attacks, armed conflict, fires, power disruptions, and port/logistics disruption.
- Piracy/Organized Crime: No verified cases of piracy or hijacking, but possible increase in illegal boarding and theft due to unstable conditions.
- Hijacking/Life Damages: Merchant crew threat not identified; threats are secondary to other disruptions, including violence, infrastructure, and rescue incidents.
- GNSS/Cyber: No verified GNSS or cyber incidents, but vulnerabilities at port and energy facilities remain.
- Port Crime: Higher security levels at vessels and port facilities are recommended.
- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the only entities that have effect in all over Libya are the NOC (National Oil Company) and the Central Bank of Libya, so far.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "HIGH" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Triggers and Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Syria continues to be a very risky and unstable country due to terrorism, military tensions, corruption, and poor governance, which contribute to disruption risks.
- Military/Terrorism: The presence of an ISIS-related IED scheme in Damascus is evidence of terrorism risk, whereas Israeli–Turkish tensions may result in escalation over Syrian territory.
- Piracy/Organized Crime: There are no trends for piracy or hijackings; however, there is a risk of organized crime and cargo hijackings due to corruption and poor security.

- Hijacking/Life Damages: There are no threats of hijacking crew members; exposure is mainly indirect through terrorist activities.
- Port Crime: Even if there is a high density of criminality, the mixture of terrorists, the long-standing period of disruption, and the Israelis' operations inside Syrian territory could function as a factor for escalation of criminality in ports more than threats from military attacks.
- SEA GUARDIAN, due to the supposed diversion of Persian Gulf oil exports to the eastern coasts of the Mediterranean, advises the maritime industry to proceed with high caution and detailed planning for Syrian "port calls".

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Lebanon is a disrupted, medium- to high-risk operating environment. Political stress, humanitarian aid shortages, and the plan for future oil transit through Tripoli create additional risk on coast-related logistics and infrastructure.
- Military/Terrorism: The possibility of a ceasefire breach and political tension with Hezbollah increases the potential for escalation and collateral risk.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: No piracy or hijacking trend is observed; however, identity checks being less strict could allow for smuggling and organized crime. The risk is primarily related to spillover from conflict.
- Port Crime: Increased transit of Iraqi fuel through Tripoli makes the port more strategically relevant.
- SEA GUARDIAN assesses that the possibility of Lebanese ports being used as Iraq's oil export point to the West is more likely than the use of Syrian ports. The only threat that exists in the area derives from conflict between Israel and Hezbollah, with not influenced by other high-rivalry contradictions or states in the area such as Turkey.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Israel-Gaza maritime theater remains highly dangerous due to the lack of cease-fire negotiations, issues related to disarmament, and tensions between parties involved.
- Military/Terrorism: High threat of new attacks and disruption of coastal installations by force.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: Piracy not confirmed, although threats and risks due to activities by armed groups are still high. High indirect risk of military operations, arrests, and instability; hijackings are not confirmed.
- GNSS/Cyber: Incidents have not been confirmed, although the threat of electronic interference exists.
- Port Crime: Port facilities can be subject to rapid disruptions.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered per area as initially depicted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Sudan – Eritrea – Ethiopia

- Sudan continues to be a high-risk and deteriorating situation. Attacks from civil-war violence and RSF drones raise the risk of damage to infrastructure, harm to civilians, and disruptions to transportation and logistics, while escalation between Eritrea and Ethiopia due to the Tigray region, the access in the Red Sea and Blue Nile, still exists. The latter involves in the conflict also other states, such as Egypt.
- Military/Terrorism: Continued attacks by RSF drones in Khartoum and other cities indicate growing risks from the air.
- Piracy/Organized Crime- Hijacking/Life Damages: There is no reported trend of piracy or hijacking, but poor border security and economies of war create opportunities for smuggling. Risks of being attacked, displaced, and having essential services compromised pose high indirect risks to personnel.
- GNSS/Cyber: There are no reports of GNSS or cyber incidents; communications and critical infrastructure are vulnerable.
- Port Crime: Port facilities and supply routes along borders are subject to corruption, theft, and interference from armed groups. Enhanced access and controls of cargo are recommended.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Triggers and risk indicators remain unaltered as analyzed in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Red Sea – Yemen

