



THREAT & RISK ASSESSMENT BRIEF UPDATE

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
STATEMENT

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OBJECTIVES

To provide in a 15-day cycle, the maritime industry and Security Stake or Shareholders with:

- Major maritime security incident summary and analysis in Geo-strategic frame for Operational Security and Security of shipping for the period **30 December - 13 January, 2026**.
- Threat/risks assessment updates concerning military operations - terrorism - piracy and cargo theft, hijacking and dentations, smuggling, stowaways, ships fired, crew loses and Cyber-threats.
- Overview of risk assessment and relevant information, in order to support strategic & operational planning and decision-making contribution for shipping companies.
- SEA GUARDIAN, pursues innovative approach by analyzing Maritime Security in accordance with international standards and a certain frame of Geo-policy including synergies with a specialized entity the Cyber-defense, adding new section in assessment which includes the most important sectors of the policy, the methods and training to confront the Cyber threats and risks.



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Political / Strategic-Operational Intel/Info collection "app's chart snap"

- SEA GUARDIAN has developed digital communication, command and control system depicted in the picture:



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- On January 02, [Amal Shehadeh told LBCI that Israeli media are reporting a decision to expand military operations](#) against Lebanon, including intensified airstrikes and possible ground incursions. According to the report, an Israeli security cabinet meeting is expected to convene, to discuss a plan prepared by the army outlining the expanded operations. In addition, Israeli media reported, citing an unnamed source, that the Trump administration does not rule out a possible Israeli operation against Hezbollah, but said it asked Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to delay any decision to allow more dialogue with the Lebanese government.
- On January 02, it was stated by TASS that [NATO's military activity at the borders of the Russia-Belarus Union State](#) is fraught with an unpredictable escalation, up to a direct military clash, the Head of the Russian delegation at talks in Vienna on military security and arms control Yulia Zhdanova, told the agency.
- On January 03, [the Sudanese Doctors Network warned of an imminent health and humanitarian catastrophe](#) in the besieged town of Dilling in south Kordofan, following intensified Rapid Support Forces (RSF) attacks. The notorious RSF paramilitary group has surrounded and attacked several areas, including North Darfur state capital El-Fasher, and South Kordofan's Kadugli and Dilling. The network added that RSF ally, the People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N), have also been involved in the wave of recent attacks.
- On January 03, [the US military operation that led to the seizure of Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro](#) sparked alarm across the international community, with allies and foes of Washington and Caracas expressing disquiet. US President Donald Trump said Maduro and his wife would be taken to New York to face federal charges after military strikes and an operation which he described as looking like a "television show". The Venezuelan government decried what it termed an "extremely serious military aggression" by Washington and declared a state of emergency. Countries such as Russia and Iran, which had longstanding ties with Maduro's government, were quick to condemn the operation but their alarm was also shared by Washington's allies including France and the EU.
- On January 03, [President Donald Trump invited Japan's Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi to the United States](#) during a phone call late on Jan 2 and they agreed to work towards a meeting early this year, officials said. Trump has already said he will visit China in April, with Tokyo and Beijing in dispute over Takaichi's suggestion last November that Japan could intervene militarily in case of any attack on self-ruled Taiwan.
- On January 03, [the Ministry of Defense \(MoD\) has announced the completion of the return of all UAE Armed Forces personnel from the Republic of Yemen](#). The ministry stated that the return of the UAE forces follows the implementation of a previously announced decision to conclude the remaining missions of counter-terrorism units. The process has been conducted in a manner that ensured the safety of all personnel and carried out in coordination with all relevant partners.
- On January 04, [gunmen have raided a village in northern Nigeria's Niger state](#), killing at least 30 villagers and abducting others, in what marks the latest deadly attack in the conflict-hit region. "Over 30 victims lost their lives during the attack; some persons were also kidnapped," Wasiu Abiodun, Niger police spokesman, said in a statement.



- On January 04, [the Northeast monsoon, which is likely to persist until March 2026](#), may at times bring stronger winds, choppier sea conditions, and moderate to heavy rain. The Maritime and Port Authority of Singapore (MPA) advises members of the public, port users, and maritime industry stakeholders to stay alert, exercise caution at sea, and ensure that appropriate personal safety measures are in place and vessels are properly prepared for rough sea, during this period.
- On January 05, it was stated that [the so-called "shadow fleet" of global shipping is not a temporary phenomenon](#) that will disappear with a possible peace in Ukraine. On the contrary, according to analysts and market data, it is a structural change in the international shipping system, which will continue to exist regardless of developments in 2026. The rapid expansion of the "shadow fleet" began as a direct consequence of sanctions against Russia after the invasion of Ukraine. Negotiations to end the war bring back the question of what will become of the hundreds of low-end tankers that currently transport "sanctioned" cargoes.
- On January 05, [new banknotes have arrived at money exchanges across Syria](#), replacing those showing ousted longtime ruler Bashar al-Assad and his family, as the fledgling government hopes the Syrian pound can regain some of the value lost over more than a decade of war. The redesigned notes have been months in the making and are part of a broader effort to stabilize and revitalize the economy and rebrand the state.

