Because of limitations imposed by coastal states and the unique shipping patterns in the Gulf of Guinea region, those shipoperators who desire to employ additional security measures for their vessels have turned to private maritime security companies (PMSCs) which have established operations in the area. These companies have established liaisons with the relevant Gulf of Guinea coastal states to arrange for security services provided by the Navy or Police.
These PMSCs either communicate directly with the relevant coastal state authorities to broker an arrangement for embarked security or employ the help of a local liaison to manage the interface between the ship-operator and the Navy or Police. While some nations, such as Benin and Togo, have established specific procedures for the embarkation of armed personnel or the provision of security services, the policies for other coastal states may not be as clear. Nigeria presents a more complicated case, as the country has an official policy that forbids the embarkation of any armed personnel on merchant vessels in territorial waters. However, operators and Flag States note that there is an unofficial system which still continues that facilitates the employment of armed guards from government agencies.
This ambiguity between official policy and actual practice has made it difficult for both operators and Flag States to ensure adequate security for vessels while remaining within legal boundaries. In some circumstances, foreign PMSCs may embark unarmed maritime security liaison officers (MSLO) to be the onboard security manager who facilitates communication between the bridge team and the coastal state navy or police personnel aboard the ship. However, the presence of MSLOs has not always been welcome or understood by coastal state authorities, and some of these advisors face arrest or deportation upon arrival in port.
MARINE SECURITY SERVICES Three types of maritime security services are offered by governmental authorities in the Gulf of Guinea region: 1. Escort vessel / Guard Ship with coastal state military or police team onboard which can protect commercial vessels or offshore installations in waters of the coastal state including in the EEZ. 2. Secure Anchorage Areas (SAAs) are anchorage areas protected by coastal state armed forces where vessels can wait and in some cases even conduct activities such as ship to ship transfers. 3. Coastal State military or police personnel can embark a vessel entering that coastal state’s waters or a particular anchorage or port, remain onboard to protect the vessel throughout all operations, and then disembark as the vessel departs the coastal state’s waters or the area of concern. This issue paper will focus on Number 3 — Coastal State Embarked Personnel. 3 | COASTAL STATE EMBARKED PERSONNEL oceansbeyondpiracy.org At times, this has also created confusion or friction in the chain of command structure, with the unarmed MSLO, as a civilian representative of a private security company, giving guidance that may influence the rules of engagement for the embarked armed military or police security team. Some have reportedly gone so far as to personally hold all ammunition and/or weapons of the government security team, issue direct orders to open fire, or muster to a citadel.
CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES
Status As mentioned above, serious ambiguities and challenges are present in this model. One major challenge is defining the status of the guards on client vessels under laws of the flag state, coastal state, international law, and commercial law—especially with regard to insurance claims. The guards are uniformed members of a coastal state’s armed forces or police, but are not necessarily members of the ship’s crew, passengers, or supernumeraries. At the time of writing there is no consensus as to the status of these guards and to the status of the vessel when such guards are embarked.1 Command Structure Also of concern is the command structure of these coastal state embarked personnel. Operating offshore, often with limited equipment such as proper communications equipment, these guards must make decisions alone on which course of action to take in response to an armed threat. Although some legal scholars, advisors, and standard commercial contracts suggest that the ship’s Master should maintain the ultimate authority aboard at all times, the division of responsibility can become blurred if uniformed military personnel on the vessel decide to take actions without the Master’s approval or directive, as has been the case in several incidents. With these soldiers and sailors accustomed to following a strict chain of command and having a clearly defined division of responsibility, their actions aboard private commercial vessels without their normal command and control structures present can be confusing2 , or worse— go awry, leading to hijacking, kidnapping3 , capture, or even death of crew via friendly fire.4 Adding further complications to this matter is if a civilian MSLO from a PMSC is present. MSLOs have at times acted as the de facto Team Leader or commander of the embarked security team. In such a scenario, the coastal state personnel may ask “who do we take commands from—the ship’s Master, the MSLO, or our command ashore?” often receiving no solid answer. This not only results in confusion, but can lead to communications breakdowns, insubordination, non-performance or abandonment of duties, and unnecessary violence at sea.
Source: OBP