- Yemen and the southern part of the Red Sea still represent a highly hazardous maritime region, even if only Saudi Arabia-linked shipping has been attacked so far. The increased attacks from Houthis and a shaky ceasefire situation pose danger for ships, ports, cargoes, and crews, while tensions between Yemen's official military forces and Houthis flare up from time to time.
- Military/Terrorism: There have been missile and drone attacks on Mocha and elsewhere, with a strong possibility of increased warfare.
- Piracy/Organized Crime: There are no regular piracy developments; however, coercion and potential transit fee charges pose danger to commercial vessels.
- Hijacking/Life Damages: There is a high exposure to this risk because of strikes on ships, ports, and coastal zones.
- GNSS/Cyber: There are no important incidents of cyber and GNSS attacks; however, the possibility of GNSS/GPS/NAVAIDS interference risk is very high in several periods.
- Port Crime: The closure of Mocha proves high port vulnerability; maximum security should be exercised by masters and crews at anchor or at berth.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Northern Persian Gulf / Iran's region

- The Northern Persian Gulf and the Strait of Hormuz remain in a high-threat/risk zone. Vessel attacks, disruptions to shipping operations, and ambiguity in a conditional route through Iran-Oman pose serious risks to commercial shipping and energy transfers. The accommodation of traffic is disrupted as repeated military attacks in the South around Hormuz create a high level of uncertainty for the maritime community to return into the strait.
- Military/Terrorism: Regional escalation and activities by Iranian proxies keep the risk of attacks on vessels, energy infrastructure, and personnel alive. The characterization of ships as targets in accordance with different rules between the US mission tasks and Iran's pursuit to totally dominate the strait creates a puzzle of threat and risk difficult to resolve in any case.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: Although there is no piracy trend, ship detention, smuggling, and forced management of waterways pose credible risks. High crew risk is posed by vessel strikes, ship detention, and restricted access to emergency services in the strait.
- GNSS/Cyber: Even if there have been no confirmed important incidents due to electronic warfare, the electronic interference picture is of a high risk.
- Port Crime: Even if there aren't port crimes in practice, there is still the possibility of military attacks inside ports or at anchorages.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN Threat & Risk Assessment 08-1/2026, April 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Black Sea / NW part (RUSSIA - UKRAINE WAR)

- Black Sea remains an extremely dangerous maritime area. The use of drones and unmanned surface vessels for strikes has become a major hazard for commercial vessels, ports, export lanes, and offshore energy installations. The latest attacks were against cargo ships; at most, they verify that the grain and wheat exports are highly affected, as assumed in the previous SEA GUARDIAN assessments. In practice, the attacks have been reduced only against tanker vessels.
- Military/Terrorism: Both Russian and Ukrainian maritime activities pose threats to coastal infrastructure and littoral navigation. An explosive marine drone has been thwarted off the Neptun Deep gas development in Romania.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: There are no indications of any piracy trends. The threat posed by the conflict-related targeting of commercial shipping is becoming increasingly more likely. High danger to crew security. Five grain freighters have allegedly been targeted in the vicinity of Novorossiysk and Tuapse; Anna S caught fire due to the drone strike; the 21 crew members remained unharmed.
- GNSS/Cyber: There are no known cases; however, electronic warfare and navigation jamming are possible threats.
- Port Crime: Ports, grain facilities, and energy infrastructure are susceptible to drone attacks and shutdown of operations.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: VERY HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Baltic Sea / NE part (RUSSIA-UKRAINE WAR)