- On January 05, [the Israeli military has spent the past 24 hours expanding the so-called “yellow line”](#) in eastern Gaza, particularly in eastern Gaza City’s Tuffah, Shujayea, and Zeitoun neighbourhoods, according to Al Jazeera teams on the ground, squeezing Palestinians into ever smaller clusters of the enclave. The Israeli army’s actions are also pushing it closer to the key artery of Salah al-Din Street, forcing displaced families sheltering near the area to flee as more of them come under intensive threat, as Israel’s war on Gaza shows no signs of abating.
- On January 05, [in a statement, the Libyan government said the proposed conference would bring together southern Yemeni groups](#), with the talks to be hosted by Saudi Arabia, to address disputed issues and seek what it described as “fair solutions”. Tripoli praised Riyadh’s role in creating conditions for dialogue and uniting Yemeni parties, and said it supported regional and international efforts to restore peace and stability in Yemen. The statement added that Libya favors political solutions and said dialogue among all parties was the only way to end the Yemeni conflict.
- On January 05, [the High Council of State \(HCS\) of Libya has voted to elect Salah Al-Kumayshi as head of the National High Electoral Commission \(HNEC\)](#) after he secured 63 votes in a second round of voting. His rival, Al-Aref Al-Tair, received 33 votes. A total of 103 members took part in the runoff, out of 107 who attended the session. There has been no immediate response from the House of Representatives or from the current leadership of the electoral commission regarding the Council’s decision. The House of Representatives (East Libya) ruled last week to keep the existing commission board in place, while proceeding with the election of vacant posts.
- On January 06, [the Israeli foreign minister arrived in Somaliland on Tuesday in a high-profile visit](#), condemned by Somalia as an "unauthorized incursion", after Israel recognized the breakaway region in the Horn of Africa. Israel announced last month it was officially recognizing Somaliland, a first for the self-proclaimed republic since it declared independence from Somalia in 1991.



- On January 06, [the African Union Commission \(AUC\) and the United Arab Emirates \(UAE\) held a high-level meeting](#) in Addis Ababa between Mahmoud Ali Youssouf, Chairperson of the AUC, and Sheikh Shakhboot bin Nahyan Al Nahyan, UAE Minister of State. The meeting built on the first round of political consultations held in Abu Dhabi on September 13, 2025, within the framework of the 2019 Memorandum of Understanding, and reaffirmed the shared commitment of both sides to further strengthening the UAE–AU partnership. Both sides reviewed progress achieved since the inaugural consultations, exchanged views on priority areas of cooperation, and reaffirmed their commitment to sustained political dialogue.
- On January 07, [the Saudi Arabia-led coalition in Yemen has launched strikes on the country’s southern Dhale governorate](#), saying it was targeting secessionist forces after their leader fled, instead of boarding a plane scheduled to take him to talks in Riyadh. In a statement the coalition said the leader of the Southern Transitional Council (STC), Aidarous al-Zubaidi, had been due to fly out from the Yemeni city of Aden the previous night for talks, on ending the conflict between his group and the internationally recognized government of Yemen.
- On January 07, [the Suez Canal Economic Zone Authority \(SCZONE\) achieved total revenues of EGP 6.25 billion](#) during the July-November 2025 period, an annual hike of 55% from EGP 4 billion, according to a statement. The authority’s board reviewed its activities for the past three years and promotional efforts for the first half of the fiscal year (FY) 2025/2026. Strengthening its global position, the SCZONE attracted various contracts for 383 projects, with total investments of \$14.21 billion.
- On January 07, [Fresh clashes erupted in Syria’s northern city of Aleppo after hundreds](#) — and later thousands — of civilians fled two predominantly Kurdish neighborhoods through corridors opened by government forces, with the Syrian army launching shelling once a deadline for evacuations expired, witnesses and officials said. Syria’s military had given residents until 3pm (1200 GMT) to leave the neighborhoods of Sheikh Maqsoud and Achrafieh, warning they would be treated as “closed military zones” after the deadline. Soon after the cutoff, explosions and heavy weapons fire were heard across the two areas, an AFP correspondent reported.
- On January 07, [the US has seized a Russian-flagged oil tanker in the Atlantic despite the reported deployment](#) of a Russian submarine. The seizure of the ship, which evaded being boarded near Venezuela, was a joint operation between the Department of Homeland Security and US military personnel, the US European Command, which is

responsible for the region, said in a post on X. “The vessel was seized in the North Atlantic pursuant to a warrant issued by a US federal court,” US European Command, which oversees American forces in the region, said in a statement on X. After the operation, Pentagon chief Pete Hegseth posted that the US blockade on Venezuelan oil was in full effect “anywhere in the world.”

- On January 08, [against the backdrop of Western sanctions and the reorientation of its trade flows towards Asia](#), Russia is systematically investing in the Northern Sea Route (NSR), which Vladimir Putin has made a central pillar of his strategy. The strengthening of trade through the Arctic passages is now gaining in importance, with oil shipments from Russian ports to China via the NSR underlining Moscow’s shift away from European markets. At the same time, developments in the Russian Arctic are also meeting the United States’ renewed interest in the northern geostrategic space. US President Donald Trump’s public statements on Greenland are part of a broader reading of the Arctic as a new field of geo-economic and maritime competition. Comment: The will of the US to become an Arctic Cycle Country is unquestionable.

- On January 08, [a senior official from Somaliland’s governing party has fiercely defended the breakaway region’s](#) decision to normalize relations with Israel, dismissing widespread condemnation from the Arab and Muslim world as hypocritical. In a heated interview with Al Jazeera, Hersi Ali Haji Hassan, chairman of the ruling Waddani party, argued that Somaliland was forced to look to Israel for legitimacy after being ignored by the international community for decades.

- On January 08, [a Greenlandic lawmaker has stressed that Greenland is “not for sale”](#) as United States President Donald Trump and senior members of his administration renew threats to take control of the autonomous Danish territory. Aaja Chemnitz, a member of the Danish parliament representing Greenland, welcomed talks between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Danish and Greenlandic officials, expected to take place next week.



- On January 09, [the Yemeni separatist group Southern Transitional Council \(STC\) has announced](#) it will dissolve following talks in Saudi Arabia. Several STC members are in Riyadh for discussions on ending unrest in southern Yemen. The group praised Saudi Arabia’s efforts, while former STC leader Aidarous al-Zubaidi, now wanted by the Presidential Council for high treason, has fled Yemen and has not participated in the talks. An Yemeni source told Arab News: “this announcement and ease shown in the televised video statement, shows that in fact Al Zubaidi was the obstacle, and that most southerners are open to resolving their matter via dialogue and discussion”.

- On January 09, [the Lebanese army declared that progress on the second phase of a plan](#) to place all weapons under state authority depends on external factors, highlighting constraints facing the state. These include continued Israeli attacks on Lebanese territory, the occupation of several Lebanese sites, the establishment of buffer zones, repeated violations of the ceasefire agreement, and delays in the delivery of promised military capabilities to the army. The statements were made during a cabinet session, where the army announced the successful completion of the first phase of Hezbollah disarmament south of the Litani River (PROVIDE CHART AND PHOTO).

- On January 09, [the United States military has seized another oil tanker in the Caribbean](#), as it continues to target vessels sanctioned by Washington in its pressure campaign against Venezuela. In a statement, the US military Southern Command said its forces had “apprehended” the Olina tanker “without incident”. It did not say why the tanker was targeted or offer further details on alleged violations. The Wall Street Journal reported the tanker had previously been sanctioned by Washington for transporting Russian oil. The operation comes two days after US forces seized two oil tankers, including the Russian-flagged Marinera oil tanker, originally known as the Bella-1.

- On January 10, [the United States has carried out a new round of “large-scale” attacks](#) against the ISIL or ISIS group in Syria, following an ambush that killed two US soldiers and a civilian interpreter in the city of Palmyra last month. The US Central Command (CENTCOM) said in a statement that the attacks occurred at about 17:30 GMT and hit “multiple ISIS targets across Syria”.

- On January 10, [authorities in The Gambia said they have intercepted more than 780 migrants](#) at three different locations, all trying to reach Europe via Spain’s Canary Islands. Among those detained were 233 people from Senegal, 197 from The Gambia, 176 from Guinea, and 148 from Mali. The operation came just days after another boat capsized

off the Gambian coast on New Year's Eve, killing more than 30 people. While it is not the closest African country to the Spanish archipelago, migrant vessels have been forced recently to leave from further south after Senegal, Mauritania, and Morocco increased maritime patrols.

- On January 11, [the Sudanese army is renewing efforts for an operation to retake the Kordofan and Darfur](#) regions from the control of the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), as the civil war rages deep into its third year. The army has been assessing the RSF's capabilities and resources in readiness for launching the military operation with a large number of military formations fully prepared to launch an attack, it said.
- On January 11, [United States President Donald Trump says no more Venezuelan oil or money will go to Cuba](#), and he has suggested that the communist-run island should strike a deal with Washington, ramping up pressure on the longtime US nemesis. Venezuela is Cuba's biggest oil supplier, but no cargo has departed from Venezuelan ports to the Caribbean country since US forces abducted Venezuelan President Nicolas Maduro on January 3, amid a strict US oil blockade on the OPEC country, according to the latest shipping data.
- On January 12, [Kurdish armed units are breaking away from the pro-American Kurdish militia/Kurdish army SDF](#) (Syrian Democratic Forces) led by Mazloun Abdi and are calling for the immediate formation of a new Kurdish army. Abdi and the SDF are accused of betraying the Kurdish freedom struggle. It seems that a new anti-American era is beginning as the Syrian Kurds believe that the US and the West have betrayed them and handed them over to the whims of the Islamists.
- On January 12, [the internationally recognized government of Yemen said its forces have taken full control](#) of the south from the separatist Southern Transitional Council (STC), which was aligned with the Saudi-backed government until recently. As the president of the country and the high commander of the armed forces Rashad al-Alimi, the head of the Presidential Leadership Council (PLC), said "I want to assure you of the recapture of Hadramout and al-Mahra".
- On January 12, [companies and shares invested by the State Oil Fund of Azerbaijan \(SOFAZ\) have been announced](#), trend reports via the nation's Chamber of Accounts. During the first nine months of 2025, the volume of assets in the SOFAZ's equity sub-portfolio grew to \$18.1 billion due to reclassifications, net cash outflows, and positive investment revenues, and the portfolio's profitability indicators were largely in line with the benchmark.
- On January 13, open-source reporting indicated that multiple crude oil tankers were struck by drones while anchored offshore and waiting to load in the vicinity of the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC) marine terminal off Novorossiysk in the Black Sea. The vessels most consistently named in same-day reporting are DELTA HARMONY and MATILDA, with follow-on reports adding FREUD and DELTA SUPREME as additional tankers reportedly been attacked in the same CPC waiting-for-loading area. Publicly available details remain limited and do not yet confirm the drone type (airborne or surface), the precise point of impact on each vessel, or the extent of damage, casualties, pollution, or post-incident vessel movements. The incident set should therefore be treated as a confirmed cluster of drone strikes involving the named tankers near the CPC terminal area, with technical damage assessments and operational impacts still pending further official or corroborated updates.

MARITIME SECURITY INCIDENTS: December 29, 2025 - January 13, 2026¹

INCIDENT No	INCIDENT Type	INCIDENT TIME	INCIDENT DETAILS



¹ In accordance to JMIC and/or UKMTO sources

JMIC Legend



GEOPOLITICAL AWARENESS / ASSESSMENTS SECTIONS (CONTEXT TABLE)			
<u>VICINITY / AREA / DOMAIN</u>	OVERALL	THREAT's sections	RISK's sections
<u>THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)</u>	X	-	-
Libya - Central Mediterranean	-	X	-
<u>Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)</u>	-	X	-
<u>Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)</u>	-	X	-
<u>Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)</u>	-	X	-
Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia	-	X	-
Red Sea – Yemen	-	X	-
Northern Persian Gulf / Iran-Israel conflict	-	X	-
<u>RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Black Sea / NW part)</u>	-	X	-
<u>RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Baltic Sea / NE part)</u>	-	X	-
<u>Cyber-Defense / assessment and mitigation of Risks by CyberPax</u>	-	X	-
Terrorism - piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways	X	X	-
Gulf of Guinea	-	-	X
Central Mediterranean Sea - Libya	-	-	X
East Mediterranean Sea	-	-	X
Suez Canal - Northern Red Sea	-	-	X
Bab-el-Mandeb Straits - Southern Rea Sea	-	-	X
Gulf of Aden – Somalia	-	-	X
Arabian Sea – Gulf of Oman	-	-	X
Hormuz Straits – Persian Gulf	-	-	X
Malacca Straits	-	-	X
Black Sea / East Part	-	-	X
Baltic Sea / West part	-	-	X
Taiwan – Japan & South China Seas	-	-	X
Piracy – Boarding conditions, kidnapping, firing, electronic harassment	X	-	X
<u>OVERALL ASSESSMENT - CONSULTING</u>	X	-	-
ANNEXES TO “SECURITY ASSESSMENT”			
ANNEX “A”: Overall Threats / Risks Level per SGUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSED AREA	X	-	-
ANNEX “B”: Lessons Learned & Useful documents and manuals for GNSS interference	X	-	-