- The Northern Baltic continues to be a highly risky region for navigation because of drone activity, electronic warfare risks, sanctions, and hybrid threats.
- Military/Terrorism: Ukraine used a drone in an attack on Ust-Luga, and another drone operating in Latvian airspace was downed by NATO planes.
- Piracy/Organized Crime - Hijacking/Life Damages: There are no piracy incidents in practice. Shadow/Grey fleets, smuggling, and sanctions evasion continue to be the main source of risks. No reported vessel hijacking risk, but crews are indirectly exposed to drone operations, misidentification, and navigational risks.
- GNSS/Cyber: Electronic warfare risks have been reported in connection with the Latvian airspace intrusion, meaning that GNSS and communications disruption are risks.
- Port Crime: Energy terminals are still vulnerable to sabotage or drone attacks, while strengthened Finnish border controls indicate higher hybrid threats.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "HIGH"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as estimated in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

TERRORISM - ORGANIZED CRIME / HUMMANS' TRAFFICKING – NAVIGATONAL / ENVIRONMENTAL HAZARDS

- Terrorism: Attacks by Houthi groups ensure that the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden are critical regions for shipping due to risks of terrorism, piracy, and coastline attacks.
- Organized Crime / Human Trafficking: Ineffective port and border controls lead to risks of smuggling, trafficking, stowaways, cargo theft and armed robbery, especially in the regions of Libya, Yemen and Somalia.
- Navigational / Environmental Risks: The Black Sea is at risk of mines, drones and missile threats while the Red Sea is at risk of disruptions caused by weather and oil spills.
- Assessment: Maritime security risk is critical in the Red Sea–Gulf of Aden region and high in the Black Sea, Horn of Africa, Libya and Gulf regions.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

RISK ASSESSMENT UPDATE:

Gulf of Guinea

- Piracy, armed robbery, kidnapping for ransom, trafficking, and port crime pose threats to the Gulf of Guinea, notably Nigeria. These are now worsened by terrorism, regional instability, and poor security coordination resulting from insecure conditions in the Sahel region.
- Although there have been improved efforts in combating piracy, crews are at risk of violence, hijacking, injury, and even death, while ports are open to smuggling, facilitation, cargo theft, and stowaways.
- Ships should adopt security measures that include cyber defense and independent navigation in case of GNSS jamming.
- Military threat analysis for Gulf of Guinea states:

NIGERIA	CAMEROON	GHANA	CONGO	IVORY COAST	GABON
High	High	Medium	High	Medium	Medium

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW"*

- Triggers and indicators per area remain as in the SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30 and SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

East Mediterranean Sea

- As respectively analyzed in the SYRIA, LEBANON, GAZA-ISRAEL threat assessment sections of this report.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/22, November 12, 2025.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Suez Canal – Northern Red Sea

- Eastern Mediterranean and the Egyptian waters are currently assessed as being low- to medium-risk areas, where Suez Canal security guarantees a slow resumption of major container shipping. To the other hand Houthis' warnings and heightened tension in the region keep exposing Red Sea passages and crews to the risk of attacks.
- There have been no reports of damage to the canal following the recent quake near Suez, but it further strengthens the importance of contingency plans for ports and infrastructure.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Bab-El-Mandeb Straits – Southern Rea Sea

- Bab al-Mandeb Strait and the southern Red Sea are of high-risk seaways, where Houthis' attacks have become the major threat to vessels and crews.
- The diversion of Saudi Arabian tankers through the Suez channel, the Med and around the Cape of Good Hope, the deadly attack on the Tihamah coast, as well as the avoidance of the area by the major Chinese shipowners, show that there are interruptions, longer routes, and increased expenses.
- Piracy, smuggling, port crimes, and military rivalry among regional countries are additional threats; however, the presence of multinational navies in Djibouti does not completely prevent or deter any risks.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "NSR".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially presented in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Gulf of Aden – Somalia / Somaliland

- Western Indian Ocean and the Horn of Africa continue to be a zone of significant risks, including piracy and criminal syndicates, ongoing insurgency by Al-Shabaab, and increased geopolitical rivalry in the areas of the Gulf of Aden and Red Sea approaches.
- The deadly ambush of the militants from Al-Shabaab in Kenya is a proof of the continued ability of the cross-border militants to pose a threat. On the other hand, foreign naval and military presence, including the renewed deployment of China for escort mission in the Gulf of Aden and provided training to Somali forces, can increase the capabilities of the response but complicates the coordination efforts.
- The proportion of piracy attacks to hijacked vessels has increased remarkably, accounting for 6 vessels under detention so far during the last five months, still under captivity without signs of release. Somali pirates show a strong profile in negotiations in order to liberate crews and vessels.
- SEA GUARDIAN is closely monitoring the situation by providing a table of detained ships in its weekly report of July 20, 2026.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "VERY HIGH" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "NSR"*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman

- Oman itself hasn't been involved in the US-Iran war, but its coastal waters are vulnerable to attacks by Iranians, even if specific operations have reduced the sources of monitoring the area by IRAN, especially in the second phase of the war.
- Continued vulnerability exists in the Arabian Sea and the Gulf of Oman, considering the hostile relations between the United States and Iran, restricted freedom of navigation at the Hormuz Strait, and the danger of GNSS/AIS interferences and cyber operations.
- An arrangement for an Iran-Oman traffic routing could help in better managing the current situation; however, such an agreement is still very vulnerable and cannot reduce the risk of being detained or subject to coercive action and military confrontation, as it disregards the US maritime traffic control.
- Caroline Bezengi's grounding and a huge oil spill in Oman waters are examples of additional risks.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially noted in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf

- As respectively analyzed in the NORTHERN PERSIAN GULF / IRAN'S REGION current threat assessment the aforementioned risk updates the relevant section of this report.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "VERY HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "VERY HIGH" – GNSS interference: "HIGH".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" HAS BEEN LEFT INTENTIONALLY BLANK DUE TO WAR CONDITIONS and unpredictable actions by all involved parties.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Black Sea / East Part

- Eastern Black Sea continues to be a moderate-risk marine area because of the repercussions from the Russia–Ukraine war, dangers to infrastructure for energy exports, and possibilities of disruptions to navigational or global positioning systems activities.
- Disruption of operations in Novorossiysk is encouraging Kazakhstan to seek out export options via the Caspian, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and Türkiye, while protection guarantees on the safety of non-Russian commercial shipping and Kazakh oil infrastructure could mitigate exposure.
- Energy connections and Middle Corridor investments (Romania-Georgia submarine connection, Azerbaijan-Uzbekistan cooperation) enhance trade security; however, vessels and ports have to continue to remain vigilant.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: HIGH *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Baltic Sea / West part

- This region continues to be relatively hazardous for navigation, with NATO-Russia tensions, military operations, hybrid warfare, and potential GNSS/cyber-attacks among the most significant threats to shipping.
- The resubstituting of the Russian Navy vessel Admiral Levchenko in proximity to the Fehmarn Belt, apparently connected with the security of the shadow fleet, and the increased NATO presence in its eastern flank, consists an additional risk.
- Piracy is not a threat in this area, yet navigators should take precautions against navigation checks, cyber vulnerabilities, AIS hazards, and monitoring of military maneuvers; the deadly crash of the Misje Verde confirms this need as an obligation.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

South America / NW part – PANAMA

- The Panama Canal continues to be a moderately risky environment strategically and operationally, given the competition between China and the United States, disputes over ship compliance, and water level problems. While the reduction in Chinese detentions of vessels flying the Panama flag is a step toward reducing short-term tensions, the dispute over terminal control has not yet been settled.
- Decreasing water levels and slots are leading to increased costs in transiting the waterway, possibly delays, cargo limitations, or diversion plans; average auction prices stood at $1.1 million in August 2026.
- Increased regional cooperation to counter cartels and PANAMAX 2026 provide for canal security. Operators need to stay flexible on their schedules, check compliance documents, and plan for contingencies in case of disruptions.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "NSR" - ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