THE GEOPOLITICAL PROFILES & INTERNATIONAL SECURITY (G3is)



- **Geo-political / Geo-Strategic profile:** The current geopolitical environment is defined by unstable multipolarity, persistent indirect competition, and fragile crisis-management mechanisms, while major powers avoid direct confrontation, overlapping spheres of influence and regional hotspots sustaining continuous tension. The “Maritime Europe & the Maghreb” remains particularly unstable since the Arab Spring. It seems that Maghreb is not included in the Maritime Europe section in accordance with the new Geo-politic multi-polar concept, while in a wider frame, superpowers will continue to seek for total controlling of their poles/regions such as Russia in Ukraine and USA in the Gulf of Mexico (Venezuela and maybe Cuba). The world will be divided in Geopolitical poles, or will be formulated as depicted in the above maps (or not). Shipping lanes will change not only due to the new arctic cycle route but also due to the changes in influence zones. The potential occupation of Greenland by USA, which frequently is referred by Trump, has two objectives: The Geostrategic which is the control of Russia maritime force entering the “hot seas” to the South and the Geo-economic which is the widen of US coasts in the arctic, pursuing to have a wider Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) by becoming an Arctic Member State.
- **Geopolitical / Geo-economic Profile:** The global system is becoming more fragmented, with geopolitical tensions shaping trade, energy, and technology flows, leading to increased market volatility. Greece is emerging as a key hub for energy, logistics, and shipping, bolstered by stronger ties with the U.S. and its dominant shipping fleet. A conjunction of sanctions, rare earths provisions, markets demands, multi-modal transportation (sea, air, train, road), as well as war regions and tensions consequences, will create a multi-threat specific successive environment for each shipping lane between port calls, as the new era of logistic concept appears. The low tense Geo-economics race in the Arctic cycle so far, is getting to be denser as US hadn't showed great interest until Trump had been elected in Presidency. The big issue for Geo-economy far from Geo-strategy is the EEZs and the disputed areas especially in the Arctic cycle, as the Arctic zone provides not only oil and natural gas but also “rare earths” in accordance to several experts.



- **International Security / Strategic sector:** Even if the previous year ended without any change in relation with the conflicts characteristics, triggers and indicators, it is assessed that this year is coming with significant change in international security situation. The intervention in another country to capture its leader is a reality testing the tolerances of international security norms. Moreover, the norm is changing as super-powers provide new trend of international security implementation rules, while the reactions of states have been harmed or will be harmed from this change. This could create a new situation of what is today in accordance with international law. In addition, the escalation of attacking methods, the use of high-hybrid technology and the spread of the conflict among states in other areas than their sovereignty, appeared in several cases, and show the trend conflicts being transferred to other terrains, as SEA GUARDIAN had warned for through a series of Security Assessments. Transformation of Geo-policy into a multi-polarity concept leads to international security threats with multi-faced profile against normality, difficult to be assumed totally, so far. States and unions pursue to take their position in the new multi-polar international security concept, through its internal and external procedures and concepts.



- **Global Maritime Security profile:** This previous year saw increased attacks on shipping, highlighting the need for stronger security in 2026. Shipping companies more than in the past, need military support in some cases, ought to invest on private security not only at open sea but also in harbors, tighten the measures of hull inspections in areas where a sub-water threat exists, and be focused on cyber-defense and advanced monitoring systems in order to construct a multi-level security and safety capability. As key defense/guarding/protection tools are considered the digital risk management, operational intelligence, UAVs, and underwater robotics for inspections. There is more necessity for maritime industry to invest on the above tools for the aforementioned multi-level capability, than in the past.



THREAT ASSESSMENT UPDATE: **Military Operations**

Libya - Central Mediterranean

- The way of Libya towards to one state and one government seems to be full of obstacles. While this year elections seems to be unified for the whole country as well as for all governmental bodies, elections success is not assured. The announcement of new HSC (High Council of State) voted Salah Al-Kumayshi as head of the national High Electoral Commission (HCS) has not yet received admittance by the Eastern Libyan government yet, which shows a high uncertainty towards a stable united situation.
- Parallel financial markets and widespread unlicensed currency trading continue to undermine the Central Bank, fuel illicit financing, and exacerbate exchange-rate instability. These structural gaps leave Libya highly exposed to regional spillover effects and maritime security risks.
- Conditions for international companies trying to open business in Libya are not so fruitful so far, due to the governmental uncertainty but also because of internal financial instability, as even some banknotes in its market are under insufficient value.
- Libya on the international level continues to pursue cooperation with the foreign governments taking initiatives to provide conference for Yemen's groups to adapt each other under an official government.
- In Maritime/shipping sector while reports have raised the possibility of foreign involvement in maritime attacks, attribution remains inconclusive due to the opaque security environment.
- Overall, Libya continues to sit in a gray-zone risk category, with persistent threats to both security and economic stability.
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10](#) and [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" (NO SIGNIFICANT REPORT) - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "LOW".

Syria (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Syria suffers from internal clashes even if at the beginning of this situation, the interim government showed a prosperous path to stability. It seems that the differences of the past were there seeking good reason to re-emerge.
- Syria's path toward international recognition is advancing slowly, supported by limited diplomatic engagement and partial sanctions easing. However, unresolved internal divisions, continued militant threats, and competing regional agendas constrain progress. Ongoing foreign military operations reduce terrorist risks but also contribute to local instability.
- Even if the withdrawn of US sanctions against individual's credibility, such as Jolani and state's commercial activities, created a hope of the state getting fast to stability, the new attacks in the west and in Aleppo having officially as targets the ISIS and Kurdish's groups not included in HTS, respectively widen the gulf in the country. Amid the internal clashes USA executed tense airstrikes inside Syria during the previous 4 weeks against "Islamic state forces" with the hardest last week. This event has complicated more the roadmap to a successful state. This situation can influence the coastal cities and harbors in Mediterranean which are in uncertain security condition, restrains "port calls" and the transferring to normality.
- Syria interim government continues its efforts to eliminate the past as it issues new banknotes with the exclusion of previous president and his family's photos. But these actions while the country is in a mess possibly will make the clashes worst.
- Overall, Syria remains a fragile and partially failed state, with persistent security concerns—particularly in the south and around port areas. While regional spillover is currently contained, the situation sustains elevated security threats and the commercial activity warrants cautious, and a case-by-case execution of "port calls".
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.](#)
- Overall threat/risk level: "HIGH" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"

Lebanon (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Many experts support that the issue for Hezbollah disarmament in a frame of peace, is doomed to fail. On the other hand, Israel has this as high priority aim, while Lebanon trying to avoid Israel attacking targets inside its territory, which seems inevitable the most times.
- Lebanese government tries hard to persuade Netanyahu to delay any offensive measures and give space for dialogue, but it is uncertain if Israel will stop to continue striking.
- To sum up, localized tensions between Hezbollah and Israel, including airstrikes and disarmament efforts, pose risks near the coasts. The broader Mediterranean shipping is likely unaffected, but port calls and near-shore operations require caution and continuous monitoring.
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.](#)
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"

Gaza-Israel (Middle East issue in East Mediterranean region)

- Gaza is still really unstable while things just don't seem to be settling down at all. The military stuff from Israel keeps happening in these packed regions, which forces people to move into even tighter spots, feeling way riskier.
- Displacement has not stopped, especially around the big roads where it's hard to feel safe. Additionally, Hamas keeps showing up with threats like setting up rockets even after the ceasefire talks, so the whole security sector feels pretty unpredictable.
- Humanitarian conditions are bad, tensions are up, and no one knows when the fighting will end. Risks for anything near the sea-waters or close to shore are super high, and they probably will stay that way for the mid-term future.
- It is assessed that the situation will not change and the threat for maritime sector maintains the same as it had been in the previous year. Eastern coasts of the Mediterranean as well as "port calls" in the Israel-Gaza coast demand coordination well in advance with Israeli authorities.
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered per area as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/23, November 13.](#)
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

Sudan-Eritrea-Ethiopia

- The security situation in Sudan remains very unstable, maintaining heightened risks across both maritime and land-based operations. Shipping in the vicinity of Port Sudan continues to be subjected to high threat levels due to ongoing conflict, weak coastal security, and more general regional tensions. Accordingly, strict security measures, contingency planning, and continuous monitoring are required.
- Landward, violence has increased while RSF expands attacks along several state capitals and besieged areas in South Kordofan and Darfur. There have been reports that an unfolding health and humanitarian disaster has worsened in the besieged towns, as health services and basic items provisions reached growing difficulty. The increasing presence of allied groups testifies to the fragmentation of armed forces and the entrenching depth of conflict.
- To sum up, all factors put together, such as persistent fighting, deteriorating humanitarian conditions, and limited prospects for de-escalation, would most likely be set back as instability. Elevated risk levels will persist in the near term.
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" - GNSS interference: "NSR".

Red Sea - Yemen

- The Red Sea corridor remains relatively stable for maritime transit, despite the security environment in Yemen continuing to present localized risks that could rapidly escalate. Ongoing military activity and political fragmentation onshore underline the need for high readiness, cautious navigation, and continuous monitoring for vessels operating near Yemeni waters.
- Recent developments have signified deep instability among anti-Houthi elements, with Saudi-led airstrikes that have hit the ports and southern governorates and collapsed security arrangements between regional allies due to clashes between Saudi-backed government forces and UAE-backed separatists. While dialogue initiatives have been signaled, they remain fragile amid continued military pressure and shifting alliances.
- Overall, persistent armed activity, volatile political dynamics, and proximity of conflict zones to key maritime routes sustain an elevated risk environment, with potential indirect impacts on port operations and coastal approaches in the near term.
- Triggers and risks indicators remain unaltered as in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/15, July 10](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" - ICC/Piracy: "LOW" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM"

Northern Persian Gulf / Iran in post-war

- Maritime risk levels remain high amid Iran's assertive security posture and escalating. A high degree of risk persists in the use of the marine environment due to the aggressive posture of Iran's security sector as well as mounting tensions in the region. Instability from a collapsed economy has instigated large-scale protests in many areas with resulting casualties and intense reaction from the security sector.
- At the same time, increasing international pressure against the Tehran regime, such as strengthening sanctions involving drone-related activities, is contributing to a confused security environment. The simultaneous presence of internal unrest and international pressure increase the stakes for miscalculations or faulty response-oriented security actions, maintaining a high level of threat for seaborne operations.
- Uncertain situation during the previous months for the future of Iran has made a turn going worse. The US declaration that is ready for an intervention due to humanitarian reasons and the reaction of Khomeini blaming Western countries (including UK and France) for their involvement, could trigger a Jihad in case of an attack against Iran.
- It is assessed that even if there are not actually many incidents against maritime sectors, the threats and risks persist. Shipping companies navigating through this area have to take internal and external measures for safety and security of their crews, vessels and cargos.
- Triggers that could create escalation are: deployment of additional US military forces or equipment to the region, Iranian military exercises, escalation a internal security in Iran and the stalemate in UN-brokered peace talks on Yemen.
- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "HIGH" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Black Sea / NW part)