South America / NE part – VENEZUELA

- The Guyana-Venezuela region is an environment that suffers from political instability, mainly after Maduro's capture but also due to the re-emergence of disputes on the borders between them that appeared in the previous months. The outstanding Essequibo territorial dispute doesn't seem to escalate, but still remains as dispute.
- Venezuela's limited financial budget amid the consequences of the recent earthquake, forces the country to seek repatriation of its capital held in offshore banks, which shows that there is a lack of budget not only to develop its oil extraction capabilities, but also to rebuild the state.
- Guyana's growing oil production and connections to energy resources in the Caribbean region elevate the area to a more strategically important position for operations in the offshore facilities and export paths.
- Increased vigilance and security measures must be maintained in order to protect from possible disruptions.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "LOW" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 26/06, March 19.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Southern Africa / West part – Angola / Namibia

- Maritime risk environment of the Angola-Namibia area is assessed as moderate, resulting primarily from organized crime and opportunistic boarding of anchored vessels in Angolan ports, especially Luanda. Increased vigilance is required regarding offshore energy structures, support vessels and approaches to ports because of theft, intrusion and disruption.
- Military, paramilitary and terrorism risks assessed as low. There is no proven militant anti-shipping threat; however, Angola's offshore energy facilities may be at risk of criminal reconnaissance or intrusion.
- Piracy and organized maritime crime assessed as low-to-moderate, generally limited to anchorage robbery, and not involving hijacking, kidnapping or other major threats. Risk of hijacking, gunfire directed against vessels, crew injury or death low in Angola-Namibia area.
- There is no identified pattern of special interference with GNSS, AIS, ECDIS systems or cyber-attack. Port risk factors include waterside theft in Luanda and cargo theft, documentation fraud, trafficking, insider-enabled crime and stowaways at Walvis Bay. Masters should maintain strong access control, secure stores, anchor-watch patrols, contractor checks, cargo integrity controls and navigation cross-checks.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "NSR" - ICC/Piracy: "HIGH" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area)

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Southern Africa / East part - Madagascar

- This new region has been set under the permanent assessment of SEA GUARDIAN DACOR system. There is no information on any piracy, terrorism, hijacking, crew casualties, or GNSS/AIS disruption in the Mozambique Channel/Madagascar Strait for 2026, in this narrow area. It should be noted that assessment is based on public reports rather than confirmed threat events.
- Risk comes from port and anchorage crimes such as opportunistic boarding, robbery, stowaways, trafficking, cargo and document forgery. The major hotspot is Toamasina, while northern approaches may have some spill-over risk due to the Cabo Delgado conflict. In recent weeks, reports show that ISIS is trying to enhance its growth by adding about 400-500 members to its force, even if there aren't signs of a remarkable escalation of threats/risks.
- The deep-water route is still low-risk. Keep ISPS Level 1, enhance access control and anchoring watches, service craft identification, cargo security, and independent navigation using radar and visual monitoring.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "LOW" - GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators will be published in the next monthly assessment (new permanently assessing area)

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Malacca Straits

- Malacca Strait continues to be a medium-risk but strategic passage due to maritime opportunism, congestion, and possible GNSS/Cyber disruption. Political rivalry and dependence on heavy trade flows may quickly impact operations.
- Singapore, Malaysia, and Indonesia are mitigating the risks by improving information exchange, cooperative operations, and maritime security cooperation, affirming their commitment to secure the safe transit in one of the eight global major maritime chock points.
- Keep a vigilant watch, navigational checks, verifications, and contingencies for congestion and regional disruption.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "NSR" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"*

- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as cited in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Taiwan – Japan Sea