- Black Sea shipping remains highly exposed due to the increasing tempo of military operations between Russia and Ukraine, as well as a variety of hybrid threats. Continued international support for Ukraine by the EU and reports of civilian abductions highlight a protracted and escalating conflict, sustaining elevated security and humanitarian risks, especially now the negotiations for a cease fire are intensifying.
- European countries still do not show signs of direct military involvement in the war, while sanctions over any Russia treasure being in EU states, mainly in Belgium, are confronted by states non-consent. The year 2026 if the US-Ukraine-Russia negotiations will not achieve ceasefire and peace will become very hazardous. Ukraine has already expanded the area of war beyond its boundaries, launching attacks against the supposed Russian “shadow fleet” and sanctioned companies in the whole Black Sea as well as in the Mediterranean basin.
- The new “20-point peace proposal” being negotiated between Zelenskyy and Trump could alleviate the situation having four focal points and two pre-conditional terms: Ukraine’s NATO membership, territorial concessions, elections and demilitarized zones. Also, the announcement of Zelenskyy’s willingness to accept the creation of some kind of “free economic zone in Donbas” is correlated to the agreement, but all these have to be granted by a referendum. It seems that Trump’s main ambition to close the 2025 with one more “peace agreement” has been postponed for the future.
- On the other side Russia tries to protect its oil exports by positioning military personnel onboard Russian merchant vessels. It is assessed that the re-emergence of hitting in Ukrainian ports shows that Russia is not willing to close quickly a “peace agreement”. The recent Ukrainian strikes against tankers approaching Novorossiysk to load oil products from CPC show that the maritime security situations is worsening day by day.
- Vessels should maintain heightened awareness while sailing in the Black Sea, to adopt strict security measures, and have robust contingency planning.
- The triggers and indicators per area remain as in the [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30](#) and [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” - GNSS interference: “HIGH”

RUSSIA-UKRAINE war (Baltic Sea / NE part)

- The Baltic region remains a high-risk area due to increased NATO and Russia tensions, the threat of hybrid attacks, and irregular ‘shadow fleet’ operations; therefore, increased alertness and strategic route and contingency planning are a must.
- The activities of both NATO and Russia military information gathering operations in close proximity to the boundaries of the Russia and Belarus Union State, are unpredictable and pose threat of escalation, up to direct conflict.
- To sum up, even if the situation seems to be actually de-escalated, Baltic sea remains in uncertainty with hybrid and underwater threats being persisted, while the “shadow fleet” operates undivert.
- The triggers and indicators per area remain as in the [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30](#) and [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/19, September 16](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “HIGH” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” - GNSS interference: “HIGH”

Cyber-Threats / Risks assessment and mitigation by CyberPax (new section)

- In a modern, computerized command–control–communication environment, the first line of defense against electronic interference and cyber-attacks is not technology, but trained operators who recognize when “something is wrong”.
- Preventive measures should combine network segmentation, strict control of remote access, verified backups and tested fallback procedures with regular, scenario-based training on both IT and OT systems.
- When users are trained to detect abnormal system behavior, unexpected loss of functions or misleading messages – and know the immediate steps to take in the first minutes (isolation, reporting, switching to predefined manual or degraded modes) – many complex attacks can be contained before they evolve into full loss of control.
- Recent disruptions in major European capitals show that even the most advanced infrastructures remain vulnerable when connectivity grows faster than procedures and training.
- Risk snapshot (global trend – maritime-relevant):
Viruses: LOW – Ransomware: HIGH – Worms: MEDIUM – Trojans: HIGH – Spyware: HIGH – Adware: LOW



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Terrorism - piracy and also cargo theft, smuggling, stowaways

- Shipping faces elevated risks from cyber-attacks, terrorism, piracy, and politically motivated disruptions in a sense of terrorism. Vigilance, robust cyber defenses, and contingency planning are essential, with threats likely to fluctuate based on geopolitical and the developments of conflicts.
- Threats and risks has been analyzed in the previous year last assessment [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/26, December 29, 2025](#).
- To sum up, the tense of terrorism and organized smuggling under the domination of state actors will be escalated in this current year, not only in the areas are constantly monitored and analyzed but also in other areas around the globe.
- In areas where the possibility of military/paramilitary/terrorism attacks exist in combination with organized maritime crime, such as in the Gulf of Guinea, the situation is more complicated.

RISK ASSESSMENT

Gulf of Guinea

- Maritime and coastal security along the West African coast is considered high-risk because of political instability, coupled with criminal activity and militant threats. Vigilance, increased security measures, and monitoring of the ports and coastal waters are necessary to mitigate these risks.
- In Guinea, the junta head's consolidation of power after an election widely criticized for excluding opposition candidates, has fueled concerns about civilian governance and eventual political unrest. Meanwhile, deadly attacks by armed groups continue in northern Nigeria, while raids on villages have left scores killed and abducted in a rising up of the terror and paramilitary threats.
- SEA GUARDIAN has already warned shipping cluster for the rise of illegal actions on land, which could influence criminality at sea and transfer hijacking and detentions trend in the sea environment. Escalation of attacks in conjunction with attacks aiming to destroy ships need to be taken seriously by vessels' masters. The organized piracy is transforming to become an organized lethal piracy.
- In summary, political instability and violent insecurity present a dual challenge in the region, placing demands for coordinated monitoring and proactive risk mitigation strategies for both maritime and inland (harbor) operations.
- Indicators which altering the "risks levels" as in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/26, December 29, 2025](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "HIGH" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "HIGH" - ICC/Piracy: "MEDIUM" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "HIGH" - GNSS interference: "LOW"

East Mediterranean Sea

- Generally, the Eastern Mediterranean is stable; however, there are persistent localized risks near Lebanon, Syria, and Gaza. Vigilance and pre-emptive security measures remain key in these geopolitically uncertain times.
- SEA GUARDIAN consults shipping to take appropriate measures as the tensions rising up in Syria, making "port calls" after a detailed analysis for the risks to be mitigated appropriately in a case-by-case terms.
- Indicators which altering the "risks levels" as in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/22, November 12](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "LOW" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "NSR" - ICC/Piracy: "VERY LOW" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "LOW" - GNSS interference: "MEDIUM".

Suez Canal - Northern Red Sea

- Shipping lines are cautiously reassuming Suez Canal transits, reflecting moderate confidence in canal stability. While the canal itself presents relatively low risk, navigation through the Red Sea and calls at regional ports remain exposed to geopolitical tensions and potential security threats. Operators should maintain vigilance, implement targeted security measures, and conduct sectoral-specific risk assessments.
- The Suez Canal Economic Zone continues to demonstrate strong performance, with significant revenue growth and substantial project investments, reinforcing its strategic importance for the global trade. Major carriers are increasingly routing services through the canal and expanding port rotations, indicating operational confidence, though the regional maritime environment remains dynamically threatened and warrants ongoing monitoring.
- Thus, SEA GUARDIAN advises for proactive planning and continuous monitoring, actions that are essential to ensure safe operations in this complex environment.
- Indicators altering the "risks levels" as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: "LOW" // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: "LOW" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "LOW".

Bab-el-Mandeb Straits - Southern Red Sea

- Bab El Mandab is affected by three threats, the Somalian, the Houthis and the piracy threat which could be covered by the tense fishing activities in the straits until the end of March.
- Piracy off Somalia is increasingly sophisticated, with militants using modern tracking technology to extend their operational range. Combined with terrorism activity, this creates a high-risk environment both near the coast and offshore.
- Although Houthi attacks have eliminated, the overall maritime risk remains high, and vessels should maintain heightened vigilance and robust security measures.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “LOW” - ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” - GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Gulf of Aden – Somalia/Somaliland

- Maritime risks across the Arabian Sea, Gulf of Oman, Red Sea, and Horn of Africa remain elevated due to a combination of piracy, terrorism, regional tensions, and sophisticated threats. Iranian vessel detentions and GNSS interference add complexity to transits. Vessels should maintain heightened vigilance, implement robust security measures, and ensure continuous situational awareness throughout all operations.
- Political and strategic developments in the region add further uncertainty. The UAE’s intervention in Yemen, and the strengthened African Union–UAE cooperation, influence regional dynamics and may affect maritime access and security. Although international maritime forces provide a degree of deterrence in the region, the overall maritime risk remains significant, dynamic, and multi-faceted, requiring proactive risk management by the shipping companies.
- Somaliland recognition by Israel and the will have a naval footprint in order to secure the safe passage through the straits will affect in the long term the security situation.
- SEA GUARDIAN advises shipping that a proactive multi-layered risk management is essential to ensure safe operations in these turbulent waters.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “HIGH” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” - ICC/Piracy: “HIGH” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” - GNSS interference: “NSR”

Arabian Sea - Gulf of Oman

- The Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman are high-risk due to Iranian vessel detentions, Somali piracy, Houthi threats, and GNSS interference.
- This complex area is threatened on both sea sides by different kind of threats due to the long-distance capabilities of Somalian pirates, Houthi’s attacks and Iran’s domination on the area. The mediation role of Oman is recognized in several cases, i.e. Oman achieved to mediate for Houthis' hostages release and detained ships by Iran.
- The serious internal problems Iran is facing since late December 2025 will definitely affect the security situation of and the balance of powers in the region.
- Vessels should maintain heightened vigilance, strong security measures, and situational awareness while transiting the area even if the next “port of call” is eastward or westward.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” - GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

Hormuz Straits - Persian Gulf



- The Hormuz Strait and Southern Persian Gulf area is still a high-risk region because of the Iranian interference with vessels, military maneuvers, as well as GNSS interference. The Iranian government's reaffirmation of its authority and enforcement of its maritime laws have permitted vessel seizures, which would most likely continue in the future.
- It is recommended that ships exercise a high level of readiness, in addition to the use of conventional navigation methods in order to counter interference and mitigation of electronic navigational risks while the Iran poses unreadable threats and risks in several cases, against shipping.

- Internal turbulence in Iran that started last December with fierce demonstrations can spark a civil war between different ethnicities and social groups against the Mullah Regime that could change the Middle East dramatically.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/17, August 13](#)
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “HIGH” - GNSS interference: “LOW”.

Malacca Straits

- The maritime environment in Indonesia and the Southeast Asian region is prone to high risks because of factors such as security threats, environmental risks, cyber threats, as well as monsoon weather. Smugglers are known to be highly adept at adapting to maritime traffic patterns and weather changes, making them unpredictable. With new maritime activities being materialized, such as Singapore's methanol bunkering project, there are increased risks in terms of operations and regulations.
- It is advised for vessels need to be ever ready, secure, and compliant while also taking into consideration rough weather, high rainfall, and other risks presented by monsoons.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “MEDIUM” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “MEDIUM” - GNSS interference: “LOW”

Black Sea / East Part

- The South Caucasus and eastern Black Sea remain a high risk due to unrest in Georgia and vessels linked to the "shadow fleet." Tensions are increasing as Ukrainian attacks against vessels approaching Novorossiysk are happening quite often. It has to be considered that the Black Sea is constantly under threat as war between Russia and Ukraine will escalate the months to come.
- Ukrainian strike capabilities through the use of UAVs, SUVs and UUVs are increasing with the support of western countries, threatening all merchant vessels having contracts to carry Russian products in and out. It is estimated that the war could last quite longer if the US Administration will not achieve its objective to put pressure on Ukraine to sign an agreement with Russia.
- Shipping operators should maintain heightened vigilance, robust security measures, and continuous monitoring of regional developments.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as initially cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/18, August 27](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “NSR” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” - GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”

Baltic Sea / West part

- The Baltic Sea is still considered a high-risk maritime environment for reasons related to hybrid threats, insurgency pressures, shadow fleet activities and advanced GNSS disruption and spoofing. The area is strategically significant as it involves crossing NATO-controlled regions with Russia taking a tough stand amidst strong info and surveillance activities.
- Ships operating in the region owe to be on high alert in relation to security and alternative navigation systems as the threats and risks levels could be upgraded suddenly.
- It is advised that proactive risk management and continuous monitoring are essential to ensure safe and uninterrupted operations in this complex maritime environment.
- Indicators altering the “risks levels” as cited in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/20, September 30](#).
- Overall threat/risk level: “MEDIUM” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “MEDIUM” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” - GNSS interference: “MEDIUM”.