- Taiwan-Japan Sea region is still medium-risk owing to Chinese military movements, China-Japan/ cross-strait tensions, and possible miscalculations at local chokepoints. Chinese naval movement along with the Indonesian navy east of Taiwan highlights the increased sensitivity of operations, despite claims by Indonesia that it is normal.
- GNSS/cyber resilience and maritime-domain awareness remain important, as well as the possibility of disruption to the supply chain due to delays by the Chinese in exporting critical supplies to Taiwan.
- Vessels should be prepared for heightened surveillance of military/coast guard movements, navigation independently, and secure communications.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: LOW *// Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "LOW" – ICC/Piracy: "NSR" – Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" as written in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Taiwan – South China Sea

- The Taiwan-South China Sea region is still considered a moderately risky region, driven mainly by the activities of states' military and coast guards, territorial disputes, and cross-strait tensions rather than criminality.
- Low piracy and GNSS/cyber risks do not preclude significant economic risks. There is no delays in delivering of critical materials from China to the West through the supply chain. Ships must be wary of military presence and take additional precautions for navigation, communication, and route planning.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" – ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" – Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" – GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators that distort the "risk levels" in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Arctic cycle / East – Europe / Russia / Northeast Asia

- The Arctic still has a relatively low risk of piracy and conventional crime, although risks for the Northern Sea Route are rising. The launch by Russia of the K-563 Ulyanovsk nuclear submarine that will join late 2026 the Northern Russian fleet, together with sanctioned tanker fleets, is the evidence that the area is increasingly being used both militarily and commercially.
- Although China's weekly container service and South Korea's test voyage demonstrate increased commercial interest in the arctic route, it is still season-bound. The use of Russian icebreakers is of paramount importance during winter time to keep the sea lane open for commercial purposes.
- It is thus essential for the commercial entities to view the NSR as a complex, politically sensitive, specialized route, rather than an alternative to Asia-Europe routes.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "LOW".*

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

Arctic cycle / West – Greenland / Alaska

- Strategic competition expands, as indicated by the Chinese research icebreakers monitored in the waters of Alaska, suspected due to their equipment of potentially implementing underwater surveillance.
- Increased U.S. military presence in Alaska and issues surrounding energy permits for Greenland show that priority has been given to the exploitation of natural resources, without signaling an imminent threat to normal commercial shipping operations. The background for a possible escalation in the race between not only superpowers but among many other states seeking to be part of the North Pole treasures, is already there. Another factor to be taken under consideration is the new navigable waters.
- Arctic vessel operators need to maintain the capability for specialized ice navigation, weather and route planning, communication, search and rescue/evacuation provisions, and constant military/regulatory updates.

- SEA GUARDIAN considers that the North Pole surrounding areas should be monitored and analyzed separately (East/West) due to their different characteristics. The farther north we go, the easier it is for a sudden escalation among more competitors than the two superpowers (US and Russia). It is not certain that a maritime company will invest significant resources in this so far, unless is willing to take the risk.

OVERALL THREAT / RISK LEVEL: MEDIUM *// Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "NSR" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".*

- Indicators per area remain as in SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/06, April 15.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

PIRACY – BOARDING CONDITIONS, KIDNAPPING, FIRING, ELECTRONIC HARASSMENT

- Maritime security risks remain high due to piracy and hostage taking in the Western Indian Ocean and the Gulf of Guinea, along with risks emanating from conflicts including attacks, interference with navigation systems and disruption at Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, and Red Sea chokepoints. Carrier use of Suez is still tentative and reversible, while Chinese tanker companies stay clear of Hormuz and Bab el-Mandeb, adding mileage and expense.
- Energy and goods transportation is being rerouted through other shipping corridors, as Kazakhstan explores Caspian-Caucasus routes and Russia and China are building up the Northern Sea Route. The water restrictions at the Panama Canal have forced slot auction prices at about $1.1m on average. Alternative corridors provide greater resiliency but bring increased risks of sanctions, ice conditions, vulnerable infrastructure, and environmental risks, with the recent example of the CAROLINE BEZENGI oil spill off the coast of Oman.
- Migration, document fraud, and trafficking remain significant risks for port security in the Mediterranean and the border regions of Europe. Cooperation in counter-piracy and counter-cartels – such as the initiative of the Chinese navy to provide escort in the Gulf of Aden and PANAMAX – provides mitigation without eliminating the existing threat. Dynamic routing, heightened watchkeeping, GNSS/AIS validation, access control, and contingency measures for the safety of seafarers and vessels must be maintained.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