[illegible]

- Indicators that distort the “risk levels” as in [SEA GUARDIAN SECURITY ASSESSMENT 25/21, October 16.](#)
- Overall threat/risk level: “LOW” // Analyzed in: Military/Paramilitary/Terrorism: “LOW” - ICC/Piracy: “NSR” - Hijacking/Fired/Kidnapping: “LOW” - GNSS interference: “LOW”.

[illegible]

- Overall threat/risk level: "MEDIUM" // Analyzed in: Military / Paramilitary/ Terrorism: "MEDIUM" - ICC/Piracy: "NSR" - Hijacking/Fired/ Kidnapping: "MEDIUM" - GNSS interference: "LOW".

- Maritime operations face multiple types of threats that vary by region and nature:
 - Collateral risks from military conflicts (e.g., missile exchanges affecting ports and nearby waters).
 - Unprovoked military-type attacks on vessels, aiming at destruction or capture.
 - Organized piracy with hostage-taking or detentions, as in the Gulf of Guinea, Persian Gulf and Gulf of Aden.
 - Opportunistic piracy/theft, common in high-traffic areas like the Straits of Singapore.
 - Methodical piracy for ransom, targeting entire vessels without crew casualties like in Hormuz straits / Gulf of Oman and Gulf of Aden/Somalia(frequently)/Somaliland (rarer).

- ## OVERALL ASSESSMENT - CONSULTING

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- Amid the USA involvement in several different fronts around the Globe, there is a possibility of tensions to be expressed in other ways than the ordinary military activity. This means that International Commerce crimes will enhance needing more detailed and upgraded measures to be taken by the maritime industry itself.


- Assessment:

- Global shipping feels like its shifting into something new. Uncertainty hangs around a lot, operating risks are up, and there's this constant push for better security measures, staying on top of regulations, and handling risks ongoing. SEA GUARDIAN assesses that is the main picture, though parts of it might be messy to figure out.
- Overall, for trade to keep going reliably in 2026, maritime security and dealing with geopolitical uncertainty will matter a lot. Cyber resilience is assessed important too, for planning logistics.

Consultation:

- Even with all that uncertainty, companies in shipping need to focus on spreading out their routes so they are not stuck in one spot. They should keep a close eye on sanctions and compliance issues, and make sure contracts handle risks well. Investing in ships that use less fuel, better emission management, and their companies building up defenses against cyber threats are all essential.
- There is a strong need for ongoing info on geopolitical changes, in order to plan voyages that can adjust quickly, and work well ahead with insurers and regulators. It might be messy to pull off, but taking proactive actions could help keep operations steady and protect profits in such a risky setup. This part gets a bit complicated, like how to balance everything without overdoing it.

ANNEX "A" TO PERIODIC "SECURITY ASSESSMENT"



LATEST DATE OF INSERTING reports : Monday January 12, 2026

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RELATIVE TRAFFIC PERFORMANCE OF ROUTES BASED ON "CHECKPOINTS" (%)



Sea Guardian S.G. Ltd / Intel Department (www.sguardian.com / +30 6944373465) can support your operational planning, assist in determining the risk assessment and aid in decision making by producing taylor-made assessments upon request on ports in the region, on routes, on cargos and specific merchant vessels. You can refer to our previous Threat & Risk assessment analysis briefs for more information and background analysis on the events and situation for each specific region.

ANNEX "B" TO PERIODIC "SECURITY ASSESSMENT"

LESSONS LEARNED		
INCIDENTS	REACTIONS	TRANSFORMATION NOTICES
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The permanent contact with the shipping company hiring maritime security teams.	Developing independent international relations and operational apps for supporting crew recovery after a submerging.
The defensive actions against the attack on ETERNITY C	The Security management and team's high standards in decision-making processes in international environment respecting the ship's Captains' capacity.	Developing of training standards.
The attacks on July 2025 in RED SEA	The active contingency plans and bussiness impact analysis in case of discontinuation with the guarding of security teams (such an attack difficult to be faced by small arms).	Further implemantation of matitime/ISO standards.
The aftermaths analysis of the ETERNITY C submercion	The possible changing in Houthis attacking methods not only to destroy but also to attain ships under their internal coast guard rules for ransoms in the form of penalty fees to liberate it.	Specifying and bordering threats/risks analysis for depicting what needs military response.
Inbound in an area of high military/ paramilitary threats with all navigational aids and AIS closed	Opened all the navigational aids and AIS / communication systems on after having had attacked by ballistic or related missiles while visual targeting was available due to the lack of international naval forces.	Stabilize the closed navigational aids to prevent targeting with the necessity of giving informations through them to friendly entities.
The detailed analysis after a special interview of security crew assessing decision-made	A fundamental analyzed decision, involves choosing whether to abandon a sinking ship using a lifeboat for safety, or to escape directly into the sea with only life jackets, while under the threat of attacking boats searching for survivors.	Balance the threat of being targeted while in the sea whith the trheat environmental and geography conditions to survive.
The re-emergence of piracy in Gulf of Aden-Somalia	From the latest incidents in the area it was porven that the existence of Maritime security teams is paramount as well as the continue of military Maritime operations in the area is a necessity.	The overall security umbrella is achieved if: - A consistent/ coherent Security assessment has been done in advance - Military Maritime operations in the region are exist - The use of Security teams onboard for a widen area is available.

Usefull links for conflict indexes and picture of piracy attacks in:

- [ACLED](#) and [IMB/ICC for the war threat levels and International commerce crime incidents.](#)
- Companies under sanction by Ukraine (Black Sea): [Database Of Legal Entities Under Sanctions](#)
- <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Pt6GS7QohAI>, for an overall general assessment by the SEA GUARDIAN President presented at Naftemboriki TV (Shipping) for the latest period, covering the time-frame before and after the Houthis ballistic, drones and UCAV attacks.



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