OVERALL ASSESSMENT – CONSULTING

- Diplomatic Tensions. There have been increased diplomatic tensions over strategic maritime corridors. Iran-Oman negotiations over Hormuz still have not been sorted out in the context of the wider US-Iranian differences, while China is ramping up anti-crime and naval operations in the Gulf of Aden. Baltic cooperation for NATO deterrence is increasing as well, which indicates a rising competition in vital maritime areas between superpowers.
- Political Instability. Political instability is acute in the Israel-Lebanon-Syria region, Yemen, Sudan, Somaliland, Somalia and some parts of West Africa. Ongoing wars, displacement, terrorism and drone use are eroding state control and increasing regional escalation dangers.
- International trade. International trade is getting restructured due to security disruptions of energy and commodity routes. Energy flows from the Persian Gulf are continuing to be affected by uncertainty over Hormuz, leading to alternative flows through Egypt and the Mediterranean. Libya's energy development and Kazakhstan's need to find alternatives to the Russian Black Sea routes, are additional evidences of that trend.
- Maritime trade. Trade risks on the maritime route have not improved much despite positive changes in some corridors. Hormuz is impacted by attacks and transit disruptions, while the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab are threatened by Houthi missiles and drones. There are rising risks of piracy in the Gulf of Aden and drone strikes on ships near the Russian Black Sea ports.

- **Overall assessment:** Overall, shipping companies should assess security risk as high to critical in the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea–Bab al-Mandab, Gulf of Aden and Black Sea. Main threats include missile and drone attacks, piracy, armed boarding, military interference and abrupt transit restrictions. Navigational safety is also affected by GNSS jamming or spoofing, unreliable AIS data, communications disruption and changing exclusion zones. Bridge teams should cross-check satellite positions with radar, visual and other independent navigation methods. Voyage-specific risk assessments, updated navigational warnings, close monitoring of port and flag-state guidance, and defined diversion options, remain essential. Vessels should retain high readiness and verify pilotage, channels, aids to navigation and port access immediately before arrival or departure.

- **Overall consulting:** Voyage-specific Security Clearance is required for transit through the Strait of Hormuz, Red Sea, Bab al-Mandab, Gulf of Aden and the Black Sea. Risk-based decisions need to consider current risks, vessel characteristics and cargo, port characteristics, insurance, risk to the crew and potential for alternative routing. Voyage clearance will allow Masters to divert, delay or suspend voyages where risk exceeds acceptable levels. Increased vigilance on the bridge, increased maneuvering preparation, enhanced reporting, improved threat intelligence, and relevant reporting to the UKMTO/MSCHOA should be maintained during voyages through the high-risk areas. Bridge watch personnel should use a variety of information sources including GNSS and AIS, checking against radar observations, visual sightings, dead reckoning and other sources prior to transit and before entering or leaving ports. For that reason, the DACOR system of SEA GUARDIAN is a helpful digital tool providing 24/7 threat and risk assessment to Shipping Companies, Masters and Security Team Leaders. Measures to secure cyber infrastructure should be in place at all times.

↩return to KEY DEVELOPMENTS OR ↩return to CONTEXT TABLE

ANNEX "A": CHOKEPOINTS TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE

SEA GUARDIAN, exploiting near-real time apps of open and specialized sources for the traffic performance reporting system to feed its algorithms, provides the following statistics shows how the relative performance in the group of major chock-points fluctuates:

ARABIC PENINSULA AND SOUTH AFRICA



MEDITERRANEAN – BLACK SEA AND SUEZ



Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / (+30) 694 437 3465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing tailor-made assessments upon request on ports, routes, cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk Assessments for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

ANNEX "B": SECURITY ASSESSMENT – LESSONS LEARNED

LESSONS LEARNED		
INCIDENTS	**REACTIONS**	**TRANSFORMATION NOTICES**
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	Permanent contact with the shipping company as well the maritime security company that hires security teams.	Developing independent international relations and operational apps for supporting crew recovery having abandoned the vessel.
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The active contingency plans and business impact analysis in case of discontinuation with the security guarding teams (such as an attack difficult to face with small arms).	Further implementation of maritime/ISO standards.
Inbound in an area of high military / paramilitary threats with all navigational aids and AIS closed	Operate all the navigational aids and AIS/communication systems after having been attacked by ballistic or related missiles, when visual targeting was available due to the lack of international naval forces.	Stabilize the closed navigational aids to prevent targeting towards the necessity of giving information through them to friendly entities.
The detailed analysis after a special interview of security crew assessing decision-made	A fundamental decision involves choosing whether to abandon a sinking vessel using a lifeboat for safety, or to escape directly into the sea with only life jackets, while under the threat of attacking skiffs searching for survivors.	Balance the threat while abandoning the ship at sea with the threat of environmental and geographical conditions for survival.
The re-emergence of piracy in the Gulf of Aden-Horn of Africa and Somalia	From the latest incidents in the area, it was proven that the existence of Maritime security teams is of paramount importance, as well as the existence of International Maritime operations.	The overall security umbrella is achieved if: – A consistent/ coherent Security assessment has been done in advance – International Maritime operations in the region exist – The use of Security teams onboard for a wider area is available.

Useful links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:

- ACLED and IMB/ICC for the war threat levels and international commerce crime incidents.
- Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea): Database of Legal Entities Under Sanctions
- https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt6GS7QohAI for an overall general assessment by the SEA GUARDIAN President presented at Naftemboriki TV (Shipping) for the latest period, covering the time-frame before and after the Houthis ballistic, drones and UCAV attacks.

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↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

ANNEX "C": THE SEA GUARDIAN DATA & CONTROL REPORTING SYSTEM - DACOR

The overall global map with the threats/risk levels, it is shown in the next chart which is the basic reference for the DACOR being informed with them:

- DACOR system visualizes this report and covers the period between two successive monthly Security Assessments and three weekly reports, with near-real time data and reporting capabilities.
- The system is ready to be provided as a subscription service hosted in SEA GUARDIAN servers.



CONTACT US FOR A TRIAL OR FIX AN APPOINTMENT:	OR BOOK A "GOOGLE MEET" APPOINTMENT THROUGH THE FOLLOWING GLOBAL CALENDAR:
E-mail: intelsec@sguardian.com	https://calendar.app.google/LmPSoo5fDxZMVq357
CY:+35725351125|GR:+302109703322 info@sguardian.com | www.sguardian.com / Sea Guardian SG Ltd Intel & Security	

↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE

FUTURE OUTLOOK

Looking Ahead,

SEA GUARDIAN is committed to further enhancing the digital capabilities and expanding service offerings. The focus remains steady on leveraging data analytics to drive personalized customer experiences and explore new market opportunities. There is confidence that SEA GUARDIAN strategic initiatives will support our partners for sustained growth and successful decision making. Digital, Control & Reporting System – DACOR, digitalizes the maritime security environment in harmonization with new equipment, training updates, and synergies with the cyber sector, in order to provide a holistic physical and digital security environment with supplementary function to the available networking systems of control, intelligence, and share maritime situational awareness, to better assess risk management studies.

Partners (shipping companies) willing to experience the DACOR system for a 10day free of charge trial should communicate with SEA GUARDIAN for a user name and password.

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↩ return to CONTEXT TABLE